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In 2011, Joanne Fraill, a juror, was imprisoned for eight months because she chatted on 
Facebook with a co-accused from the trial that she participated in.
1
 Fraill’s case prompts 
questions about how social media affect courts, legal regulators and lawyers, as well as 
important legal principles. Those important legal principles are: (1) public confidence in the 
judiciary and the courts; (2) public confidence in the legal profession; (3) open justice; and 
(4) the right of an accused to a fair trial.  
 
This thesis offers an analysis and conclusions on those issues. It examines case law, 
legislation, academic articles and internet materials on social media.  
 
It is found that some Australian courts and legal regulators would benefit from doing more to 
adapt their procedures and rules to social media. The extent to which Australian courts and 
legal regulators adapt their procedures and rules to social media can have significant 
repercussions on the important legal principles considered. 
 
This thesis provides Australian courts, the judiciary, legal regulators and lawyers with 
information and recommendations about their social media use that may assist them. The 
author believes that this is the first scholarly work to consider the impact that social media 
has had upon all of these stakeholders, and the first scholarly work in this area to recommend 
appropriate actions to maintain or possibly increase confidence in the judiciary, the courts 
and the legal profession, improve open justice and ensure that accused receive fair trials, 
despite the possibility that jurors may use social media inappropriately.  
  
                                                             
1
 See Attorney General v Fraill [2011] EWHC 1629 (Admin) (16 June 2011) (Ouseley J) for more information 
about this case.  
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Ned Kelly was arguably the most famous outlaw in Australia.
1
 In 1880, he was tried for the 
murder of a police officer
2
 at the Central Criminal Court in Melbourne, Victoria.
3
 Sir 
Redmond Barry presided over the trial and the triers of fact were a sequestered jury.
4
 
Reporters from newspapers such as The Argus and The Age made handwritten notes at the 
trial;
5
 some submitted their stories to their editors by electric telegraph.
6
 Illustrators also 
attended the trial and drew images that were then made into wood engravings and printed by 
newspaper staff.
7




Now, fast forward approximately 130 years to another famous Australian trial. In 2012 Lloyd 
Rayney was on trial in Western Australia for his wife’s murder.
9
 Rayney was a prominent 
barrister.
10
 His wife had been a Registrar at the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
11
 Brian 
Martin, a former judge of the Northern Territory Supreme Court, presided over the trial; there 
was no jury, at Rayney’s request.
12
 Court staff created a room at the Perth District Court with 
a video link where journalists could use social media to instantly inform the public about 
what occurred.
13




 were highly interested in the case. 
                                                             
1 Bruce Tranter and Jed Donoghue, ‘Ned Kelly: Armoured Icon’ (2010) 46(2) Journal of Sociology 187, 189. 
2 ABC Radio National, ‘The Trial of Ned Kelly’, The Law Report, 8 August 2009 (Susanna Lobez)  
<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/the-trial-of-ned-kelly/3470596#transcript>. 
3 National Archives of Australia, The Trial of Ned Kelly (October 2007)  
<http://vrroom.naa.gov.au/records/?tab=about&ID=19379>. 
4
 ABC Radio National, above n 2.  
5 John H Phillips, The Trial of Ned Kelly (Lawbook, 1987) 90. 
6 ‘Trial of Kelly at Beechworth’, The Age (Melbourne), 9 August 1880. 
7 National Archives of Australia, The Trial of Ned Kelly (October 2007)  
<http://vrroom.naa.gov.au/records/?ID=19379>. 
8 Morgan Pettersson, ‘On this Day, Ned Kelly is Hanged’, Australian National Geographic (online), 7 November 
2012 
<http://www.australiangeographic.com.au/journal/on-this-day-ned-kelly-is-hanged.htm>. 
9 Western Australia v Rayney [No 3] [2012] WASC 404 (1 November 2012) [1].  
10 Ibid [4].  
11 Ibid [36].  
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 Rania Spooner, ‘Do We Want Court TV?’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 10 May 2013, [7]  
<http://www.smh.com.au/comment/do-we-want-court-tv-20130509-2jace.html>; Rebecca LeMay, ‘Intense 




Trials have changed dramatically during the period between Ned Kelly’s trial and Lloyd 
Rayney’s. Communication about court procedures and proceedings has also changed 
dramatically during this time. One important aspect of these changes is the creation of social 
media and their rapid penetration into everyday life. According to the Chief Justice of 
Western Australia, Wayne Martin, technology, including social media, has ‘had a profound 




This thesis will argue that Australian courts and legal regulators should modify their 
procedures and proceedings to begin adapting, or further adapt, to the presence of social 
media. Modifying such procedures and proceedings can have an impact on four important 
principles: (1) the public’s confidence in the courts and the judiciary; (2) the public’s 
confidence in the legal profession; (3) open justice; and (4) providing a fair trial to an 
accused.  
 
1.2 Background on Social Media 
 
Before going further, it is important to understand what social media are. In 1997, 
sixdegrees.com, one of the first social media sites, was created;
17
 however, the forms of 
social media that this thesis will consider in depth were created later.
18
 Social media have 
changed how people communicate,
19
 consisting of online communities that users can exploit 
to network, connect and correspond in different ways, including using words, photographs 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/national/intense-interest-in-lloyd-rayney-murder-trial/story-
fndo2j1f-1226425586874>. 
14 Rania Spooner and Courtney Trenwith, ‘The Rayney Trial: The Verdict Live’, The Mandurah Mail (online), 1 
November 2012  
<http://www.mandurahmail.com.au/story/523912/the-rayney-trial-the-verdict-live/>. 
15 Rebecca LeMay, ‘Intense Interest in Lloyd Rayney Murder Trial’, The Telegraph (Online), 13 July 2012, [1] 
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/national/intense-interest-in-lloyd-rayney-murder-trial/story-
fndo2j1f-1226425586874>. 
16 Wayne Martin CJ, ‘Managing Change in the Justice System’ (Speech delivered at the 18th Australasian 
Institute of Judicial Administration Oration, Brisbane, 14 September 2012) 4.  
17 Ruizhi Gao, Social Network, Something Interesting, 5  
<theory.utdallas.edu/seminar/G2S13/RG/Social-Network-Presentation.pptx>.  
18
 For example, the social medium Facebook was created in 2004; see Sarah Phillips, ‘A Brief History of 
Facebook’, The Guardian (online), 25 July 2007 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia>. 
19
 Pamela D Schultz, ‘Trial by Tweet? Social Media Innovation or Degradation? The Future and Challenge of 





 People can use social media to create profiles, usually with photos and 
biographical information, and to communicate with other users.
21
 Social media are easy
22
 for 
almost anyone to use
23
 and are highly interactive,
24
 allowing people to exchange knowledge 
and ideas easily and quickly.
25
 People can respond to comments made on social media by 




Social media are different from usual media in three particular ways.
27
 First, each social 
media user can create content for his or herself, as opposed to traditional media, in which one 
can receive but does not create content. Next, each social media user can quickly share his or 
her content. Finally, social media users can control the privacy settings that govern their 





Social media are a type of web 2.0 technology. This means that people can use social media 
without needing to know how to design a website or have online publishing skills.
29
 Web 2.0 
sites make sharing information easy for an average user; in comparison, web 1.0 sites are 





                                                             
20 Kathleen Elliott Vinson, ‘The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just “Face” It’ (2010) 
41(2) University of Memphis Law Review 355, 357. 
21 Audrie Garrison, Tweeting from the Courtroom: The State of Social Media Reporting in Judicial Proceedings 
and How the Debate on Cameras Helped Shape It (MA (Journalism) Thesis, Indiana University, 2011) 4. 
22 Jane Johnston et al, Juries and Social Media (2013) Victorian Department of Justice, 2 
<http://www.sclj.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/sclj/documents/pdf/juries%20and%20social%20media%20-%20final 
.pdf>. 
23 Jonathan Barrett, ‘Open Justice or Open Season? Developments in Judicial Engagement with New Media’ 
(2011) 11 Queensland University of Technology Law & Justice Journal 1, 13. 
24 Karen Salaz, Thomas Hodson and Chris J Davey, New Media and the Courts: The Current Status and a Look at 
the Future (26 August 2010) Social Science Research Network, 19 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666332>. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Jacob E Dean, ‘To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Twitter, “Broadcasting,” and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
53’ (2010) 79(2) University of Cincinnati Law Review 769, 769. 
27 Hope A Comisky and William M Taylor, ‘Don’t Be a Twit: Avoiding the Ethical Pitfalls Facing Lawyers Utilizing 
Social Media in Three Important Arenas — Discovery, Communications with Judges and Jurors, and Marketing’ 
(2011) 20(2) Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 297, 298. 
28
 Johnston et al, above n 22, 3. 
29
 University of Melbourne, Wikis, Blogs and Web 2.0 Technology [1] 
<http://www.unimelb.edu.au/copyright/information/guides/wikisblogsweb2blue.pdf>; Yvette Ostolaza and 
Ricardo Pellafone, ‘Applying Model Rule 4.2 to Web 2.0: The Problem of Social Networking Sites’ (2010) 11(1) 
Journal of High Technology Law 56, 58.  
30 Tech Ease, What Is Web 2.0? [1] <http://etc.usf.edu/techease/win/internet/what-is-web-2-0/>. 
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There are several different forms of social media.
31
 The most popular today are Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn and MySpace.
32
 Eight hundred and twenty-nine million people used 
Facebook daily in June 2014,
33
 there are currently about 500 million tweets daily,
34
 and 
LinkedIn currently has over 313 million members.
35
 In December 2012, it was estimated that 
11.8 million Australians regularly used Facebook, 2.1 million Australians regularly used 
Twitter and 2.1 million Australians regularly used LinkedIn.
36
 More than 60 per cent of 
Australians use any form of social media.
37







Twitter was created in 2006.
40
 People using Twitter can write short remarks, called tweets, 
which anyone on the internet can see.
41
 Tweets must be 140 characters or less.
42
 Users can 
‘follow’ people’s tweets: this means that the tweets of the person whom one follows appear 
on one’s homepage.
43
 A person who tweets is called a tweeter;
44
 tweeters can also use Twitter 




                                                             
31 Anne Wallace et al, ‘Courts and Social Media: Opportunities and Challenges’ (2013) 40(7) Brief 36, 37. 
32 Brian Hull, ‘Why Can’t We Be “Friends”? A Call for a Less Stringent Policy for Judges Using Online Social 
Networking’ (2012) 66(2) Hastings Law Journal 595, 599.  
33 Facebook, Our Mission (2014) <https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/>. 
34
 Twitter, How Twitter Can Help Your Business (2014) <https://business.twitter.com/how-twitter-can-help-
your-business>. 
35 LinkedIn, About LinkedIn (2014) <http://press.linkedin.com/about>. 
36 Lorana Bartels and Jessica Lee, ‘Jurors Using Social Media in our Courts: Challenges and Responses’ (2013) 
23(1) Journal of Judicial Administration 35, 40.  
37 Patrick Keyzer et al, ‘The Courts and Social Media: What Do Judges and Court Workers Think?’ (2013) 25(6) 
Judicial Officers’ Bulletin 47, 51.  
38
 James Podgers, ‘Legal Ethicists Are Playing Catch-Up to Create Social Media Guidelines for Lawyers, Judges’ 
(10 August 2013) ABA Journal, 1  
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legal_ethicists_are_playing_catch-up_to_create_social_media_ 
guidelines_for_/>.  
39 Flickr, <http://www.flickr.com/>. 
40 Jane Douglas, ‘All of a Twitter?’ (2012) 26 Online Currents 305, 305.  
41 Grant Amey, ‘Student Commentary: Social Media and the Legal System: Analyzing Various Responses to 
Using Technology from the Jury Box’ (2010) 35(1) Journal of the Legal Profession 111.  
42 Dean, above n 26, 769. Note that there has been talk of increasing Twitter’s 140-character limit recently, 
see: Rebecca Hyam and Alicia Barry, ‘IPO may force Twitter to drop character limit: Analyst’, ABC News 
(online), 4 October 2013. 
43
 Twitter Inc., Facts About Following (2013) at [1]  
<https://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-faqs-about-following>. 
44
 Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of Tweeter in English 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/tweeter>. 
45
 J Paul Zimmerman, ‘A Practical Guide to the Development of Jury Charges Regarding Social Media’ (2013) 
36(3) American Journal of Trial Advocacy 641, 644. 
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People who use Facebook can construct a profile page, share information and photos and 
comment on each other’s profiles.
46
 Facebook was created in 2004,
47
 and allows people to 
instantly chat with friends and share photos and videos.
48
 Facebook has a ‘news feed’ that 
becomes part of the homepages of the people who use it, containing the latest information 
that other Facebook users have posted.
49





LinkedIn, created in 2002
51
, is ‘the modern-day equivalent of a business card’.
52
 It is a social 
medium that allows users to make a profile that resembles a CV.
53
 Users can network with 
other business professionals on LinkedIn.
54
 YouTube is a social medium that allows users to 
create a ‘channel’.
55
 Users can post videos on their channels for people to watch.
56
 YouTube 




There are social media that are specifically for lawyers, such as lawyrs.net, in which lawyers 
can create profiles and join groups.
58
 Lawlink.com allows people to network, share 
documents and chat on a forum.
59





                                                             
46 Grant Amey, ‘Student Commentary: Social Media and the Legal System: Analyzing Various Responses to 
Using Technology from the Jury Box’ (2010) 35(1) Journal of the Legal Profession 111, 111. 
47
 Phillips, above n 18. 
48 Brian Fitzgerald, Cheryl Foong and Megan Tucker, ‘Web 2.0, Social Networking and the Courts’ (2011) 35(3) 
Australian Bar Review 281. 
49 Andy Taylor, ‘Friending and Following: Applying the Rules of Professional Conduct to Social Media’ (2012) 
34(3) University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 551, 555–556. 
50 Zimmerman, above n 45, 644.  
51 Andrew Warner, Interview with Konstantin Guericke (29 October 2010) [6] <http://mixergy.com/konstantin-
guericke-linkedin-interview/>. 
52 Kate Jones, ‘Is LinkedIn a waste of time?’, The Age (online), 6 September 2013, [1] 
<http://www.theage.com.au/small-business/managing/is-linkedin-a-waste-of-time-20130906-2t8y5.html>. 
53 Linkedin, What is Linkedin? <http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=what_is_linkedin>. 
54 Amber Mac, ‘On its 10th Birthday, What is Linkedin?’, Fast Company (online), 10 May 2013, [7] 
<http://www.fastcompany.com/3009537/dialed/on-it is-10th-birthday-what-is-linkedin>. 
55 Chris McLeod and James Neil, ‘Transferring Social Media Accounts: Legal and Practical Problems’ (2013) 
16(3) Internet Law Bulletin 63, 64. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Wikipedia, YouTube, [1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube>. 
58 Steve Mark, ‘New Technologies — Social Networking Sites’ (February 2011) Without Prejudice: The Office of 
the Legal Services Commissioner, [3] 
<http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/wp_issue53_feb11.pdf>. 
59
 Ibid.  
60
 Chatterbuzz Media, ‘Changes and Trends in Social Media in 2013 — It's Evolving Every Day!’ on Moz, Youmoz 




This thesis will primarily consider the social media Facebook and Twitter, to the exclusion of 
others. The reason for choosing these two social media is because they were both created 
approximately 10 years ago. As a result, they have existed for sufficient time for examples to 
arise of their use by courts, lawyers and jurors. These social media are also among the most 
popular;
61
 it would follow, then, that more people would understand how to use them. The 
readers of this thesis may better understand the arguments that this thesis makes because they 
understand the social media under discussion.  
 
Given the relative longevity of these networks and their widespread use in many sectors of 
society, the author feels that she can more easily hypothesise about their impact upon the 
legal system than other social media. The research for this thesis commenced in November 
2011; at this time some of the social media networks that are more popular today were still 
new, or were yet to be created. For example, the social media site Google+ was created in 
2011.
62
 The author preferred not to examine social media that were only a few months old. 
Not only was hard evidence of their impact relatively rare, but the possibility existed that 
such emerging platforms might prove ephemeral, or sufficiently unstable as to require 
significant alterations that would change the way in which they might affect the issues under 
discussion. 
 
As previously stated, this thesis will consider social media in the context of the courts and 
these important legal principles: (1) the public having confidence in the judiciary and the 
courts; (2) the public having confidence in the legal profession; (3) open justice; and (4) 
providing an accused with a fair trial. These principles will be examined to the extent that 
they are relevant to social media. An exhaustive examination of them will not be provided. 
 
1.3 The Impact of Social Media on Public Confidence in the Courts and the Judiciary 
 
                                                             
61




62 Google, Our History in Depth <http://www.google.com.au/about/company/history/>. 
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Chapter Two of this thesis discusses how social media can affect the public’s confidence in 
the judiciary and the courts.
63
 Australian courts depend on public confidence in the judiciary 
for their authority.
64
 This means that when the public is confident in the judiciary, they are 
more likely to accept and comply with the decisions of judicial officers.
65
 When court 
officials educate and engage the public, it is more likely that the public will have confidence 
in the courts and the judiciary.
66
 A 2007 study by Kathy Mack and Sharon Roach Anleu from 
Flinders University found that 46.1 per cent of the 4569 people whom they surveyed had low 
confidence in the courts and the judiciary, and 22.2 per cent of the people surveyed had no 
confidence in the judiciary at all. Mack and Anleu note that the people surveyed may not 
have had personal experience of the courts. They further note that it is important that the 
court staff actively tries to improve the public’s confidence in the courts and the judiciary.
67
 
Judges’ work becomes more difficult if the public lacks confidence in the judiciary and the 
courts.
68
 If the public believe that judicial officers are fair and impartial, this increases their 
confidence in the judiciary.
69
 In 1998 Professor Stephen Parker of Griffith University 
released a report entitled ‘Courts and the Public’, discussing Australians’ confidence in the 
judiciary. Parker’s report stated that Australians have ‘a perception that some courts are 
organised largely for the benefit of judicial officers’. It also stated that Australians who 




1.4 The Impact of Social Media on Public Confidence in the Legal Profession 
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64
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Chapter Three of this thesis discusses the ways in which social media can affect the public’s 
confidence in the legal profession. It is extremely important that the public has confidence in 
the legal profession
71
 because of the role that lawyers play in the administration of justice.
72
 
If the public do not have confidence in the legal profession, then it is difficult for the legal 
profession to function;
73
 they may choose not to use lawyers when they are involved with the 
courts, making it difficult for the public to navigate the court system, particularly higher 
courts. The public must also be confident in the ability of the system to discipline lawyers 
when necessary, such as in cases of negligence or misconduct.
74
 It is in the public’s interest 
that it has confidence in the legal profession.
75
 This confidence is secured when only lawyers 
who are ‘fit and proper’ are in practice.
76
 The public expect lawyers to have high ethical 
standards.
77
 Maintaining these ethical standards will ensure that lawyers continue to be 
engaged by members of the public, as well as supporting other important principles discussed 
in this thesis, such as ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial. 
 
1.5 The Impact of Social Media on Providing a Fair Trial for the Accused 
 
Chapter Six of this thesis discusses the way in which social media can affect the fairness of a 
trial for an accused. Providing an accused with a fair trial is an important principle in 
Australian law;
78
 many practices and rules exist to protect this principle.
79
 No person can be 
convicted of a crime unless they have received a fair trial.
80
 A fair trial is best described by a 
series of ‘general propositions’ and examples from past cases.
81
 For example, one of the 
general propositions is that if an accused is charged with a serious criminal offence and does 
not have a lawyer, this could result in an unfair trial.
82
 An unfair trial may occur if the 
prosecution deliberately does not provide important evidence to an accused that the accused 
                                                             
71 Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Figwer [2013] SASC 135 (23 August 2013) [13]. 
72 Legal Services Commissioner v Nguyen [2013] VSC 443 (23 August 2013) [25]. 
73 Law Society (SA) v McKerlie [2008] SASC 222 (12 August 2008) [22] (Gray J). 
74 Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Condon [2004] SASC 346 (3 November 2004) [18] (Gray J). 
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76 Legal Services Commissioner v Rushford [2012] VSC 632 (20 December 2012) [16]. 
77 Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Clisby [2012] SASCFC 43 (1 May 2012) [6]. 
78 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326, quoted in Roxanne Burd and Jacqueline Horan, ‘Protecting 
the Right to a Fair Trial in the 21
st
 Century — Has Trial by Jury Been Caught in the World Wide Web?’ (2012) 
36(2) Criminal Law Journal 103, 103–104. 
79
 Bartels and Lee, above n 36, 38. 
80
 Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23, 25.  
81
 Ibid 57.  
82 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 311.   
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requires to prepare a defence.
83
 An unfair amount of media attention on an accused can 




One aspect of providing a fair trial to an accused is that verdicts by jurors must be based on 
the evidence and argument that they saw in court, during the trial.
85
 At trial, the judge and 
lawyers can ensure that the rules of evidence are applied to all evidence tendered.
86
 Jurors 
must also be ‘indifferent’ to the trial before them.
87
 During a trial, jurors should communicate 
about a case only with each other, and only after the evidence and law in a trial are finished.
88
 
They should not communicate with any third party about the trial in which they are to give a 
verdict,
89
 in case the third party might affect the juror’s decisions.
90
 This type of juror 




1.6 A Brief Explanation of the Open Justice Principle 
 
Chapter Five of this thesis examines how social media can help to realise the open justice 
principle, an important part of the Australian justice system.
92
 Open justice ‘was derived from 
observation of the actual practice of dispute resolution over long periods of time’
93
 and has 
been embraced in England ‘from time immemorial’.
94
 Open justice is now considered ‘one of 
the most fundamental aspects of the system of justice in Australia’.
95
 The open justice 
principle requires the public and the media to be able to watch most court proceedings in the 
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87 Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 722 (1961).  
88 United States v Cox, 324 F 3d 77, 86 (2nd Cir, 2003).  
89 Washington v Depas, 165 Wn 2d 842, 18 (Wash, 2009).  
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92 Burd and Horan, above n 78, 104. 
93
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 Accordingly, Australian State and Federal Court officials currently allow the 




One reason for open justice is that it helps ‘to inform the public about the workings of the 
third arm of government and to ensure that courts and judges administer the justice system in 
a way that will maintain and foster its integrity, fairness and efficiency’.
98
 Open justice keeps 
the judiciary accountable.
99
 The principle reassures the public that judicial officers administer 
trials fairly and without prejudice.
100
 It also discourages witnesses from committing perjury 
and allows the public to ‘judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right’.
101
 It 
is also important for the public to see that people who are charged with an offence go on to 
face a judicial officer.
102
 In this way, open justice may be considered ‘therapeutic’, partially 




As a result of the open justice principle, journalists may attend court proceedings.
104
 Their 
attendance and reports are critical to the maintenance of open justice, because the public 
cannot attend court on a daily basis to see what occurs themselves. 
105
 An extension of the 




According to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, open 
justice is also crucial to the rule of law.
107
 She stated that the rule of law ‘cannot exist without 
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open justice and deep public confidence in the judiciary and the administration of justice. 
And the media is essential to building and maintaining that public confidence’
108
 because it 
informs people of the logic and principles that judicial officers use in their decisions.
109
 




1.7 Aims and Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis argues that the courts and legal regulators should change their policies and 
procedures regarding social media because they have not taken sufficient action to date.  
 
Chapter Two examines the topic of judges using social media privately and how this can 
affect the public’s confidence in the courts and the judiciary. It considers three specific 
issues: (1) whether judges should be discouraged from using social media privately; (2) 
whether they should be prevented from being ‘friends’ with lawyers who may appear before 
them; and (3) judges participating in ex parte communication about cases before them. It is 
argued that ethical guidelines for judges should be modified to include conduct on social 
media, and that this will help maintain public confidence in the judiciary.  
 
Chapter Three discusses the challenges that result from lawyers using social media. If 
lawyers face ethical challenges when they use social media, this can lower public confidence 
in the courts and in the legal profession. It is crucial that lawyers act ethically to maintain this 
public confidence in the courts
111
 and in the legal profession.
112
 The chapter examines three 
ethical issues that lawyers may face if they use social media: (1) unintended or faulty 
retainers, (2) challenges involving their duty to the court, and (3) their duty of confidentiality. 
It also argues that ethical guidelines involving social media should be created for lawyers for 
the same reasons that they should be for judges. Appendix A of this thesis suggests sample 
guidelines.  
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110
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Chapter Four discusses the results of a survey conducted by the author of the social media use 
of court staff in various jurisdictions.
113
 Between May and July 2013, the author emailed the 
survey to 23 courts in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 
stating that the author emailed a survey to 23 different staff at different courts, she did not 
include the emails that she sent to staff who worked at the same courts as the 23.
114
 The 
following table shows the courts contacted and which of them did and did not complete the 
survey.  
 
Table 1. Courts Contacted by the Author 
Courts that Completed the Survey Courts that Did not Complete the Survey 
In Australia 
Family Court of Australia High Court of Australia 
Federal Court of Australia Queensland Courts 
New South Wales Supreme Court Tasmanian Courts 
Northern Territory Supreme Court  
South Australia Courts  
Victoria Children’s Court  
Victoria Magistrates’ Court  
Victoria Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court of Western Australia  
Outside of Australia 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Federal Court of Canada 
British Columbia Court of Appeal Prince Edward Island Courts  
Nova Scotia Courts Quebec Courts 
Saskatchewan Courts Winnipeg Law Courts  
Massachusetts Court System  
United Kingdom (a member of Her Majesty’s 
Courts and Tribunals Service Performance 
Analysis, Reporting Team) 
 
 
The survey was designed to ask court staff about whether they used social media to engage 
the public, and their reasons for their chosen practice. The author hoped to obtain examples 
                                                             
113
 The author believes that this research is the first of its kind in Australia. 
114
 For example, if the author sent an email to a staff member at Court X, but the staff member told her to 
email another staff member at Court X, only one of the two staff members would be included in the total 
count of respondents. This occurred twice. 
22 
 
of courts using social media to engage the public and the benefits gained from doing so. She 
also sought examples of reasons why courts do not use social media in order to consider them 
and analyse whether these reasons could potentially be overcome. It was not part of the aims 
of the survey to: (1) submit it to a significant sample size; (2) use a methodology informed by 
social science research; or (3) analyse it using complex statistics. Chapter Four considers the 
information that court staff could post on social media, which types of social media court 
staff could use and which court staff could use social media. Appendix B of this thesis 
contains the social media URLs for the courts that participated in the survey. Appendix C 
contains the participant consent information and the questions used. Appendix D contains an 
information letter addressed to the survey participants that accompanied the survey’s 
questions. Appendix E contains the questions that the survey asked with the answers that the 
participants provided.  
 
The author chose to send a survey to the Massachusetts Court System because she hoped to 
present her findings at Harvard University, Massachusetts at some point in the future. She felt 
that this information would be relevant to a Harvard University audience. The author did 
present her findings at Harvard University in January 2014. Chapter Four concludes that 
courts should embrace social media as a method of self-promotion and engaging the public. 
The examples from the survey show that some courts are using social media successfully as a 
method of self-promotion.  
 
Chapter Five of this thesis examines whether journalists should be allowed to use social 
media in the courtroom, in accordance with the open justice principle. It considers the 
positive and negative aspects of journalists using social media in the courtroom. It is 
concluded that journalists should be able to use social media in the courtroom as a result of 
the open justice principle. Appendix F to this thesis contains a model policy drafted for court 
staff to use in relation to journalists using social media in the courtroom.  
 
Chapter Six examines jurors who use social media inappropriately in relation to providing an 
accused with a fair trial, and considers the question of how to prevent jurors from using social 
media inappropriately. An example of a juror using social media inappropriately would be if 
he or she wrote something specific about the trial in which he or she was participating. For 
example, it would be inappropriate if a juror wrote on their Facebook wall, ‘When I saw the 
bloody gun in court today, I did not think that the accused would have been able to figure out 
23 
 
how to use it.’ Another example of inappropriate use would be if a juror asked other social 
media users for their opinion about the relevant trial. By contrast, a juror who complained on 
social media about the quality of the coffee available to jurors at court would not be 
considered inappropriate; while it would be preferable that jurors do not comment about the 
court whatsoever on social media, the coffee example just given would not have an impact on 
providing an accused with a fair trial. Chapter Six also discusses how to assist court staff in 
determining whether jurors have used social media inappropriately and the consequences to 
the juror and to the trial when this has occurred. It is argued that the court should take more 
action regarding inappropriate social media use by jurors. Possible strategies could include 
hanging posters that warn against inappropriate social media use in the area where the jury 
deliberates. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the issues in this thesis that affect the majority of the relevant 
stakeholders (e.g. the judiciary, lawyers, jurors) and it states the main findings of this thesis. 
It states the main recommendations that this thesis makes and it makes suggestions for future 
research in the area of social media and the courts. It also makes some concluding remarks.  
 
This thesis is grounded in the discipline of law with a view to law reform.
115
 It aims to 
address an existing gap in that there is little to no academic research that applies the 
following legal concepts to social media: (1) confidence in the courts and the judiciary; (2) 
confidence in the legal profession; (3) open justice; and (4) providing a fair trial to an 
accused. It aims to provide a systematic policy framework that responds to the recent 
significant phenomenon of social media in the legal context. It is intended that this thesis will 
provide a comprehensive foundation in this area for future researchers. The research 
questions in this thesis are the following: 
 
a. How has social media caused challenges in the areas of: (1) confidence in the courts 
and the judiciary; (2) confidence in the legal profession; (3) open justice; and (4) 
providing a fair trial to an accused? 
b. How might social media cause challenges in these areas in the future?  
c. What law reforms could be helpful in addressing these challenges? 
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d. Are new ethical guidelines or modified ethical guidelines on social media use 
necessary for the judiciary and lawyers? 
e. How might courts benefit if they could use social media for promotion and if they 
permit journalists to use social media in the courtroom?  
f. How can the courts try to lessen the chances that jurors will use social media 
inappropriately? 
 
This thesis will reference the experiences of other jurisdictions (Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) in relation to some matters to help shed light on the Australian 
experience. This is especially because: (1) more incidents of inappropriate social media use in 
the legal context have occurred in some jurisdictions other than in Australia; (2) Australian 
courts have been slower to make modifications to their processes, etc. due to social media 
than some of the other jurisdictions; and (3) social media is so new that in some research 
areas there is simply no Australian scholarly material available, so the material and 
experience of other jurisdictions is valuable. This thesis does not attempt to engage in 
comparative law analysis. This thesis primarily focuses on the challenges that social media 
can create, and only looks at the benefits that it can provide comprehensively in the areas of 
journalists using social media in the courtroom. Because the research area of social media 
and the courts is still so new, the author indulges in conjecture at certain points to share new 
ideas about potential directions for the field. 
 
This thesis does not cover the following topics: using social media material as evidence in 
trials, and the effect that pre-trial publicity on social media can have upon jurors. The thesis 
leaves these areas to other researchers in order to focus more closely on the scope thus far 
described. While this thesis does address some ethical aspects of social media use, using 
social media as evidence in trials is more of an evidentiary issue than an ethical one.  
 
This thesis uses research published online in books and journals. The author draws upon her 
experience as a lawyer in Australia in the areas of civil litigation and criminal and family law 
and her experience as a freelance journalist in Toronto, Canada. She has presented parts of 
her thesis to judicial officers and court staff at the Federal Court in Sydney, the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ottawa, the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia in Perth and the State Administrative Tribunal in Perth. She has also 
presented parts of her thesis to staff and students at Harvard University in Cambridge, 
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Massachusetts. Some of the chapters of this thesis have been amended and published in peer 
reviewed and non-peer reviewed publications.
116
 Court staff, academics and the editors of law 
journals have provided the author with encouraging feedback that has confirmed her belief 
that her research is necessary and will be valued. The research included in this thesis is dated 
up to 31 December 2013;
117







Australian researchers are starting to consider social media’s impact on the courts. For 
example, academics from five Australian universities were part of a national taskforce who 
advised Australia’s Standing Council on Law and Justice on how social media can affect 
juries.
119
 They released an options paper for the Commonwealth Attorney General.
120
 The 
Government’s support for research in this area is evidence that the topics discussed in this 
thesis are of significant legal relevance.  
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 The peer-reviewed publications are: Marilyn Krawitz, ‘Can Australian Judges Keep their ‘Friends’ Close and 
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In a 2012 speech at Carleton University in Ontario, Canada, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, asked the following questions: ‘[s]hould judges 
“tweet”? Should they be on Facebook?’
1
 She did not answer her own questions. It is not 
surprising that the Chief Justice neglected to answer these questions, because there are as yet 
no adequate guidelines for Canadian, Australian and British judges about social media use.  
 
Many Australian judges already have public presences on social media: the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Victoria, Marilyn Warren, blogs for the Herald Sun newspaper in 
Victoria;
2
 Judge Judith Gibson of the New South Wales District Court uses social media;
3
 the 
Deputy Chief Magistrate of Tasmania, Michael Daly, uses Facebook;
4
 some Australian 
Registrars have accounts on LinkedIn.
5
 A large proportion of Australians in general use 
social media,
6
 and thus it is likely that many Australian judges use social media as well. The 
situation is similar for American judges. A 2012 survey of 623 American judges from state 
courts about their use of social media revealed that 46.1 per cent of the judges surveyed used 
social media.
7
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 Brian Fitzgerald, Cheryl Foong and Megan Tucker, ‘Web 2.0, Social Networking and the Courts’ (2011) 35(3) 
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The topic of social media has become one ‘of particular interest to judges because of the 
public nature of the activities and the multitude of topics on which comments may be posted 
and viewed’.
9
 American academics and State ethical advisory groups have given judicial 
social media use considerable attention. Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature 
Society Center for Judicial Ethics, states that, ‘[a]lthough social networks are a relatively new 
phenomenon, some judges have already begun to display a lack of judgment usually 
associated with teenagers.’
10
 Later, this chapter provides some examples of judges who have 
displayed a lack of judgment in regard to social media use. Despite these examples, John Z 
Vertes J of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories in Canada
11
 believes that there 




The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the issues surrounding Australian judges’ 
use of social media. As mentioned, it is crucial that judges uphold high standards of 
behaviour so that Australians ‘have confidence in [the] judiciary’.
13
 This standard should also 
apply to social media use. If judges use social media inappropriately, they risk lowering the 
public’s confidence in the judiciary.  
 
This chapter gives a brief history of regulating judges’ behaviour. It then outlines the 
problems that can occur when judges use social media and briefly discusses the guidelines (or 
lack thereof) available to judges in Australia, Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom on this subject to date. The following specific issues are considered: (1) whether 
Australian judges should be prevented from using social media, (2) whether Australian 
judges should be discouraged from becoming friends on social media with lawyers who may 
appear before them, and (3) ex parte communication on social media. In particular, it 
discusses whether written guidelines on social media use are necessary for Australian judges, 
examining these issues in light of whether existing case law and ethical guidelines in 
Australia assist judges with social media concerns. Ultimately, it is argued that social media 
present outlets for communication that may not occur in any other context, so guidelines for 
judges about how to use them are necessary in order to maintain the public’s confidence in 
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the judiciary. The use of social media by judges as educational tools is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
 
In order to understand this chapter, a brief explanation of the word ‘recuse’ is necessary. 




2.2 A Brief History of Regulating Judicial Behaviour 
 
If people contact judges on social media or make general comments it calls into question the 
impartiality of the judiciary. There are rules governing this behaviour that put pressure on 
judges. Section 72 of the Australian Constitution states that federal judges would ‘not be 
removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the 
Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved 
misbehaviour and incapacity.’
15
 This protects judges from people trying to put pressure on 
them to make a specific decision. 
 
2.2.1 The Position in Australia 
 
In the mid-1980s, some senior Australian judicial officers were accused of ‘serious 
misconduct’. For example, in 1985 and 1986, Lionel Murphy J of the High Court of Australia 
faced a parliamentary commission of inquiry into whether he should be dismissed from his 
position.
16
 Justice Murphy was accused of attempting to pervert the course of justice
17
 by 
speaking to the Chief Magistrate of New South Wales and a District Court Judge about his 
friend, solicitor Morgan Ryan. Ryan was charged with two indictable offences. It was alleged 
that Murphy tried to influence the Chief Magistrate and the District Court Judge to be 
positively biased towards Ryan.
18
 This resulted in the New South Wales Parliament passing 
the Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), which created the Judicial Commission of New South 
Wales, an independent organisation that receives and investigates complaints about judicial 
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 The Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Act 2012 (Cth) 





In 2001, Chief Justice John Doyle of the Supreme Court of South Australia wrote an article 
recommending that the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration or the Council of Chief 
Justices of Australia and New Zealand create written guidelines for judicial behaviour.
21
 The 
Council of Chief Justices of Australia, a non-statutory body comprised of the Chief Justice of 
the High Court and the heads of superior Federal, State and Territory Courts, instructed two 
retired judges to draft the guidelines.
22
 Staff of the Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration published the first edition of the Guide to Judicial Conduct in 2002
23
 and a 
second edition in 2007 (AIJA Guide).
24
 The AIJA Guide gives judges advice about the 
community’s expectations of them.
25
 In particular, the AIJA Guide discusses issues that 
judges may be unclear about.
26
 Justice Ronald Sackville of the Court of Appeal of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales believes that the AIJA Guide ‘emerged as a response to 




[a]lthough the Guide has considerable prestige, it has no legal standing. Moreover, it is 
indicative or suggestive, and not prescriptive. Nonetheless, in terms of identifying issues for 
consideration by judicial officers in relation to personal relationships, it reflects and explores 




In Willoughby City Council v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation,
29
 David 
Lloyd J said that the AIJA Guide ‘reinforced [his] view’
30
 on his decision about whether the 
Acting Commissioner hearing the case with him should be disqualified for bias because his 
                                                             
19 Sackville, above n 16, 4.  
20 Explanatory Memorandum, Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill 2012 (Cth) 1.  
21 See John Doyle CJ, ‘Judicial Standards: Contemporary Constraints on Judges — The Australian Experience’ 
(2001) 75(2) Australian Law Journal 96, 101. 
22
 Sackville, above n 16, 7.  
23 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct (at 2002). 
24 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct (at 2007).  
25 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Sackville, above n 16, 14.  
28
 DPP v McNamara [2012] NTSC 81 (12 October 2012) [19] (Barr J).  
29
 Willoughby City Council v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation [2008] NSWLEC 231 (12 August 
2008) (Lloyd J).  
30 Ibid [13]. 
30 
 
son was a partner in the firm acting for the respondent.
31
 Approximately half a dozen 




2.2.2 The Position in the United States 
 
In the 1920s, Kenesaw Mountain Landis J of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois took a second job as a Major League Baseball commissioner to earn extra 
income.
33
 As commissioner, Landis J had to decide whether teams and players were guilty of 
crimes such as gambling and bribery.
34
 Some lawyers believed that Landis J created ethical 
problems by serving in both positions, but could not find a law or ethical rule that forbade 
him from doing so.
35









The Canons were modified and released as the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972.
39
 The Code 
was released again as the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and the staff of most 
American state regulatory bodies adopted it.
40
 There is another version of this Code for the 




2.2.3 The Position in Canada, the United Kingdom and Internationally 
 
There are ethical materials for judges in Canada and the United Kingdom that are similar to 
the AIJA Guide. The Canadian Judicial Council released Commentaries on Judicial Conduct 




 The Judges’ Council of England and 
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Wales released the Guide to Judicial Conduct in 2004.
44
 The AIJA Guide and the similar 
Canadian and British guidelines ‘tend to be limited to providing guidance rather than binding 
authority’.
45
 Despite this failure to provide binding authority, the simple fact that these 
guidelines exist and the public’s ability to easily find them online may increase the public’s 
confidence in the judiciary. The average person reading these documents can likely learn and 
understand some of the ethical standards that are generally expected of the judiciary.  
 
In 2000, the Centre for International Crime Prevention of the Secretariat asked the Judicial 
Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity to create a document that later became known as 
the Bangalore Principles. Some of the Bangalore Principles state that judges must be 
impartial, have integrity and treat all people equally.
46
 The Bangalore Principles state ethical 
guidelines for judges worldwide to follow.
47
 The Bangalore Principles are ‘widely accepted’ 
and many jurisdictions use them as a model.
48
 The Bangalore Principles are an example of 
the importance of ethical guidelines for judges internationally.  
 
This section has shown that attention has been given to guidelines for judicial conduct, 
particularly during the past 20 years. The next section will examine why judges using social 
media can cause problems. This is important because it will inform the later discussion 
considering whether judges should be prevented from using social media.   
 
2.3 Potential Problems with Judges Using Social Media 
 
There are several reasons why judges using social media can be a problem. As stated 
previously, Australian courts depend on public confidence in the judiciary for their 
authority;
49
 when the public has confidence in the judiciary, they are more likely to respect 
                                                             
44
 Ibid. 
45 Sarah M R Cravens, ‘Promoting Public Confidence in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct: A Survey of Recent 
Developments and Practices in Four Common Law Countries’ (2010) 42(1) McGeorge Law Review 177, 195. 
46 Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Strengthening Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct (2006) 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/corruption_judicial_res_e.pdf>. 
47
 Judge Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Accountability in Australia’ (2003) 6(1) Legal Ethics 41, 53.  
48
 Robert Nicholson AO, ‘Updating Asian-Pacific Judicial Conduct Provisions’ (2008) 17(3) Journal of Judicial 
Administration 144, 144.  
49 Cesan v R (2008) 236 CLR 358, 380 (French J). 
32 
 
and abide by judges’ decisions.
50
 Judges must refrain from acting in a way that ‘will erode 
public confidence in the judiciary, or impair respect for the judicial office’
51
 both within and 
outside of their work.
52




Justice John Vertes states that conventional communications give judicial officers time to 
think between writing a message and sending it, whereas social media use is immediate. This 
immediacy increases ‘[t]he opportunities for a judge to engage in spontaneous and ill-
considered communications that may reflect badly on the judiciary’.
54
 In other words, 
because of this immediacy, judges may write comments without considering their 
consequences.
55
 These comments may negatively affect their reputation and the judiciary’s 
image.
56
 Further, comments written on social media can be sent to thousands of people 
without the judge who wrote them knowing or approving.
57
 Comments on social media may 
be permanent, even if they are deleted.
58




Genelle Belmas states that ‘it is easy to imagine situations in which judges could use social 
media sites in ways that suggest impropriety, and just as easy to imagine situations that seem 
innocuous on the surface but that could develop into problems.’
60
 Belmas provides the 
example of a judge who posts information on a Facebook page that supports a football team. 
The football team’s coach is fired and sues the team. The case then comes before the judge.
61
 
In that situation the judge should disqualify him or herself from the case because the public 
may reasonably believe that the judge’s comments demonstrate that he or she has a bias 
towards the football team. 
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There have been cases in the United States where judges have misused social media. This 
misuse has been to varying degrees of seriousness. On the lower end of the spectrum is Judge 
Thomas A Placey of the Cumberland County Court in Pennsylvania,
62
 who was criticised for 
permitting himself to serve as the judge at a preliminary hearing in which the defendant was 
his Facebook friend.
63
 Judge Placey stated that he was not a friend of the defendant in reality 
and that he never refused a Facebook friend request.
64
 Judge Matthew Destry of the Broward 
Circuit Court in Florida tweeted from the courtroom about upcoming cases and posted photos 
of lawyers before him. Whether Judge Destry’s behaviour was highly inappropriate would 
depend on the words that he tweeted. If Judge Destry simply tweeted comments about what 
he saw in the courtroom, journalists would have been able to tweet something similar, if they 
were permitted to use social media in the courtroom (journalists’ use of social media in the 
courtroom is discussed in detail in Chapter Five). Judge Destry’s photographing of lawyers 
who appeared before him was probably unprofessional and out of the ordinary. A lawyer who 
appeared before Judge Destry requested that he not tweet during the trial.
65
 On the higher end 
of the spectrum is Chief Judge Ernest Woods of the Mountain Judicial Circuit Court in 
Georgia, who initiated Facebook contact with an accused appearing before him.
66
 The Chief 
Judge and the accused discussed the accused’s case strategy on Facebook.
67
 The accused also 
asked the Chief Judge if she could borrow money from him.
68
 When the District Attorney 
attempted to discuss the Facebook exchange with the Chief Judge, His Honour stood down 
from his position.
69
 If social media did not exist and the Chief Judge had to use a less 
instantaneous communication tool, perhaps he would have thought more carefully before 
acting. If that had been the case, perhaps he would still work as a judge. The majority of the 
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American advisory opinions about judges using social media state that judges face ethical 




In Australia, the Chief Magistrate of Tasmania, Michael Hill, disqualified himself from 
hearing a case that involved a former prosecutor, Tim Ellis, who was charged with death by 
negligent driving.
71
 The Deputy Chief Magistrate of Tasmania, Michael Daly, was then 
assigned to the case. However, His Honour informed the parties that he was a Facebook 
friend of the accused’s wife and he had met with the accused several times socially.
72
 He 
asked the prosecution and the accused to provide submissions about whether he should be 
disqualified from the case.
73
 This situation demonstrates that judicial officers using social 
media in Australia can be a problem, because the Deputy Chief Magistrate’s use of social 
media caused confusion about whether he should preside over Ellis’ trial. This took up the 
parties’ lawyers’ time with the need to write submissions on the matter. 
 
Having established that the use of social media by judges can be problematic, the following 
section will examine the actions that staff of Australian, Canadian, American and British 
judicial organisations have taken to address this matter to date.  
 
2.4 Background to the Actions that Judicial Regulators Have Taken to Date 
 
Staff of organisations regulating or advising on judicial conduct in Australia, the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom have chosen different courses of action (including 
inaction) in advising judges about social media use. 
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2.4.1 The Position in Australia 
 
In Australia, information about regulating judicial conduct is found in various places, 
including case law, the AIJA Guide,
74
 legislation and books about judicial ethics.
75
 None of 
these sources of information currently mention the use of social media by judges.  
 
2.4.2 The Position in Canada 
 
In Canada, no cases exist to date regarding a judge who has used social media 
inappropriately.
76
 Canada’s Ethical Principles for Judges
77
 does not mention judicial social 
media use, nor yet does Canadian legislation. Staff of the Canadian Judicial Council have 
released three documents, Is Skype Safe for Judges?,
78
 Facebook and Social Networking 
Security,
79
 and Blueprint for the Security of Judicial Information,
80
 which explain security 
issues involving social media, but provide little guidance on judges’ social media use.  
 
2.4.3 The Position in the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom’s Guide to Judicial Conduct briefly mentions judicial social media use. 
It also explains privacy and security problems of which judges should be aware.
81
 It does not 
advise judges about whether they can ‘friend’ on social media lawyers who appear before 
them, or whether judges can communicate with these lawyers on social media during the 
course of their appearance. There is as yet no case law or legislation on this subject in the 
United Kingdom.
82
 Sir John Goldring, Lord Justice of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales, released guidelines that state that judicial officers cannot post 
controversial opinions on social media. The guidelines state that it is irrelevant whether 
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judicial officers post controversial opinions anonymously,
83
 and also require judicial officers 
to delete any such opinions that they have already posted. Judicial officers who disobey the 




2.4.4 The Position in the United States 
 
The greatest body of literature about judges’ social media use comes from the United States. 
Staff of judicial ethics committees in the following states have published advisory opinions 























 Staff of the American Bar 
Association have also released a formal opinion.
96
 Some American case law,
97
 several journal 
articles
98
 and a written reprimand of a District Court Judge
99
 also exist on this subject. 
 
It is possible that there is a paucity of guidelines about social media use for judges because 
social media is relatively new and the staff of relevant judicial bodies have not had the ability 
to produce such guidelines. Staff of judicial bodies may also believe that existing guidelines 
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about judicial ethics can apply to social media, and may not see a need to produce new 
guidelines about social media use.  
 
While the American body of guidelines and literature is helpful in considering the position 
that Australian judicial officers should adopt regarding social media use, one must remember 
that American and Australian judges differ in some important ways. For example, 87 per cent 
of American State judges are elected,
100
 while Australian judges are all appointed.
101
 
American Federal judges are also appointed.
102
 Nearly 10 000 of the approximately 30 000 
elected State American judges have no legal background or exposure to judicial ethics.
103
 As 
a result, guidelines for Australian judges should differ at least partially to guidelines for 
American judges.  
 
Staff of American legal regulatory bodies may be ahead of other jurisdictions on this issue 
because many judges use social media as part of their election campaigns;
104
 elected judges 
are more likely to use social media than unelected judges.
105
 Elected judges need to engage 
with the public themselves more than unelected judges do. Using social media is a useful and 
cost-effective way for elected judges to achieve this. Another reason why American 
regulators may be ahead in this area is because American judges are asking state ethical 
bodies for guidance on this subject and the ethical bodies make their answers public.
106
 If 
Australian judges are asking for guidelines about this issue, the available research does not 
show it.  
 
Staff of the legal bodies in the four jurisdictions discussed (Australia, Canada, United 
Kingdom, and the United States) took different actions regarding providing guidelines to 
judges about social media use. The following section will discuss specific situations 
involving judges’ potential social media use.  
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2.5 Examining Specific Issues 
 
2.5.1 Should Australian Judges Be Discouraged from Using Social Media? 
 
Whether Australian judges should be discouraged from using social media is a new issue, and 
existing Australian judicial ethical resources do not directly apply to it. It is argued here that 
Australian judges should not be discouraged from using social media altogether, but that 
there should be some limits on their use.  
 
International empirical research does not support preventing judges from using social media. 
As previously stated, an American survey of 623 judicial officers revealed that 46.1 per cent 
of those surveyed used social media.
107
 Given this high proportion, it would be important to 
ensure that it is indeed problematic before asking so many to stop using it. Admittedly, there 
are differences between Australian judges and the American judges surveyed. However, the 
survey still supports the view that Australian judges should not be discouraged from using 
social media. Staff of the International Bar Association surveyed approximately 60 bar 
associations internationally about social media.
108
 One of the questions asked was whether 
judges should cease their social media use upon becoming judges. Over 70 per cent of 
respondents answered in the negative.
109
 Members of three of the associations questioned 
were Australian: the Australian Bar Association, the Law Society of New South Wales and 
the South Australian Bar Association.
110
 While three bar associations out of 60 is not many, it 
suggests that members of Australian bar associations may be in favour of Australian judges 
using social media.  
 
Different opinions exist about how Australian judges should live outside of their work. The 
AIJA Guide states that some people believe that judges choose a ‘monastic’ life that involves 
few activities outside their judicial work.
111
 Living this way may engender public respect for 
judges; however, critics of this ‘monastic’ life believe that judges are ‘remote’ from the rest 
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of society, which could lower confidence in the judiciary.
112
 This way of thinking would 
apply to the ‘restrictive approach’ of judges using social media. The ‘restrictive approach’ 




The AIJA Guide states that the more commonly accepted judicial lifestyle is for judges to 
participate in their communities so that they remain in touch with them.
114
 Justice James 
Thomas AM of the Supreme Court of Queensland, adds that  
 
a capacity to understand community attitudes and the practicalities of everyday life is essential 
to the dispensation of justice. How else can a judge realistically assess damages, sentence 
offenders, decide if something is capable of being defamatory, tell if something is in the public 
interest, spot the tricky witness, or make true to life findings of fact on the myriads of 




Social media is a part of life and Australian judges should be able to use it for a number of 
reasons. Given how prevalent social media is, as time passes it will become increasingly 
likely that a lawyer has used social media prior to his or her judicial appointment. It may be 
onerous for a judge to cease that aspect of his or her life for work. While some may argue that 
judges are expected to have ‘some limitations in private and public conduct’
116
, it would be 
unfair to expect judges to sacrifice activities that are unlikely to reduce confidence in the 
judiciary if undertaken responsibly. Social media may enable Australian judges to stay in 
touch with their family, friends and community. If judges are prevented from using social 
media, they may not ‘understand changing social values’.
117
 In the past, judges could learn 
about the social values of the majority of Australians in different ways, such as reading print 
newspapers; that may not be the case today.
118
 Social media may also make it easier for 
Australian judges to stay in touch with judges abroad, with whom they can potentially discuss 
the law in their respective jurisdictions. Some judges use social media creatively in their 
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work; for example, Judge Kathryn Lanan of the Juvenile Court in Galveston, Texas, requires 
all minors to ‘friend’ her on her Facebook or MySpace page so that she can see if they have 
acted inappropriately and must appear before her again as a result.
119
 Judge Lanan’s use of 
social media in this way may raise ethical issues about whether she should be permitted to 
monitor minors using this method.  
 
It is acknowledged that the Australian judiciary has considerable integrity.
120
 It is reasonable 
to expect that people of this calibre are capable of using social media in a way that would not 
lower confidence in the judiciary. This is especially the case if they are given written 
guidelines to follow. Current resources for judicial ethics in Australia do not forbid judges 
from using any other new technology, such as email;
121
 it would not make sense to single out 
social media in this context. Judge Gibson believes that it is ‘too late’ to create a rule that 
prevents judicial officers from using social media because too many use it already,
122
 and that 
the better question to consider is what content judicial officers should be permitted to post on 
social media.
123
 However, it is arguably not too late to discourage judges from using social 
media; if the AIJA Guide is amended to state that judges should be discouraged from using 
social media, then it would be reasonable to expect that Australian judges would shut down 
their social media accounts voluntarily.  
 
Every American advisory opinion about judges using social media expressly permits social 
media use.
124
 The United Kingdom’s Guide to Judicial Conduct states that it ‘is a matter of 
personal choice’ whether judges use social media.
125
 Some judges and retired judges have 
provided written support for the judiciary’s use of social media. Justice John Vertes is one 
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example. He states that preventing judges from using social media ‘would be a far-reaching 
intrusion into their private lives’.
126
 Justice Estlinbaum of the 130
th
 Judicial District Court of 
Texas
127




Belmas states that discouraging judges from using social media would be ‘an extreme 
solution to a currently small problem’.
129
 The small problem to which Belmas is likely 
referring is the number of American judges who have used social media inappropriately to 
date. Jonathan McArthur, a former substitute judge at the North Las Vegas Justice Court, is 
one such judge. McArthur listed his personal interests on MySpace as ‘breaking my foot in a 
prosecutor’s ass ... and improving my ability to break my foot in a prosecutor’s ass’.
130
 This 
appeared to show a bias against prosecutors.
131
 A District Attorney saw McArthur’s MySpace 
page and recommended to the North Las Vegas Justice Court administrator that McArthur be 
disqualified.
132
 McArthur was later stood down from his position.
133
 While McArthur may 
only have been a substitute judge, he presided over trials; the public would be entitled to 
expect that his behaviour inside and outside of court be as impeccable as that of a permanent 
judge. McArthur’s possession of a MySpace page let others easily and quickly learn about his 
bias towards prosecutors. Had the only evidence of McArthur’s potential bias been in the 
implementation of his decisions, detecting the bias would have been more difficult. 
McArthur’s case appears to be an extreme example of a judge using social media 
inappropriately. 
 
While the present author recommends that Australian judges should not be discouraged from 
using social media, it is important that they use it ‘with caution and with the expectation that 
their use of the media likely will be scrutinized’
134
 because it may become public.
135
 
Similarly, Martin Felsky, PhD recommends that judges use social media ‘with caution’ and 
‘judiciously’ because judges cannot control what others do with the information that they 
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 The word ‘judiciously’ is not defined, but one may assume that this refers to using 
social media in a manner that does not breach existing Canadian ethical guidelines for judges. 
Australian judges should be careful to use social media in a way that does not breach any 
existing Australian laws and to consider those sections of the AIJA Guide that could be 
relevant to social media use. For example, the AIJA Guide states that judges should generally 
not become involved in controversial political debates,
137
 nor should they comment in public 
about a trial after the reasons for judgment are published.
138
 Judges should not, therefore, 
discuss any controversial matter, or a trial, before or after reasons for judgment are published, 
on social media. The AIJA Guide also states that judges should not fundraise,
139
 so judges 
should avoid mentioning fundraising activities on social media.  
 
Alternatives exist for judges who want to have a presence on social media, but do not feel 
comfortable having a personal account. Some of these alternatives are discussed in the 
sections below.  
 
2.5.1.1 Facebook Fan Page 
 
One possible alternative for judges is to create a Facebook fan page for their public persona 
that provides information, but is not interactive.
140
 This would avoid the argument that there 
is an appearance of bias if judges and lawyers become friends on social media.
141
 
Unfortunately, if judges have fan pages, instead of personal pages, they may miss some of the 
important benefits that the average person enjoys from using social media, such as sending 
messages to their friends.  
 
2.5.1.2 Social Media Site Just for Judges 
 
In Canada, judges have their own social media site, JUDICOM.
142
 JUDICOM is restricted to 
Canadian Federal judges and their staff.
143
 While JUDICOM appears to be a good idea, 
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Australian judges may not want to implement it, because its design does not allow Federal 
judges to associate with provincial judges and others outside the judiciary.  
 
2.5.1.3 Separating Social Media for Personal and Professional Uses 
 
It is also possible for judges to have one social medium account that is used personally and 
another that is used professionally.
144
 A judge would rely on the particular social network’s 
privacy settings so that the public could not see the personal account. Judges should not try to 
rely on social media’s privacy settings concealing any information because privacy settings 
can be unilaterally changed without the user’s knowledge or consent and the privacy settings 
often change.  
 
2.5.2 Australian Judges Being ‘Friends’ on Social Media with Lawyers who Appear 
Before Them 
 
If judges use social media, then a subsequent relevant issue to consider is whether judges can 
or should ‘friend’ counsel appearing before them on social media. A former Canadian 
Minister of Justice stated that ‘a judge should not be seen dancing with the wife of a litigant 
who will appear before him the next morning’.
145
 This quote demonstrates the importance of 
judges being careful regarding with whom they associate in public and what they say to those 
people. For example, a judge should not go for a drink with a barrister who is arguing a 
matter before him or her.
146
 A somewhat similar issue to consider is whether Australian 
judges should be prevented from being friends on social media with lawyers who may appear 
before them. The AIJA Guide, case law and existing judicial information are not sufficient to 
give a definitive answer. The better view for Australian judges based on existing resources is 
that they should not be prevented from being friends on social media with lawyers who may 
appear before them.  
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The International Bar Association survey previously asked whether judges ‘should 
discontinue being online contacts with former colleagues comprising advocates and legal 
practitioners once they become judges’. Of those surveyed, 60 per cent answered no.
147
 Given 
that three of the 60 bar associations surveyed are Australian,
148
 this suggests that there may 
be some support for Australian judges being allowed to remain friends on social media with 
lawyers who may appear before them.  
 
Advisory opinions from the American State judicial ethics bodies differ on this issue. The 
majority who wrote the Florida advisory opinion (“Florida Majority”) state that judges cannot 
add lawyers who may appear before them as friends on social media, because this ‘conveys 
the impression that the lawyer is in a position to influence the judge’.
149
 They add that a judge 
‘friending’ a lawyer violates Canon 2B of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, which states 
that ‘[a] judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of 
the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that 







 advisory opinions similarly state that judges should be prevented from being 




Judge Robert Gross applied the Florida Majority’s opinion in Domville v Florida
154
 
(Domville). In Domville, the accused requested that the trial judge in his matter be 
disqualified,
155
 because the trial judge and the prosecutor were Facebook friends.
156
 The 
accused submitted that the trial judge was not ‘fair and impartial’ as a result. Judge Gross 
stated that a judge will be disqualified from a case if the application is ‘legally sufficient’. In 
a ‘legally sufficient’ application ‘the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would 
prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial’. 
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Judge Gross stated that the facts in this case ‘would create in a reasonably prudent person a 
well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial’, so he directed the matter to the 
Circuit Court ‘for further proceedings consistent with this opinion’. Judge Gross added that 
‘judges must be vigilant in monitoring their public conduct so as to avoid situations that will 
compromise the appearance of impartiality’.
157
 Neither Judge Gross, nor any part of the 
Domville judgment, described the friendship between the trial judge and the prosecutor as it 
existed in reality. The judgment is lacking in that respect. Judge Gross made assumptions 
about what a Facebook friendship may appear to be to the public, and did not consider that 
the reality of the friendship was relevant. Venkat Balasubramani comments as follows about 
Domville:  
 
I'm still struggling to see how this is different from other forms of social interaction between 
lawyers and judges. Social interaction between judges and lawyers happens all the time and is 





Perhaps Balasubramani missed the point that the publication on Facebook has a different 
character to an actual friendship. Nicole Black states that Judge Gross’ decision in Domville 
was ‘short-sighted and misguided. Online connections are no different than those made 
offline. Certain types of offline interactions with judges have always been considered 
acceptable and are commonplace, such as lunching or golfing with a judge’.
159
 Black does not 
clarify whether or not the golfing and lunching would occur while the lawyer was appearing 
in a trial before a judge. One would assume that a lawyer and a judge would not fraternise 
while the lawyer was appearing before the judge, although the same activities would be 
acceptable at other times.  
 
Several lawyers and academics disagree with the Florida Majority’s opinion. Stephen Gillers 
of New York University believes that the Florida Majority’s view is ‘hypersensitive’, and that 
where a judge and a lawyer have a close friendship in reality, opposing counsel can request 
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that the judge be disqualified.
160
 Gillers’s opinion has merit, because it appears to apply 
common sense while acknowledging that a genuine close friendship between a judge and a 
lawyer can be a problem, as opposed to a judge and a lawyer who are friends only on social 
media and potentially never exchange a single word through that medium. Bill Haltom, a 
former president of the Tennessee Bar Association, states that the Florida Majority’s opinion 
is ‘nonsense on stilts’, as he is actual friends with several judges before whom he has 
appeared, and has not experienced any problems.
161
 Haltom did not state whether he 
socialised with the judges with whom he was friends while he appeared before them for a 
trial or hearing. If Haltom socialised with judges while he was not before them, this should 
not present any problems. 
 
Kellen Hade states that the Florida Majority’s opinion ‘probably best illustrates 
misconceptions the uninitiated harbor about the nature of social media; specifically the 
mistaken belief that a user will add as friends only those people with whom he socializes on a 
frequent basis.’ Hade adds that ‘“[f]riendships” in a social network are better understood as 
simple links between people, either on [a] personal or professional level, and even as mere 
acquaintances’.
162
 Hade’s definition may be too narrow, however, as it is possible that friends 
on social media could be very close friends in reality. Angela O’Brien states that the Florida 
Majority’s opinion ‘will only stifle the use of these communication devices and prevent these 
tools from being embraced by the legal community’.
163
 Assuming that O’Brien’s comment is 
accurate, it would be unfortunate if judges in Florida missed out on the benefits of using 
social media as a result of the Florida Majority.  
 
The minority in the Florida advisory opinion believe that a judge can ‘friend’ lawyers who 
may appear before her or him without violating Canon 2B. They state that 
 
social networking sites have become so ubiquitous that the term ‘friend’ on these pages does 
not convey the same meaning that it did in the pre-internet age; that today, the term ‘friend’ on 
social networking sites merely conveys the message that a person so identified is a contact or 
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The minority’s view is better than the Florida Majority’s
165
 because it takes a practical 
approach to interpreting the word ‘friend’. The Utah advisory opinion permits judges to add 
lawyers who may appear before them, because this  
 
is not a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, the designation of someone as a 
‘friend’ on a website such as Facebook does not indicate that the person is a friend under the 
usual understanding of the term. Many Facebook users have hundreds or even thousands of 
‘friends.’ Whether someone is truly a friend depends on the frequency and the substance of 
contact, and not on an appellation created by a website for users to identify those who are 




The Utah advisory opinion appears similar to the minority’s view in Florida. The advisory 
opinions of the American Bar Association,
167











 permit judges to ‘friend’ lawyers who may 
appear before them on social media. Steven Seidenberg states that ‘friendships in social 
media are less threatening to judicial impartiality than are friendships in the real world, 
according to some experts’ because the public can see these relationships, as opposed to 
friendships in reality, which may be hidden.
173
 Seidenberg’s comment appears reasonable, 
particularly when coupled with the knowledge that social media friendships may consist of 
nothing more than the original friendship request. Judges are often friends with lawyers prior 
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to entering the judiciary. It would be wrong to assume that these friendships automatically 




The California advisory opinion states that if a judge interacting with a lawyer on social 
media ‘would create the impression the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge 
and cast doubt on the judge’s ability to be impartial’, then the judge should not interact with 
the lawyer on social media.
175
 The opinion also states factors that can be used to decide 
whether the lawyer is indeed in such a position; for example, if the judge’s page is very 
personal, then it would be more likely that the friendship could influence the judge.
176
 It is a 
positive step that the advisory opinion provides factors for people to consider before deciding 
that a social media friendship between a judge and a lawyer must have an impact on the 
judge’s impartiality. This can help people to critically analyse the relationship between the 
two, instead of making an assumption simply based upon the existence of the social media 
friendship.  
 
The Kentucky opinion states that judges should be aware that if social media friendships, 
either on their own or together with other evidence, comprise ‘a close social relationship’,
177
 
then this should ‘be disclosed and/or require recusal’.
178
 Similarly, the Utah opinion states 
that while a judge may not be prevented from being friends on social media with lawyers who 
appear before him or her, if the judge and the lawyer often communicate on social media, the 
judge may consider disqualifying him or herself from hearings, trials, etc. involving that 
lawyer because this could ‘create the appearance that the lawyer has a special position in 
relation to the judge’.
179
 The Ohio opinion states that if a judge’s social media relationship 
with a lawyer results in the judge becoming biased or prejudiced, then the judge should 
disqualify him or herself from cases involving that lawyer.
180
 The Kentucky, Utah and Ohio 
opinions appear to apply common sense in a similar way to the California opinion. They do 
not merely assume that a social media friendship between a judge and a lawyer creates an 
apprehension of bias. These opinions consider other facts besides the mere ‘friending’, such 
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as how often the judge and the lawyer communicate on social media. While compelling 
judicial officers to consider these other factors creates more work in deciding whether the 
judge should disqualify him or herself, it is likely fairer and more practical than deciding 
outright that a judge should disqualify him or herself from a trial where he or she is friends on 
social media with one of the lawyers. American lawyer Peter Vogel states that if lawyers 
contribute money to a judge’s electoral campaign, then lawyers should be able to be friends 
with the judge on social media,
181
 but the lawyer and judge should not be able to 
communicate with each other on social media while the lawyer appears before the judge. 
 
In Australia, ‘[a] judge should not sit to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or 
the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an 
impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it’.
182
 Also, 
‘[t]he appearance of impartiality’ ‘plays a part in maintaining public confidence in the courts 
irrespective of their relationship to the actual outcome of the process’.
183
 The fact that a judge 
and a lawyer are friends on social media should not automatically mean that an apprehension 
of bias towards the lawyer exists, although several American academics and ethical advisory 
opinions have argued that it does. When Australian judges consider whether they should 
disqualify themselves from appearing on a matter because of an apprehension of bias, it is 
important that they do not agree too quickly that an appearance of bias exists. This could 
encourage parties to try to disqualify judges without sufficient reason.
184
 An Australian judge 
is ‘selected for judicial office because of his learning and training in law, his integrity and 
capacity for impartiality. The combination of these factors results in a judge being assumed to 
be able to bring a detached mind to his task of judgment’.
185
 This should remain the case even 
where the judge is friends on social media with the lawyer appearing before him or her in 
court. 
 
In Emanuele v Emanuel Investments a liquidator applied for examinations pursuant to the 
Corporations Law.
186
 The plaintiffs requested that the examinations be stayed and that all 
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evidence from the examinations be removed from the court’s file and destroyed.
187
 The 
plaintiffs’ request was based on the fact that Justice Timothy Anderson, who presided over 
the examination, met with the liquidator’s counsel at a bar for an hour for a drink and a chat 
during the course of the examinations.
188
 The plaintiffs submitted that the meeting resulted in 
‘a reasonable apprehension of a bias on the part of’ Anderson J,
189
 despite Anderson J 
recusing himself from the examination after the meeting.
190
 Justice Bruce Debelle of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia stated that ‘a judge should disqualify himself from hearing, 
or continuing to hear, the matter if the parties or the public entertain a reasonable 
apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of 
the issues’.
191
 Justice Anderson and the liquidator’s counsel said that they did not discuss the 
examination at their meeting at the bar, but Debelle J stated that ‘it was entirely wrong’
192
 of 
them to meet and their ‘meeting should not have taken place’.
193
 Justice Debelle stated that 
 
a reasonable member of the public and the plaintiffs as persons who must submit themselves to 
further examination, would entertain a reasonable suspicion that Judge Anderson might not 
bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the adjudication of rulings in the examinations and 
to orders to be made in the course of the proceedings. It was, therefore, not only appropriate but 





Debelle J dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ applications.
195
 Given that the public meeting 
between Anderson J and the liquidator’s counsel was held to be inappropriate, does it follow 
that judges and lawyers who may appear before them should not be friends on social media? 
The author suggests not. In this case, Anderson and the liquidator’s counsel met alone. In 
contrast, on social media, a judge may be friends with hundreds or even thousands of people, 
and the online friendship does not mean that the judge is discussing anything with the lawyer 
on social media while the lawyer appears before him or her. Additionally, psychological 
research shows that Facebook users have friends who may be close or may be merely 
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 A judge and a lawyer who appears before him or her may have absolutely 
no interaction on social media at all besides their initial ‘friending’.  
 
An examination of Australian case law regarding judges being friends outside of social media 
with lawyers who appear before them provides some assistance. Bienstein v Bienstein
197
 
involved a family dispute about maintenance of an adult disabled child. When the matter 
came before Kenneth Hayne J, the appellant requested that Hayne J disqualify himself, but 
Hayne J refused. The appellant then appealed on several grounds, and one was Hayne J’s 
refusal to disqualify himself.
198
 The appellant requested that Hayne J disqualify himself 
because her application before him involved serious allegations against the Melbourne 
Registry of the Family Court and the bodies who regulate lawyers in Victoria. She stated that 
there may be a conflict of interest and bias because Hayne J was ‘from the Melbourne legal 
fraternity and is likely to have past and continuing associations and friendships with the 





Their Honours stated that ‘[a] judge is disqualified from determining a case if the judge is 
biased or [if] a party or a member of the public might reasonably apprehend that the judge is 
biased. Bias exists if the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the 




 They added that  
 
a reasonable apprehension of bias may exist where the presiding judge has a substantial 
personal relationship with a party to, or a person involved in, proceedings or a substantial 
personal relationship with a member of the family of that party or person.
 
But absent such 
relationships or others like them, it is absurd to suggest that a reasonable apprehension of bias 
can exist merely because a person involved in the proceedings comes from a city where the 
judge once practised professionally or because the judge may have had professional dealings 
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Their Honours also stated that 
 
[s]imilarly, ordinarily interaction (social or otherwise) between a practising lawyer who 
becomes a judge and other members of the legal community in that city does not itself give rise 





Justice Hayne did not make a mistake when he refused to disqualify himself.
203
 The fact that 
a judge is friends on social media with lawyers who may appear before him or her could 
qualify as ‘ordinary interaction (social or otherwise)’.
204
 While this case did not involve a 
social media friendship between a judge and a lawyer who appeared before him or her, it is 
useful in showing how judicial officers dealt with a judge facing an accusation of bias 
involving a possible friendship. Their Honours appeared to take a practical approach by not 
finding that an apprehension of bias existed. It is inevitable that judges and lawyers who 
appear before them interact on a social basis, particularly in small jurisdictions. This 
judgment should likely apply to those situations. 
 
Mazukov v University of Tasmania
205
 was an appeal of a decision not to quash an Acting 
District Registrar’s decision
206
 where the Acting District Registrar failed to waive a 
requirement that the appellant had to pay security for costs for the taxation of a bill of 
costs.
207
 In the hearing before the trial judge, Peter Heerey J, the appellant submitted that 
Heerey J should disqualify himself from hearing the matter because of apprehended bias, 
because he was a graduate of the respondent university and had previously rejected a 
different application by the appellant.
208
 Judge Heerey dismissed the appellant’s 
application.
209
 On appeal, their Honours stated that ‘no “fair-minded, lay observer” with 
knowledge of these “material objective facts” would entertain a reasonable concern that the 
primary judge would not bring “an impartial and unprejudiced mind” to bear on the question 
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The AIJA Guide states that ‘[f]riendship or past professional association with counsel or 
solicitor is not generally to be regarded as a sufficient reason for disqualification.’
211
 This 
strongly suggests that social media friendship between a judge and a lawyer is not 
inappropriate. The AIJA Guide also states that 
 
[t]here is a long-standing tradition of association between bench and bar, both in bar common 
rooms and on more formal occasions such as bar dinners or sporting activities. Many judges 
attend Law Society functions by invitation. The only caveat to maintaining a level of social 
friendliness of this nature, one dictated by common sense, is to avoid direct association with 
members of the profession who are engaged in current or pending cases before the judge. A 




While one may argue that a social media friendship between a judge and a lawyer who 
appeared before him or her is a ‘direct association’, if the judge and the lawyer who appeared 
before him or her do not communicate on social media while the lawyer is before the judge, 
then a ‘direct association’ arguably does not exist. A judge and a lawyer who appears before 
him or her regularly may not be engaging in ‘particularly close contact’
213
 if they are friends 
on social media. However, if the judge and the lawyer are close friends outside of social 
media, or frequently communicate on social media, then the judge should consider 
disqualifying him or herself from the case because an apprehension of bias could potentially 
apply and ethical problems may arise.  
 
If a judge becomes friends on social media with lawyers who may appear before him or her, 
there are some opportunities to lessen the chance that this may lead to an appearance of bias. 
One possible strategy is that when a lawyer comes before a judge for a trial, the judge should 
delete the lawyer from his or her friends on social media. After the trial concludes, the judge 
can ‘friend’ the lawyer again. This way judges can be friends on social media with lawyers, 
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but not during the relevant time when a judge is making a decision that could affect the 
lawyer’s client. 
 
A judge in Florida suggested that she might place a message on her social media profile page 
that states that ‘friend’ on her page means acquaintance, and not a ‘friend’ according to the 
word’s usual meaning.
214
 This may be helpful for people who are new to Facebook and are 
not aware that a friend on social media may simply be an acquaintance. The disclaimer may 
not always be accurate, because it is possible that one or more of the judge’s social media 
friends may be genuine friends in reality. Balasubramani suggests that judges should simply 
hide their Facebook friendships from the public, which Facebook’s privacy settings permit.
215
 
It is submitted that this is not an appropriate solution because it is dishonest; its lack of 
transparency may lower confidence in the judiciary, should the public find out. 
 
It is also possible for a judge to be friends on social media with a party or a relative of one of 
the parties in a trial or hearing.
216
 The judge or one of the judge’s relatives may be social 
media friends with someone related to the victim or someone related to the case in some 
way.
217
 Consideration of these issues is outside the scope of this thesis, but it is likely that the 
appropriate view on these issues would be different to that on the cases considered in this 
thesis. This is because judges and lawyers necessarily have ongoing professional 
associations, while judges, victims and parties do not. Due to the professional association 
between judges and lawyers, a stronger argument could be made that judges should be able to 
be friends on social media with lawyers, than that they should be able to with victims or 
parties. 
 
This section of the chapter has argued that Australian judges should not be prevented from 
being friends on social media with lawyers who may appear before them. Assuming that this 
argument is accepted, the next appropriate step is a discussion about ex parte communication 
on social media; this issue will be addressed in the following section.  
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2.5.3 Ex Parte Communication on Social Media 
 
Ex parte communication occurs when one of the parties in a trial, their lawyers or a third 
party communicates about the trial with the judge without informing all the lawyers or parties 
involved.
218
 If ex parte communication occurs, then the public may not believe that the judge 




Belmas states that it is a relatively straightforward question whether judges and lawyers can 
communicate on social media about a case both are involved with. Because ex parte 
communication in other contexts is not permitted, it should not be permitted on social media 
either.
220
 This may be true, but since it has never been as easy for parties, lawyers, witnesses 
and other court stakeholders to send ex parte communication to judges as it is in the age of 
social media, a discussion of this issue is necessary. 
 











opinions address this topic. The Kentucky and Utah opinions state that a judge should 
disqualify him or herself if ex parte communication with a lawyer occurs.
226
 The Ohio 





Ex parte communication on social media between a judge and a party or a lawyer before him 
or her occurred in the United States with B Carlton Terry Jr., a District Court Judge.
228
 While 
Terry J was presiding over a child custody and child support matter, he and the defendant’s 
counsel became Facebook friends.
229
 The two then discussed the case on Facebook.
230
 Judge 
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Terry later told the plaintiff’s counsel about the Facebook exchanges.
231
 The plaintiff’s 
counsel filed a motion that requested that Terry J’s decision be vacated, for Terry J to be 
disqualified and that a new trial be held.
232
 The plaintiff’s motion was granted.
233
 The 
Chairman of the Judicial Standards Commission publicly reprimanded Terry J for his 
behaviour.
234
 He stated that Terry J’s conduct demonstrated  
 
a disregard of the principles of conduct embodied in the North Carolina Code of Judicial 
Conduct, including failure to personally observe appropriate standards of conduct to ensure that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall be preserved (Canon 1), failure to respect 
and comply with the law (Canon 2A), failure to act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2A), engaging in ex 
parte communication with counsel and conducting independent ex parte online research about a 
party presently before the Court (Canon 3A(4)). Judge Terry’s actions constitute conduct 




The public nature of the reprimand of Terry J should discourage others from behaving 
similarly. It is also a reminder of the importance of reporting ex parte communication when it 
happens. If Terry J had not informed the plaintiff’s counsel about the ex parte communication 
between him and the defendant’s counsel, then it may not have come to the Chairman’s 
attention and the Chairman may not have reprimanded Terry J. Judge Terry’s communication 
with the defendant’s counsel may not have occurred if social media did not exist. This 
demonstrates that it is important that the staff of ethical bodies carefully consider how judges 
should use social media.  
 
2.5.3.1 How a Judge Should Handle Ex Parte Communication 
 
The actions that a trial judge takes after he or she becomes involved in ex parte 
communication are important, and may be relevant to an appeal judge deciding whether to 
grant an appellant’s appeal when the ex parte communication is one of the grounds of appeal. 
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In Youkers v Texas, the appellant had been convicted of assaulting his girlfriend
236
 and 
sentenced to eight years in gaol. One of the appellant’s four grounds of appeal involved the 
fact that the judge had communicated with his girlfriend’s father on Facebook during the 
initial trial.
237
 The appellant alleged that the trial judge was biased due to the Facebook 
communication. The appellant’s girlfriend’s father and the trial judge were Facebook friends 
who had previously run election campaigns at the same time. The appellant’s girlfriend’s 
father sent a Facebook message to the judge in which he requested that the judge not sentence 
the appellant harshly.
238
 The trial judge stopped reading the message when he learned that it 
was about the trial before him and then told the father online that the communication violated 
ex parte communication rules.
239
 He also stated that if the father contacted him again about 
the trial then the judge would delete the father from his Facebook friends. He further stated 
that he would put a copy of the Facebook message in the court’s file, inform the relevant 
lawyers and contact the Judicial Conduct Commission to enquire about whether he needed to 
take further steps. The father responded and apologised. The judge then followed through 
with the actions as promised.
240
 Justice Mary Murphy, who presided over the appeal of this 
action, stated that the Facebook communication was not indicative of bias because the 
girlfriend’s father sought leniency and the judge followed all of the steps required by the 
Texas Committee on Judicial Ethics in cases where ex parte communication occurs. Her 
Honour stated that she did not find an appearance of bias, either, because ‘a reasonable 
person’ who knew all the facts of the case would have thought that the judge was still 
impartial despite the Facebook communication, and the manner in which the judge dealt with 
the ex parte communication did not result in an appearance of bias.
241
 The appellant was 
unsuccessful with his appeal.
242
 This case shows that the way in which judges deal with ex 
parte communication is significant. Judges should inform courts and counsel when they use 
social media inappropriately. It is similarly important that jurors tell court staff if they use 
social media inappropriately; this issue will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Six of 
this thesis. Youkers v Texa also shows that the content of ex parte communication is 
important: if the father in this case had asked Her Honour to sentence the appellant harshly, 
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the appellant may have had a better chance of succeeding on appeal. The actions that the trial 
judge took in this case when he faced ex parte communication on social media contrast with 
the actions of Terry J. While Terry J discussed the trial before him on social media, the trial 
judge in this case did not. It could be helpful for Australian judges if there was information 
available to them that stated the specific steps that they should consider taking if they become 
involved in ex parte communication on social media.  
 
Ex parte communication on social media was also considered in Onnen v Sioux Falls 
Independent School District #49-5.
243
 In this case, the appellant sued his former employer for 
alleged wrongful termination.
244
 One of the appellant’s grounds for appeal was that the trial 
judge wrongly used his discretion to reject the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The 
appellant had requested a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge was allegedly biased 
because a witness in the trial had communicated with the trial judge on Facebook during the 
trial.
245
 The witness wrote ‘happy birthday’ in Czech on the trial judge’s Facebook wall.
246
 
Chief Justice David Gilbertson stated that the Facebook post was not ex parte communication 
because nothing was said in it about the trial.
247
 His Honour added that even if the Facebook 
post had constituted ex parte communication, it would not merit a new trial because the trial 
judge was not prejudiced.
248
 The trial judge did not ask the witness to write on his Facebook 
wall, the birthday message was one of many, and the trial judge did not know the witness.
249
 
The Chief Justice denied the appellant’s appeal application.
250
 In this case, His Honour took a 
practical approach to the alleged bias; it makes sense that the trial judge would not be biased 
by a Facebook post from someone he did not know. It is possible for a Facebook user who 
does not use Facebook’s privacy settings to receive thousands of happy birthday messages on 
his or her Facebook wall from people he or she does not know. Some of these people could 
appear before the judge, particularly in small communities. It would not make sense if a 
judge was considered to be biased as a result of each of the messages. It is interesting that His 
Honour discussed bias in this case, but not the appearance of bias. An argument could be 
made that the witness’s Facebook post could cause others to believe that there was an 
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appearance of bias. However, this is likely a weak argument in this case because the trial 
judge did not even know who the witness was when the witness posted on his wall. If a party 
(rather than a witness) in the case, whom the judge knew, posted on the judge’s wall, perhaps 
a different approach would be taken. In that situation, there could be a chance that there was 
at least an appearance of bias. In Australia, the position on ex parte communication is clear: 
 
The sound instinct of the legal profession — judges and practitioners alike — has always been 
that, save in the most exceptional cases, there should be no communication or association 
between the judge and one of the parties (or the legal advisers or witnesses of such a party), 
otherwise than in the presence of or with the previous knowledge and consent of the other 
party. Once the case is under way, or about to get under way, the judicial officer keeps aloof 
from the parties (and from their legal advisers and witnesses) and neither he nor they should so 
act as to expose the judicial officer to a suspicion of having had communications with one party 
behind the back of or without the previous knowledge and consent of the other party. For if 
something is done which affords a reasonable basis for such suspicion, confidence in the 




The AIJA Guide states a similar position to the one above and adds that this position is ‘of 
course, very well known’.
252
 Additionally, ex parte communication in Australia 
 
is not confined to representations made by a party or the legal adviser or witness of a party. It is 
equally true that a judge should not, in the absence of the parties or their legal representatives, 
allow any person to communicate to him or her any views or opinions concerning a case which 
he or she is hearing, with a view to influencing the conduct of the case. Indeed, any interference 
with a judge, by private communication or otherwise, for the purpose of influencing his or her 




Given that the position on ex parte communication in Australia is clear in case law and in the 
AIJA Guide, the position on social media should be similarly clear: judges and lawyers who 
appear before them may not communicate on social media about a case that they are involved 
in.  
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A motivation for this discussion of ex parte communication is that it provides a clear example 
where existing Australian case law and judicial ethical resources can easily and clearly be 
applied to social media use. It was previously recommended in this chapter that Australian 
judges should not be prevented from friending on social media lawyers who may appear 
before them. However, being able to friend each other makes it easier for judges and lawyers 
to engage in ex parte communication. As a result, a reminder about the importance of 
refraining from ex parte communication is appropriate. While a lawyer is appearing before a 
judge, the lawyer and judge should not communicate at all on social media. This precaution is 
necessary to ensure that nothing between the two individuals is misconstrued by either, or by 
others, as being about the case before the judge. Allowing judges and lawyers to be friends on 
social media but not allowing them to communicate on social media while the lawyer is 
appearing before the judge requires the public to place a considerable amount of trust in 
judges and lawyers. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the public can have this confidence.  
 
Ex parte communication is mentioned in this chapter as a warning to judges that it can occur 
without the judge’s intention. When people are Facebook friends, they see what is posted on 
each other’s walls whether or not it is intended for that specific person.
254
 A lawyer may post 
information on his or her Facebook wall that was not tendered as evidence and a judge may 
accidentally see it.
255
 If this occurs, judges may want to consider informing the parties and 
their lawyers accordingly and seeking guidance from senior judges about next steps. Having 
this procedure in place for Australian judges can help maintain the public’s confidence in the 
judiciary. Having discussed the Australian position on three situations involving social media 
for judges, the next issue for this chapter to consider is whether written guidelines for 
Australian judges about social media use are necessary. 
 
2.6 Recommendation: The AIJA Guide Should Be Revised to Include Social Media 
 
Seidenberg states that ‘[e]xperts are divided on how, or whether, legal ethics rules need to be 
revised to address social media.’
256
 Some experts say that ethical rules should not be changed 
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every time new technology is created,
257
 and that judges can refer to existing ethical rules if 
they face an ethical challenge involving social media.
258
 In contrast, Belmas recommends 
updating judicial ethical guidelines to reflect new changes in technology.
259
 Admittedly, it 
would be difficult to constantly update the AIJA Guide every time new technology is created. 
Nevertheless, occasional updates to the AIJA Guide when revolutionary technology is created 
could be very helpful to Australian judges, without being too onerous on the AIJA Guide’s 
editors to implement. Social media is not just any new technology; it has had a major impact 
on how people communicate,
260
 and ethical rules should be amended to address it.  
 
Hade states that new ethical guidelines on judges’ use of social media are unnecessary, 
because existing ethical guidelines cover the potential problems that may arise from its use. 
He adds that statements are required that make it clear that existing ethical guidelines apply 
to social media.
261
 Hade’s statements are made in regard to the American ethical guidelines, 
which differ greatly from Australia’s.
262
 Hade’s comment is arguably not applicable in 
Australia; as this chapter has established, existing Australian ethical guidelines do not clearly 
address all situations that can occur when a judge uses social media. Consequently, it is 
recommended that the AIJA Guide be modified to provide guidelines for Australian judges 
on social media use. Updating the AIJA Guide will show Australians that initiatives are being 
taken to advise judges about social media use, which may increase confidence in the 
judiciary. 
 
Julien Goldszlagier, Julie Hugues and Florence Lardet are in favour of ethical guidelines on 
social media use for European judges.
263
 They state that without guidelines, there is 
‘uncertainty about what is tolerable or not’, which ‘worries judges and disturbs the public’.
264
 
It clearly worries some American judges, which is probably why they sought advisory 
opinions from ethical bodies about this issue. Their worries may also have stemmed from the 
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incidents in which American judges have used social media inappropriately and have been 
fired or stood down as a result. Justice Vertes in Canada similarly believes that guidelines on 




At least one Australian judicial officer is unsure of the repercussions of using social media: 
the previously mentioned Deputy Chief Magistrate of Tasmania, who was a Facebook friend 
of the wife of an accused who was about to appear before him.
266
 This Facebook friendship 
was one reason why the Deputy Chief Magistrate requested that the prosecution and the 
accused provide submissions to him about whether he should be disqualified from the case.
267
 
If the AIJA Guide is amended to discuss social media, it may provide some advice about 
what Australian judicial officers should do in this type of situation. 
 
The Judicial Conference of Australia states that ‘judicial officers are human. [They] are 
therefore imperfect. Inevitably, some of [them] will occasionally fail to conduct [themselves] 
as judicial officers should’.
268
 Updating the AIJA Guide will make it easier for Australian 
judges to learn how they should conduct themselves as they ‘should’. The AIJA Guide also 
states that it ‘sets out to address issues upon which there is more likely to be uncertainty and 
upon which guidance will be helpful’.
269
 Judicial use of social media is an area of uncertainty 
in Australia because current judicial resources do not address whether judges should be 
prevented from using social media or befriending lawyers who may appear before them; it is 
precisely these issues that the AIJA Guide should clarify.  
 
Some Australian judges work in near isolation and cannot easily discuss ethical issues with 
other judges.
270
 These judges in particular may benefit from formal direction on social media 
from the AIJA Guide. These judges may not have anyone to seek advice from about the 
possible dangers of social media; some may not have the skills or interest in social media to 
be aware of the potential problems created if they use it. By providing guidelines on social 
media use, the AIJA Guide could potentially prevent misuses of social media from occurring 
in Australia, particularly for judges who are unaware of the dangers of using social media. It 
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would be easier for judges and judicial organisations to modify the AIJA Guide than to deal 
with Australian judges who used social media inappropriately because they had no ethical 
guidelines on the issue available.  
 
Staff at the New South Wales Supreme Court are thinking about drafting a policy on social 
media use for judges.
271
 Judge Gibson agrees that rules are necessary for judicial officers’ 
social media use.
272
 It is possible that other Australian judges feel the same way. 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission observes that ‘in recent years courts have come 
under pressure to operate with a greater degree of efficiency, transparency and 
accountability’.
273
 If the AIJA Guide is amended to address social media use, this will 
increase the courts’ transparency and accountability. The AIJA Guide also states that  
 
[t]here is such a wide range of social and recreational activities in which a judge may wish to 
engage that it is not possible to do more than suggest some guidelines. Judges should 
themselves assess whether the community may regard the judge’s participation in certain 
activities as inappropriate. In cases of doubt, it is better to err on the side of caution, and judges 




Some people may argue that social media use is one of the activities that falls within this 
quoted section of the AIJA Guide, and judges should consider only whether the community 
‘may regard the judge’s participation in certain activities as inappropriate’. That is, judges 
should simply ‘err on the side of caution’ by not using social media and no amendments to 
the AIJA Guide are required. This view is not recommended, because Australian judges 
would miss out on the benefits of social media discussed earlier, such as keeping in touch 
with family, friends and the judiciary abroad.  
 
If it is accepted that guidelines for judges on social media use are necessary, one should 
consider who should draft them. Judge Ronald Sackville of the Court of Appeal of the New 
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South Wales Supreme Court states that academics should be responsible for advising judges 
about judicial ethics. He states that  
 
judges have neither the expertise nor the experience to assess community expectations and 
attitudes. The necessary expertise and spirit of independent inquiry can be found in University. 
The formulation of standards of judicial ethics is a task too important and complex to be left 




Lorne Sossin and Meredith Bacal recommend that before drafting guidelines for judges about 
social media use, regulators should obtain judges’ opinions on social media.
276
 This is a good 
idea that could help regulators to learn about what kinds of information might be most helpful 
to judges. The judges could also provide feedback on a draft of the changes before the 
amended version of the AIJA Guide is released.  
 
The best sources of guidance to judges on this issue are most likely a range of people: senior 
judges, ethical bodies, academics and lawyers. Each would probably be able to contribute 




According to the Chief Justice of Victoria, ‘[t]he judiciary regards it as fundamental that 
judges be beyond reproach in [their] behaviour both in [their] judicial and private lives.’
277
 
To ensure that Australian judges are ‘beyond reproach’
278
 and to maintain confidence in the 
judiciary, ethical organisations, senior judges and academics should advise judges about 
social media use by modifying the AIJA Guide.  
 
Black writes that ‘[s]ince sending [judges] back to 1990 in a time machine isn’t an option, the 
wisest course of action [on judges’ social media use] is to adopt reasonable standards that 
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 This chapter has attempted to find such reasonable standards 
while considering the importance of maintaining confidence in the judiciary. The American 
experience of judges’ use of social media to date demonstrates that it is possible for judges to 
use social media inappropriately. Rather than wait for this to occur in Australia, it is 
recommended that senior judges, ethical organisations and academics act now to advise 
judges about social media use by amending the AIJA Guide. Lawyers are another stakeholder 
in the Australian legal system who are impacted by social media; their situation is addressed 
in the following chapter. 
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Social media has changed the way that millions of people communicate, including lawyers. A 
BRR Media survey of 80 Australian law firms found that 91.3 per cent of the firms used 
social media:
1
 55 per cent of firms used Twitter and 36.3 per cent used Facebook.
2
 A study 
by Business Review Weekly found that one third of the law firms surveyed used a consultant 
or hired an employee to assist with social media issues. The study also found that 20 per cent 
of firms gave their employees social media training.
3
 Social media has had a major impact on 
how lawyers work.
4
 Lawyers worldwide use social media
5
 to advertise their business and to 
network.
6




According to the Law Institute of Victoria, ‘[s]ocial media presents both opportunities and 
challenges for legal practitioners’.
8
 One of these challenges is the need for lawyers to 
understand and consider the ethical implications of their social media use.
9
 One commentator 
wrote that ‘[s]ocial networking requires concerted thinking about the adaptation of legal 
ethics rules to a dynamic world, where interactions between attorneys, clients, and 
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This chapter provides a background on professional rules for lawyers. It then identifies the 
potential benefits and dangers to lawyers of using social media, as well as the the ethical 
guidelines on social media that staff of law societies and relevant professional bodies have 
provided to date. This is followed by an examination of three issues involving lawyers’ 
professional ethical duties and social media: unintended and faulty retainers, the duty to the 
court and the duty of confidentiality. The question is posed whether written ethical guidelines 
are necessary for Australian lawyers on this topic. This chapter does not aim to examine 
lawyer-judge interactions. Instead, it focuses primarily on lawyers interacting with clients, 
with each other and with members of the public. This chapter ultimately argues that social 
media present new ethical challenges for lawyers, and that uniform, standalone ethical 
guidelines are necessary as a result. Model guidelines for legal regulators to use are offered in 
Appendix A. It is important that lawyers are able to face the ethical challenges that social 
media present, because if they do not, the public could lose confidence in the courts and the 
legal profession.  
 
3.2 A Brief Background on Professional Conduct Rules for Lawyers 
 
In Australia, the common law, court rules and professional conduct rules (“Professional 
Rules”) advise lawyers about how to behave ethically.
11
 The Professional Rules are a guide 
for ‘proper behaviour’ for lawyers.
12
 Each Australian State and Territory has its own version 
of the Professional Rules.
13
 The Professional Rules implement most of the Australian Law 
Council’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, released in 2002;
14
 however, 
they vary in some aspects according to the jurisdiction.
15
 The Professional Rules exemplify 
the legal profession’s commitment to upholding the integrity of its members,
16
 and ‘have 
considerable force’ on judicial officers’ decisions.
17
 A lawyer may be disciplined if he or she 
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68 
 
does not follow a Professional Rule.
18
 The public may have greater confidence in the legal 
profession because of the Professional Rules, which provide clear standards that permit the 
behaviour of lawyers to be measured and assessed, particularly from an ethical perspective. 
 
In 2010, staff of the Law Council and the Australian Bar Association released a new uniform 
draft of the Professional Rules.
19
 The new rules are intended to ‘ensure all of Australia’s 
solicitors are bound by a common set of professional obligations and ethical principles when 
dealing with their clients, the courts, their fellow legal practitioners, regulators and other 
persons’.
20
 The rules are entitled the Legal Profession National Rules: Solicitors’ Rules 2011 
(“Solicitors’ Rules”) and the Legal Profession National Rules: Barristers’ Rules 2010 
(“Barristers’ Rules”).
21
 Staff of the Law Council also released draft commentary on the 
Solicitors’ Rules.
22
 Staff at law societies nationwide are working to implement the Solicitors’ 
Rules and the Barristers’ Rules,
23
 but only the law societies of Queensland and South 
Australia have adopted the Solicitors’ Rules to date.
24







 and South Australia
28
 have adopted 
the Barristers’ Rules thus far. The public may have greater confidence in the legal profession 
because the profession’s regulators ensure that they consistently review the Professional 
Rules. 
 
Some of the Solicitors’ Rules that will be considered in this chapter are: the duty to the court 
and the administration of justice, which is paramount; the duty of confidentiality; the duty to 
act with integrity; the duty for lawyers to supervise all employees working on a legal matter; 
and the duty not to publish comments about current legal proceedings that could result in an 
unfair trial or challenges to the administration of justice. 
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 and the United 
Kingdom.
31
 The rules regulating lawyers’ conduct ‘in all jurisdictions are predominantly 




3.3 Benefits to Lawyers of Using Social Media 
 
There are several benefits for lawyers who use social media. Social media can be a ‘potent 
marketing tool’
33
 to lawyers for little or no cost.
34
 Lawyers use social media to advertise to 
potential clients, to recruit new staff
35
 and to network with many people in a short time.
36
 
Lawyers can also use social media to educate the public and other lawyers,
37
 which can 
increase the public’s confidence in the legal profession. Lawyers can easily promote 
themselves to clients outside their jurisdiction by using social media.
38
 Lawyers can also use 
social media to provide news about their firm and about the law.
39
 Journalists who read a law 





Lawyers may use social media to improve the profession’s reputation. For example, staff of 
the Law Institute of Victoria are using social media in their Reputation Project to try to 
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2011, [31] <http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/follow-the-leaders-the-business-case-for-social-me>. 
70 
 
improve the public’s perception of lawyers.
41
 To do this, they created a YouTube channel and 
a blog that posts positive stories about lawyers for the public.
42
 Initiatives like these may 
increase the public’s confidence in the legal profession.  
 
Lawyers may also find valuable evidence on social media that could assist them in trials. For 
example, a plaintiff in a personal injury case alleged that she could no longer play the piano. 




This section has briefly examined how lawyers can benefit from using social media. Lawyers 
are likely to use social media as a result of the benefits that it offers them. As a result, 
uniform ethical guidelines for lawyers are necessary to assist them in making appropriate use 
of social media while maintaining the public’s confidence in the legal profession. 
 
3.4 Potential Problems for Lawyers Using Social Media 
 
Many problems can result when lawyers use social media inappropriately. If such problems 
do occur, and the public learns about it, this could cause the public to lose confidence in the 
legal profession. One example of a problem that could occur is where a lawyer posts 
information on social media that contains a mistake about the legislation that applies to a 
matter. It may subsequently be difficult for the lawyer to fix the mistake, because the 
statement may have already been viewed by many people, including people whom the lawyer 
does not know.
44










 Because of this, some lawyers may not exercise the same discretion while using 
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social media that they normally would in other contexts. This increases the chances that a 
lawyer may make a mistake on social media, such as writing something inappropriate
48
 or 
that breaches Professional Rules.  
 
Problems on social media may also result from social media’s interactivity and the fact that 
users cannot control the actions of other users. For example, a non-lawyer social media friend 
could post on a lawyer’s Facebook wall, ‘I hope that court went well today. I also hope that 
the Judge you hate and who naps in court was not too hard on you.’ Facebook friends of the 
lawyer’s friends may be able to see this post. This could potentially lower the lawyer’s 
reputation or point to a breach of the Solicitors’ Rule to act with integrity.  
 
A lawyer might also post a link to a friend’s Twitter or Facebook page without properly 
examining the page. The lawyer’s friend’s page might, for example, contain a short note that 
includes sexist material. It would then be arguable that the lawyer’s conduct breached the 
Solicitors’ Rule not to ‘bring the profession into dispute’ in the ‘course of practice or 
otherwise’ or the Solicitor’s Rule not to discriminate.  
 
Lawyers may face problems on social media if they do not properly understand how to use 
them. For example, Julian Burnside QC, a prominent Australian human rights lawyer, 
tweeted that the then Opposition Leader Tony Abbott was part of a group who were ‘[p]aedos 
in speedos’.
49
 Burnside’s comment referred to paedophilia.
50
 Burnside claimed that he 
thought that he sent the message to one person on Twitter, but he actually sent it to 5000 
people.
51
 Burnside later apologised for his post and explained that he did not understand the 
technology that he was using.
52
 This incident shows that any lawyer, no matter his or her 
level of legal experience, can make a mistake while using social media if he or she does not 
know how to use it. Burnside’s mistake also shows the importance of teaching lawyers how 
to use social media properly.  
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 Ibid [2].  
51
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If a lawyer writes something inappropriate on social media, staff of a legal regulatory body 
may take action against him or her.
53
 Sean Conway, a lawyer in Florida, wrote derogatory 
remarks about Judge Cheryl Aleman on a blog, stating that Her Honour was an ‘EVIL 
UNFAIR WITCH’, ‘seemingly mentally ill’ and ‘clearly unfit for her position’. Conway 
received a public reprimand as a result
54
 and had to pay a $1250 fine.
55
 Comments like 
Conway’s have the potential to result in the public losing confidence in the courts and the 
legal profession. If social media did not exist, perhaps Conway would merely have made 
those comments personally to a few people. While this would still be a problem, and 
Conway’s comments would be considered unprofessional irrespective of the medium he used, 
they would likely not have reached as many people if not delivered using social media. 
Conway’s is admittedly an extreme example of a lawyer using social media inappropriately, 
but it shows the need for ethical guidelines for lawyers about social media. If Conway had 
read ethical guidelines about social media, perhaps he would not have made the relevant blog 
post. 
 
If a lawyer uses social media inappropriately during a trial, it can have serious consequences 
for the trial and the accused. For example, in Florida, the family of an accused brought 
leopard-print underwear to court for the accused to wear.
56
 The accused’s lawyer 
photographed the underwear and posted the picture on her Facebook page with a caption
57
 
mocking the parents of the accused for thinking that the underwear was ‘proper attire for 
trial’.
58
 The lawyer for the accused did not act with integrity by posting the photograph of the 
underwear with the relevant caption. She also interfered with the administration of justice. 
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Someone who had seen the photograph on Facebook informed the judge, who declared a 
mistrial.
59
 The accused’s lawyer was also fired from her public defender role.
60
 It is probably 
rare for such serious consequences for a trial to result from a lawyer’s inappropriate use of 
social media; still, when it does occur, it is a significant waste of the court’s time and 
resources. It is probably worse for the appearance of the administration of justice if the 
negative consequences for the trial occur as a result of a lawyer’s behaviour, as opposed to a 
layperson’s behaviour. The lawyer’s actions just described could lower the status of the legal 
profession and the courts in the public’s eyes; they could also have embarrassed the accused 
and his family. However, it is possible that if a journalist took the photographs, instead of the 
accused’s lawyer, this would not have affected the public’s confidence in the legal 
profession. Journalists using social media in the courtroom is explored in detail in Chapter 
Five of this thesis. 
 
Confidentiality problems can occur when a lawyer uses social media inappropriately. If a 
lawyer does not log out of his or her social medium account after using it, then someone else 
accessing the same computer may be able to read what the lawyer wrote.
61
 Section 3.6.3 of 
this chapter discusses in detail the potential confidentiality problems that can arise from 
lawyers’ use of social media. Coralie Kenny and Tahlia Gordon state that  
 
[t]he use of social networking sites involves a fundamental change in the way legal 
practitioners communicate with their clients and consequently poses a greater risk of 
miscommunication. Although these approaches may involve more timely and better direct 
communication between client and practitioner, the nature of that communication also has the 
potential to create confusion, misunderstanding and unrealistic expectations, particularly where 




Kenny and Gordon make a good point: given how quickly messages can be sent on social 
media, clients may expect quick response times if they have open channels of communication 
with their lawyers via social media. On the other hand, email has existed for at least 15 years, 
so it is possible that clients will not increase their expectations from lawyers as a result of 
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using social media more than they did as a result of using email. Some lawyers may choose 
not to use social media when communicating with their clients, though they may use social 
media personally. Kenny and Gordon are correct that social media can increase the risk of 
miscommunication between a lawyer and a client. Since people can post information on 
social media quickly, it is possible that a client or a lawyer will not think carefully before 
sending a message to the other, which could cause miscommunication.  
 
Lawyers can be fired if they use social media inappropriately. In the United States, Aaron 
Brockler, a prosecutor in Ohio, created a fake Facebook profile and then initiated 
conversations with two witnesses in a trial in which he was appearing. He attempted to 
convince the women to change their testimony. Brockler acted dishonestly, and was later 
fired from his position.
63
 As discussed earlier, a public defender in Florida was also fired for 




As a result of the problems that can occur when lawyers use social media inappropriately, 
Australian ethical bodies may want to implement a standard set of national ethical guidelines 
for lawyers regarding social media use. The following section will discuss the actions that 
staff of ethical bodies in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have 
taken to date to release ethical guidelines on this issue. 
 
3.5 Actions that Legal Regulators Have Taken to Date 
 
Staff of ethical bodies in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have 
taken various actions to advise lawyers about how they should use social media in ways that 
take account of their professional ethical obligations. In Australia, the Law Institute of 
Victoria was the first Australian law society to release guidelines for lawyers on social 
media
65
 when it released its Guidelines on the Ethical Use of Social Media.
66
 These 
guidelines were released in response to many lawyers’ requests for help with ethical issues 
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concerning social media use.
67
 Some of the issues that the Law Institute of Victoria’s 





Officials in Victoria have introduced other initiatives to advise lawyers about their ethical 
obligations while using social media. The Law Institute of Victoria’s executive created a 
Social Media Task Force to inform lawyers about best practices in social media use,
69
 and the 
President of the Institute wrote his views about ethics and social media on his blog.
70
 The 




In New South Wales, the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (“Commissioner’s 
Office”) published draft ethical guidelines for lawyers on social media use.
72
 These draft 
guidelines are not binding on lawyers.
73
 Staff of the Commissioner’s Office also wrote about 
social media in their newsletter, Without Prejudice,
74
 and released a paper about the issue.
75
 
Staff of the Law Society of New South Wales’ Legal Technology Committee released 
‘Guidelines on Social Media Policies’.
76
 Staff of the Queensland Law Society’s Ethics Centre 




There are significant differences among the four sets of guidelines. For example, the Law 
Institute of Victoria’s guidelines discuss the harm to a lawyer’s reputation that can result 
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from using social media inappropriately, but the Queensland and New South Wales law 
societies’ and Commissioner’s Office’s guidelines do not. 
 
The law societies of the other Australian States and Territories have not released guidelines 
on this topic to date,
78
 nor do any uniform guidelines on lawyers’ social media use exist for 
all lawyers Australia-wide.
79
 It is possible that lawyers in the Australian jurisdictions 
currently lacking ethical guidelines for social media use are less prepared for ethical 
challenges involving social media, and may be more likely to cause a decrease in public 
confidence in the legal profession in those jurisdictions as a consequence. These lawyers may 
breach some of the Solicitors’ Rules, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter: the duty to the court and the administration of justice that is paramount, the duty of 
confidentiality, the duty to act with integrity, the duty for lawyers to supervise all employees 
working on a legal matter, and the duty not to publish comments about current legal 
proceedings that could result in an unfair trial or challenges to the administration of justice.  
 
Some Australian law societies may not release ethical guidelines on this issue until it  
becomes sufficiently important, which may not happen until society officials learn that an 
Australian lawyer has breached his or her ethical obligations while using social media. Legal 
regulators in Western Australia, South Australia and the Territories may currently be 
considering the guidelines released by the other states and planning to release guidelines 
themselves in the future. They may also believe that the existing Australian guidelines about 
this issue are sufficient and that lawyers in their States and Territories can refer to them. 
Nevertheless, the websites of the law societies in Western Australia, South Australia and the 
Territories do not currently provide links to the other states’ guidelines; this may indicate that 
they do not intend to refer lawyers in their jurisdictions to them. 
 
It is interesting to note that members of legal ethical bodies and judicial officers in Victoria 
generally employ a forward-thinking approach to social media. For example, staff of the 
Victorian Supreme Court were the first in Australia to release a policy permitting journalists 
to use social media in the courtroom (this issue is examined in more detail in Chapter Five). 
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 have also contributed to the debate about lawyers using 
social media by conducting research and writing articles about this topic. Such research has 
not revealed why more action has been taken in the area of lawyers using social media than in 
other areas involving social media and the courts, such as judges using social media. Perhaps 
one reason is that there are more lawyers in Australia than judges, and accordingly there may 
be more demand from lawyers. It is also harder to become a judge than a lawyer, and 
accordingly judges may have received more training in ethics than lawyers, and possess the 
ability to apply their ethical training to the social media context.   
 
In the United Kingdom, staff of the United Kingdom Bar Standards Board released a media 
comment in April 2013 about traditional and social media.
82
 The purpose of the comment 
was ‘to clarify the remaining ethical obligations in relation to media comment and to suggest 
some of the issues that the barrister should bear in mind while exercising professional 
judgment’.
83
 Staff of the United Kingdom Law Society released a practice note on social 
media use
84
 addressing how social media affects the lawyer-client relationship, privacy issues 
and the creation of a social media policy.
85
 The same organisation also released a practice 
note titled ‘Protecting Your Online Reputation’
86
 that addresses establishing and monitoring 
lawyers’ online profiles. The practice note states that lawyers are not required to follow their 
practice notes, but if they do, it might make it easier for them if an incident occurs and they 




In Canada, officials of the Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee of the Canadian 
Bar Association released ‘Your Presence in the E-World Guidelines for Ethical Marketing 
Practices Using New Information Technologies’, which advises lawyers on the use of social 
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 The Canadian Bar Association also released ‘Guidelines for Practising Ethically 
with New Information Technologies’, which supplements its Code of Professional Conduct.
89
 
The guidelines of the Canadian Bar Association discuss confidentiality, marketing and other 
important issues.
90
 The Federation of Law Societies of Canada released guidelines about 
lawyers using electronic technology
91
 and some law societies modified their guidelines 
accordingly. The law societies or barristers’ societies of the following Canadian provinces 
have adopted modified guidelines: British Columbia,
92













 Some of the 




 A search of the relevant literature in this 
area could not find what encouraged staff of Canadian regulators to offer guidelines on this 
issue years before their counterparts in the United Kingdom and Australia did.  
 
The United States Bar Association created the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to examine 
ethical issues involving technology and lawyers.
101
 It was created in 2009 to review the ABA 
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) while considering the impact of 




This section of this chapter has examined the actions that officials in four jurisdictions have 
taken to date to advise lawyers about their social media use. It appears that the United 
Kingdom is the only jurisdiction where legal regulators have released uniform, standalone 
ethical guidelines for lawyers. Australian regulators should consider following suit by 
adopting the guidelines suggested in Appendix A of this thesis.  
 
3.6 Examining Specific Ethical Situations 
 
3.6.1 Unintended or Faulty Retainers 
 
The word ‘retainer’ describes a contract between a lawyer and a client for the provision of 
legal services.
103
 If a retainer exists, then the lawyer owes fiduciary duties to the client,
104
 
including the duty of confidentiality.
105
 A lawyer’s professional indemnity insurance 
normally applies to work that is completed pursuant to a retainer.
106
 If a lawyer lacks the 
knowledge required to complete certain work, then the lawyer should refuse the retainer
107
 
and refer the work to another lawyer.
108
 A lawyer cannot accept a retainer if it conflicts with 
his or her duties to other current or former clients or with his or her own interests.
109
 If a 
lawyer acts in litigation without a proper retainer, then the lawyer may have to pay their 
client’s costs.
110
 It is possible that a lawyer may create an unintended retainer with a client in 




Problems can arise when a lawyer uses social media in such a way that gives rise to an 
unintended retainer. Steve Mark, Tahlia Gordon and Rita Shackel argue that some clients 
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believe that a retainer exists simply because a lawyer and a potential client are friends on 
social media.
112
 Common sense likely dictates that more communication than a simple social 
media friendship would be necessary for a client to believe that a retainer exists.  
 
3.6.1.1 Asking a Lawyer a Question on Social Media 
 
A non-lawyer may ask a lawyer questions on social media that the lawyer may answer. A 
non-lawyer may also ask the general public a legal question on his or her social media page, 
and a lawyer may decide to assist the non-lawyer by answering the question. This can create 
an unintended retainer.
113
 Some academics and staff of ethical bodies argue that if a lawyer 
posts an answer to a general hypothetical situation (as opposed to applying a client’s specific 
facts while providing advice), then it is unlikely that a retainer is created.
114
 This situation can 
be contrasted with the practices of certain law firms whose members appear to genuinely 
intend to create a retainer while advising a client on social media.
115
 For example, lawyers of 
the British law firm Loyalty Law Solicitors offer free legal opinions on their Twitter page, 
@thelegaloracle, to anyone who tweets questions.
116
 The advice that Loyalty Law Solicitors’ 
lawyers provide is 140 characters or less. In general, if a potential client asks a lawyer a 
question on social media and the lawyer answers the question generally, a client may still 
assume that a retainer was created by the lawyer’s mere answering of the question; this 
means that if a lawyer provides general legal advice to a client on social media, it is important 
that in addition to answering the question, the lawyer clearly states that he or she does not 
intend to create a retainer.
117
 Even better, if the lawyer does not intend to create a retainer 
when a client requests legal advice on social media, the lawyer should not post any legal 
response. The lawyer could post, ‘Why don’t you email my firm at [insert email] to set up an 
appointment to discuss this?’ The lawyer could also post, ‘Sorry, I can’t help you.’ However, 
this response may disappoint a potential client. If that person makes negative posts about the 
lawyer as a result, it could negatively affect the lawyer’s practice. People who are not lawyers 
often ask lawyers for advice in situations in which it is debatable whether a retainer is created 
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(e.g. at parties), and it is possible that non-lawyers regularly ask lawyers legal questions on 
social media. Consequently, it may be important to advise lawyers on this issue. This is 
particularly the case because the lawyer’s insurance may not cover the lawyer where they 
give advice without the existence of a retainer. If a client believes that a retainer was created 
on social media, but a lawyer behaves otherwise, the client’s confidence in the legal 
profession may decrease. 
 
3.6.1.2 Asking a Question of a Lawyer Not Licensed to Practise in the Relevant 
Jurisdiction 
 
A potential client may also post a question on a lawyer’s social media page that the lawyer 
should not answer because he or she is not licensed to practise in the potential client’s 
jurisdiction.
118
 The lawyer may answer the question because he or she does not believe that a 
retainer was created or the lawyer may not have considered the repercussions of giving legal 
advice to a client in a jurisdiction where he or she is not licensed to practise. Given how 
quickly one can post information on social media, the lawyer may not have checked the 
jurisdiction of the potential client who posted the question.  
 
3.6.1.3 Having Different Ideas About the Scope of a Retainer 
 
A retainer may exist on social media between a lawyer and a client, but the lawyer and client 
may have different ideas about the scope of the retainer because of the brevity of their social 
media exchanges. For example, a client may ask the lawyer a question on social media about 
whether it is worth suing his or her builder over a $100 000 contractual dispute. The lawyer 
may reply on social media that the cause of action is worth pursuing and, if successful, the 
client may win costs. The lawyer may assume that this is the extent of the advice provided, 
but the client may assume that the lawyer will represent him or her in the litigation. It is 
possible for a lawyer and a client to have different ideas about the scope of a retainer if they 
meet in person, but this may be more likely to happen on social media because of its typical 
brevity and informality of communication. If a client and a lawyer have different ideas about 
the scope of a retainer, this could decrease the client’s confidence in the legal profession.  
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3.6.1.4 Not Taking Full Instructions on Social Media 
 
If a lawyer answers another person’s question on social media and the lawyer does not take 
full instructions, the lawyer may not have the necessary knowledge to properly advise the 
client. As a consequence, the lawyer may unintentionally provide inaccurate legal advice. 
The client could face many negative repercussions if they act upon inaccurate legal advice: 
the client could commence a frivolous lawsuit, or fail to commence a legitimate lawsuit 
because they do not believe that they have a good cause of action. A client’s confidence in 
the legal profession could decrease as a result of receiving inaccurate legal advice.  
 
3.6.1.5 Non-Clients Taking a Lawyer’s Advice Given on Social Media 
 
A lawyer may properly advise a client pursuant to a proper retainer on social media, but 
because the advice was given publicly, other people who are not the lawyer’s clients might 
read the advice and decide that it applies to them when it does not.
119
 These other people may 
then face problems because they implemented legal advice that did not apply to them. An 
issue may arise about whether non-clients who read a lawyer’s advice to others could hold 
the lawyer accountable for their implementation of the advice. These people may have 
lowered confidence in the legal profession as a result of taking the wrong advice. In this 
situation, a disclaimer may assist the lawyer to avoid being held accountable and prevent 
people from taking advice that was not meant for them. Disclaimers will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section. 
 
3.6.1.6 Opinions in the Different Guidelines Regarding Retainers in the Context of 
Social Media 
 
Several of the current guidelines discuss unintended retainers on social media. The Law 
Institute of Victoria’s guidelines state that 
 
[p]ractitioners should take particular care to avoid creating unintended solicitor-client 
relationships on social media channels. For example, if one of a practitioner’s Facebook 
‘friends’ posts a legal or quasi-legal question on the practitioner’s Facebook wall, any answer 
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posted by the practitioner may be construed by the questioner or other ‘friends’ as legal advice 
for which the practitioner may become liable. However, there is nothing to stop practitioners 




The Commissioner’s Office’s draft guidelines and the Law Society of Upper Canada’s online 
document titled ‘Professional Responsibilities When Using Technology’ give a similar 
warning to lawyers. These documents add that lawyers should clearly communicate to social 
media users that they do not intend to provide legal advice on social media,
121
 and that any 
information posted should not be used as legal advice.
122
 The model ethical guidelines in 
Appendix A of this thesis include a recommendation that lawyers add a disclaimer if they do 
not intend to provide legal advice. A lawyer should tailor the disclaimer to the specific 
situation. The lawyer may include a disclaimer that the advice is not intended to be legal 
advice or that the advice applies for a certain jurisdiction only.
123
 Perhaps a social media 
application can be created that adds a disclaimer to lawyers’ posts and requires clients to tick 
a box indicating that they accept the terms of the disclaimer. The fact that a lawyer adds a 
disclaimer does not necessarily mean that the potential client will read it, but it could 
potentially help the lawyer if litigation results from the advice. The disclaimer could also 
increase the chances that professional indemnity insurance would cover the lawyer in the 
event that the client sues them. 
 




 law societies’ guidelines, the Canadian Bar 
Association’s ‘Guidelines for Practising Ethically with New Information Technologies’
126
 
and the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s guidelines
127
 all briefly mention this issue. 
The Canadian document ‘Your Presence in the E-World Guidelines for Ethical Marketing 
Practices Using New Information Technologies’ discusses this issue and adds that lawyers 
may be in a position of conflict where they hold a retainer with someone whose interests 
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conflict with their current or past clients.
128
 The model guidelines in Appendix A contain a 
similar statement. Lawyers may forget about their responsibilities to avoid conflicts while 
communicating with clients or potential clients on social media. If lawyers provide advice 
while a conflict exists, then they may breach the Solicitors’ Rules or the Barristers’ Rules.
129
 
The Canadian document adds that a lawyer who makes an error while providing advice on 
social media could face a negligence claim.
130
 The model ethical guidelines include a 
statement similar to this one. A lawyer may think more carefully about his or her social 
media use if he or she is concerned that a negligence claim could result. 
 
The United Kingdom Law Society’s guidelines on social media do not discuss unintended 
retainers created on social media. The United States ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 
recommend that existing model guidelines for lawyers be modified to address social media. 





3.6.2 Lawyers’ Duty to the Court 
 
A lawyer has a duty to the court that is ‘paramount’,
132
 even if a client gives contrary 
instructions.
133
 A solicitor’s duty to the court is similar to a barrister’s duty to the court:
134
 
‘The essence of these duties is the requirement for lawyers (within the context of the 
adversarial system) to act professionally, with scrupulous fairness and integrity and to aid the 
court in promoting the cause of justice.’
135
 A lawyer’s duty to the court ‘includes [acting 
with] candour, honesty and fairness’.
136
 One of the purposes of a lawyer’s duty to the court is 
to protect the administration of justice by allowing judicial officers to regulate lawyers’ 
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behaviour to ensure that lawyers act appropriately.
137
 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Victoria states that there is also a duty to ensure that the public is aware of the lawyers’ 




The Solicitors’ Rules state that a lawyer’s ‘duty to the court and the administration of justice 
is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty’.
139
 The 
Solicitors’ Rules also state that lawyers must act with integrity
140
 and they must not, in their 
professional or personal lives, act in a way that lowers the public’s confidence in the 
administration of justice or ‘bring[s] the profession into disrepute’.
141
 The Solicitors’ Rules 
also state that lawyers must not publish any comments about current legal proceedings that 
could prejudice a fair trial or the administration of justice.
142
 The Barristers’ Rules are similar 




It is possible for lawyers to breach their duty to the court while using social media 
inappropriately. Lawyers might write negative comments on social media about judicial 
officers or other lawyers, and the likelihood of their doing so is increased by the informal 
nature of social media.
144
 These types of comments could decrease the public’s confidence in 
the courts and the legal profession. An example of this kind of behaviour is a prosecutor in 
San Francisco who blogged that the opposing counsel was ‘chicken’ because she requested a 
continuance.
145
 The presiding judge called the prosecutor’s comments ‘juvenile, obnoxious 
and unprofessional’.
146
 Another example of this type of conduct occurred during the murder 
and assault trial of a Somali man in Hennepin County Court in Minnesota, United States.
147
 
                                                             
137 Ipp, above n 135, 64.  
138
 Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘The Duty Owed to the Court — Sometimes Forgotten’ (Speech delivered at 
the Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, Melbourne, 9 October 2009) 23.  
139 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (at June 2011), r 3.  
140 Ibid r 4.1.4.  
141 Ibid r 5.1.  
142 Ibid r 28.  
143 See, eg, Australian Bar Association, Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules (at 1 February 2010) rr 4, 5, 12, 25, 
75(c).  
144 Law Institute of Victoria, above n 8, [1]  
145 Gina Slaughter and John G Browning, ‘Feature: The Attorney and Social Media Social Networking Dos and 
Don’ts for Lawyers and Judges’ (2010) 73(2) Texas Bar Journal 192, 193.   
146
 Margaret M DiBianca, ‘Ethical Risks Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to Use) Social Media’ (2011) 
12 Delaware Law Review 179, 197. 
147
 See, Eric Laplant, ‘Information Shared on Facebook Leads Towards Mistrial in Hennepin County Courts’ 





The prosecutor wrote derogatory comments about Somalis on her Facebook page. After the 
accused was convicted, the defence applied for a mistrial because of the prosecutor’s 
comments.
148
 It is possible that the prosecutor’s racist comments on social media would have 
lowered the public’s confidence in the judicial process even more than if the prosecutor had 
written an insult about the competence of a judge or a fellow lawyer. Kristine Peshek, an 
Illinois lawyer, called a judge ‘Judge Clueless’ on her blog. Peshek was fired from her 
position as a result of her actions and her licence to practise law was suspended for 60 
days.
149
 If Australian lawyers acted in a fashion similar to these three aforementioned 
lawyers, they would be breaching the Solicitors’ Rules, which require them to act with 
integrity and not in a way that brings the profession into disrepute.  
 
While it would have been possible for lawyers to make comments of the nature made in these 
examples prior to the creation of social media, it is unlikely that the comments would be sent 
to such a large audience. Therefore, it is important that legal regulators in all Australian 
jurisdictions create ethical guidelines regarding social media use for lawyers, such as those in 
Appendix A of this thesis. After reading these guidelines, lawyers may be less likely to 
behave like the lawyers discussed above. This will be particularly the case if the ethical 
guidelines clearly state the negative consequences for lawyers who engage in such 
inappropriate use of social media.  
 
3.6.2.1 Approach of the Law Institute of Victoria’s Guidelines 
 
The Law Institute of Victoria’s guidelines provide details about how a lawyer’s duty to the 
administration of justice may be challenged on social media. As mentioned above, the 
guidelines state that ‘[e]very practitioner owes a duty to the court and to the administration of 
justice which is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty.’
150
 
It then reminds lawyers not to say anything negative about judges or lawyers on social media 
and not to comment on the merits of their cases on social media.
151
 This comment is a useful 
reminder to lawyers. One might argue that the comment is unnecessary because this should 
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be obvious to lawyers. However, it clearly is not obvious; the examples mentioned have 
shown that some American lawyers could have benefitted from such advice. The Law 
Institute of Victoria’s guidelines also state that lawyers should not post anything on social 
media that they would not feel comfortable saying in front of a crowd.
152
 This is helpful in 
that it provides a test that lawyers can apply to a comment prior to posting it on social media. 
A better test may be that lawyers should not post anything on social media that they would 
not be comfortable saying in front of a judge; this is likely a higher threshold. It is possible 
that a lawyer’s post on social media could be brought to a judge’s attention, despite a lawyer 
not intending it to be (e.g., a lawyer writes something that opposing counsel emails to a 
judge’s associate). This supports the view that the appropriate test is whether a lawyer would 
feel comfortable saying the comment in front of a judge.  
 
3.6.2.2 Lawyers Post Comments About the Merits of Cases 
 
If lawyers post comments about the merits of cases that are before the court or may be before 
the court in the future, this can potentially interfere with the administration of justice.
153
 It 
can also breach the Solicitors’ Rules or professional conduct rules in other jurisdictions. For 
example, a prosecutor in Florida posted updates about an assault trial on Facebook based on 
the Gilligan’s Island theme song. The prosecutor was disciplined for his actions.
154
 In Wilson, 
Wilson, a lawyer, served as a juror, but did not inform the court that he was a lawyer.
155
 
While a juror, Wilson wrote about the trial on his blog
156
 and included the defendant’s and 
the judge’s name.
157
 He stated that the judge was ‘a stern, attentive woman with thin red hair 
and long, spidery fingers that as a grandkid you probably wouldn’t want snapped at you’.
158
 
Wilson was suspended for 45 days from practising law and was required to write an exam in 
ethics because of his actions.
159
 In both these cases, the lawyers’ behaviour appears quite 
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 and could have decreased the public’s confidence in the courts and the legal 
profession. 
 
While in the past lawyers who commented about the merits of a case in public could reach 
many people, it is unlikely that they could have easily reached as many people as is possible 
with social media. If a lawyer commented about a case to a journalist, the lawyer may have 
had sufficient time before the interview itself to carefully think about the ethical 
repercussions of what he or she would say. There might also have been time between the 
interview and publishing or broadcasting the interview for the lawyer to ask the journalist to 
retract his or her comments.  
 
Social media may also reveal inappropriate behaviour that legal regulators may not have 
known about otherwise. For example, prior to social media, a lawyer may have simply orally 
told their friends information about a client that was confidential. Currently, if a lawyer tells 
their friends confidential information about a client on social media, the friends of the lawyer 
can show the recorded exchange of information to relevant legal regulators. The presence of 
such evidence could make it easier for legal regulators to decide how to deal with the 
situation. 
 
3.6.2.3 Approaches of Other Existing Guidelines 
 
The Commissioner’s Office’s draft guidelines,
161
 the New South Wales’ Law Society’s 
guidelines,
162
 the United Kingdom Bar Standards Board media guidelines,
163
 the United 
Kingdom Law Society’s social media guidelines
164
 and the Canadian ‘Your Presence in the 
E-World Guidelines for Ethical Marketing Practices Using New Information 
Technologies’
165
 each briefly state that lawyers should be courteous and act with integrity 
while using social media. The Queensland Law Society’s guidelines also briefly touch on this 
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issue and refer lawyers to the American Peshek case.
166
 The United Kingdom Law Society’s 
guidelines provide a hypothetical example of a lawyer who posts an anonymous comment 
about a client that the mainstream media publicises.
167
 This comment could negatively impact 
upon the lawyer and potentially decrease confidence in the legal profession. The model 
guidelines in Appendix A of this thesis include real examples while describing this situation. 
They likely have a greater impact on readers than a hypothetical example. The Canadian Bar 
Association’s ‘Guidelines for Practising Ethically with New Information Technologies’ goes 
further than the other guidelines, stating that lawyers’ communications on social media 
should conform to the Code of Conduct
168
 and that lawyers should ‘be vigilant to avoid 
jeopardizing their professional integrity, independence or competence’.
169
 It further states that 
 
[i]n communicating online, lawyers should encourage public respect for, and try to improve, the 
administration of justice (Rule in Chapter XIII). Any criticism of, and proposals for 





It also reminds lawyers that they should be careful because their occupation can add authority 
to their social media posts (the model guidelines in Appendix A adopt this view)
171
 and that 
lawyers ‘should be circumspect in their participation in online public discussions. Online 
public discussions should be conducted with the same respect for the administration of justice 
required of public statements that lawyers may make in other forums and media’.
172
 The 
model guidelines similarly state that lawyers should maintain their integrity online.  
 
The model guidelines additionally state that lawyers should be careful about the photos that 
they post on social media or that others tag them in. This is because it is possible that some of 
these photos could breach the Solicitors’ Rule not to bring the profession into disrepute and 
could lower the public’s confidence in the legal profession. An example of this would be a 
photo of a lawyer wearing a wig and holding several beers in front of a court building. A 
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similar comment would apply to care taken about the videos that lawyers post on social 
media.  
 
3.6.3 Lawyers’ Duty of Confidentiality 
 
Lawyers have a duty to keep their clients’ information confidential.
173
 That duty ‘is 
fundamental to the relationship between solicitor and client’.
174
 This duty encourages clients 
to tell their lawyers everything about their matter.
175
 If a lawyer breaches the duty of 
confidentiality, it may be considered professional misconduct. Indeed, Justice John 
McKechnie of the Supreme Court of Western Australia refers to breached confidentiality as 
‘a cardinal sin’.
176
 The duty of confidentiality is part of the fiduciary relationship between 
lawyers and their clients,
177
 and as such has an important relationship with the public’s 






 and each Australian State and Territory’s 
Professional Rules discuss the duty of confidentiality.
180
 The rules generally state that a 
lawyer may not provide anyone outside his or her firm with any confidential information 
obtained from a client unless the client gives permission or the lawyer is required to provide 
the information by law. The Solicitors’ Rules and the Barristers’ Rules do not define what 
information is ‘confidential’
181
, but the commentary to the Solicitors’ Rules states that the 
following are classes of information that may be confidential: 
                                                             
173 Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Camp [2010] WASC 188 (28 July 2010) [33] (Heenan, Blaxell and 
Beech JJ). 
174 Legal Services Commissioner v Tampoe [2009] LPT 14 (Atkinson J), quoted in Kenneth Martin J, ‘Between 
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Conflict Between Duty to the Client and Duty to the Court’ (Speech delivered 
at the Bar Association of Queensland Annual Conference, 4 March 2012) 21. 
175 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 114 (Deane J).  
176 Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Walton [2006] WASC 213 (1 September 2006) [21] (McKechnie 
J). 
177 Bride v Freehill Hollingdale & Page [1996] ANZ Conv R 593.  
178 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (at June 2011) r 9.  
179
 Australian Bar Association, Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules (at 1 February 2010) rr 108–112.  
180 Barristers’ Rules 2011 (Qld), rr 109–115; Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld) r 3; South Australian 
Barristers Rules 2010 (SA) rr 108–114; Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2011 (SA) r 9; Professional Conduct 
and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) r 3; The Victorian Bar Practice Rules 2009 (Vic) rr 62–67; Professional Conduct and 
Practice Rules 1995 (NSW) r 2; Barristers’ Rules 2011 (NSW) r 108–112; Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 
(WA) r 9; Barristers Rules 2011 (WA) rr 108–112; Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT) r 2; Legal 
Profession (Barristers) Rules 2008 (ACT) rr 103–110; Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 2002 (NT) r 2; 
Barristers Conduct Rules 2003 (NT) rr 103–109; Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 11. 
181
 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2011 and Consultation Draft Commentary (at 




(a) information of a former client that is directly related to a matter for an exist ing client, 
for example information belonging to an insurer concerning a potential claim, in 
circumstances where the solicitor is asked to accept instructions to act for the 
claimant; 
(b) information of relevance to a competitor, such as product pricing or business models; 
and 
(c) in some circumstances, particularly intimate knowledge of a client, its business, 
personality and strategies, for example in [the] Yunghanns case.  
 
Social media provide several new ways for lawyers to breach the duty of confidentiality, 
many accidental.
182
 If a lawyer writes on social media that he or she just met with a client, but 
does not name the client, other people who know who the lawyer met with can learn about 
the existence of the lawyer-client relationship between the two.
183
 Lawyers can make other 
remarks about a client that may not mention the client’s name, but nevertheless allow others 
to deduce who the client is. The client’s confidence in the legal profession may then decrease. 
For example, if a lawyer’s client has a retail shop, the lawyer could write on social media, 
‘The client who I saw today gave me a new pair of jeans. It’s nice to be appreciated, for 
once!’ Lawyers can breach the duty of confidentiality on social media by writing something 
confidential on other lawyers’ social media pages. In particular, lawyers may not think of the 
ethical problems that can result when they write on the social media page of another lawyer at 
their firm. The other lawyer’s privacy settings may permit people from outside his or her firm 
to see the posts, which could result in an unintended breach of confidentiality. 
 
A lawyer may ‘vent’ about his or her job, clients or judges he or she appears before on social 
media, which could result in a breach of his or her duty of confidentiality.
184
 For example, In 
the Matter of Margrett A. Skinner in the United States, one of Skinner’s clients wrote 
negative comments about Skinner’s conduct as a lawyer on a few websites. Skinner retaliated 
by writing confidential information about the client on blogs.
185
 In re Peshek, Kristine A 
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Peshek wrote her clients’ names and gaol identification numbers on her blog. Judicial officers 
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin suspended her licence to practise law for 60 days as a 
result.
186
 Carrie Pixler and Lori Higuera state that ‘Peshek’s case is an extreme situation in 
which most attorneys would (hopefully) not find themselves.’
187
 It is to be hoped that Pixler 
and Higuera are correct. Skinner and Peshek’s actions may have decreased the public’s 
confidence in the legal profession.  
 
While some lawyers have vented inappropriately about their jobs and clients for as long as 
the profession has existed, the ability of social media to reach so many people quickly makes 
the situation arguably worse than in the previous contexts. Additionally, social media’s 
ability to instantly show information to the public is relevant. Imagine if social media 
platforms had an approval process, whereby after someone types information, 24 hours would 
pass before the writer would have to provide final approval to post the information. Perhaps 
Skinner and Peshek could have avoided posting to the world what they likely wrote in a quick 
second of frustration. While a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is well known, lawyers may 
not recall this duty while using social media. If Skinner and Peshek had read ethical 
guidelines about social media use that examined the duty of confidentiality, perhaps they 
would not have acted as they did.  
 
3.6.3.1 Using Social Media to Import Information 
 
Some social media sites allow the user to import information, such as contacts, from his or 
her existing email accounts. In doing so, lawyers may accidentally post information about 
their clients or witnesses.
188
 Lawyers may try to hide the names of all their friends from each 
individual friend using social media’s privacy settings in order to prevent this from occurring. 
Lawyers should not rely on this; however, because privacy settings seem to change fairly 
often. This is also a situation that is likely unique to social media and shows how social 
media is a special case that is different from other ways of breaching client confidentiality.  
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3.6.3.2 Posting Photographs on Social Media 
 
Lawyers who post photographs on social media may reveal inappropriate information about 
one of their matters.
189
 For example, as previously discussed, in Florida, an accused’s lawyer 
posted a photograph of an accused’s underwear on Facebook, and the judge in the matter 
declared a mistrial.
190
 This example demonstrates how serious a lawyer using social media 
inappropriately can be: a mistrial can result.  
 
3.6.3.3 ‘Friending’ or Posting Links 
 
The Law Institute of Victoria’s guidelines state that lawyers can potentially breach client 
confidentiality even by simply becoming friends with a client on social media. After the 
lawyer and client connect on social media, members of the public may be able to identify 
who the lawyer’s clients are.
191
 Bennett states that if a lawyer posts a link to a client’s 
webpage on social media, the lawyer and client’s confidential relationship may become 
public.
192
 One might argue that it depends on whether any words accompany the link. If the 
lawyer writes words beneath the link that state ‘I have a meeting with the director of this 
business on Monday morning’, then someone who views the link could easily assume that the 
lawyer acts for the business. If the lawyer simply posts the link on his or her Twitter or 
Facebook page, it is possible that people who see the link will simply assume that the lawyer 
likes the business.  
 
3.6.3.4 Computer Security 
 
Social media works by cloud computing, where a third party external to the lawyer’s office 
hosts the lawyer’s information. Storing information that is not within a lawyer’s physical 
control could pose a problem because the client’s confidential information can be lost.
193
 
Individual computers and cloud storage platforms are vulnerable to hacking, whereby 
someone can access more information than what is easily accessible on social media.
194
 It is 
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important that all lawyers have a strategy to ensure that information on their computers is 
secure. If a lawyer’s social media site is hacked and confidential information is taken, this 
could lower the public’s confidence in the legal profession, in addition to causing other 
problems (e.g., a police investigation might be necessary).  
 
3.6.3.5 Non-Lawyer Employees 
 
The behaviour mentioned in this chapter also applies to a lawyer’s non-lawyer employees, 
who may breach the duty of confidentiality in the same ways as a lawyer.
195
 Interestingly, 
most of the guidelines on this issue (e.g., the guidelines of the Canadian Bar Association) do 
not remind lawyers that they should ensure that their non-lawyer employees follow them as 
well. The model guidelines offered in this thesis do make this recommendation. Something 
similar to rule 37 of the Solicitors’ Rules, which states that lawyers must supervise all 
employees working on a legal matter, may be appropriate. Arguably, a lawyer’s non-lawyer 
employees may be more likely to breach the relevant guidelines than a lawyer, because they 
may not have attended professional development seminars on ethics. At some law firms, 
there may be an information technology department, so lawyers may not consider the 
importance of ensuring that information on social media is kept confidential, instead simply 
leaving this responsibility to someone else. Lawyers should not solely rely on information 
technology professionals to ensure that they keep their client’s information confidential 
because informational technology professionals may not always be available to assist.  
 
3.6.3.6 Approaches to Confidentiality of the Existing Guidelines 
 
All of the guidelines published about social media mentioned in this chapter discuss 
confidentiality. The model guidelines in Appendix A also discuss confidentiality to lessen the 
chance that a lawyer will breach his or her duty of confidentiality while using social media.  
 
Some of the guidelines provide examples of mistakes that lawyers may make that result in a 
breach of their clients’ confidentiality while using social media. The Queensland Law 
Society’s guidelines briefly remind lawyers of their duty of confidentiality while using social 
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media and provide Peshek as an example.
196
 It is interesting that the Queensland Law 
Society’s guidelines are the only Australian ethical guidelines that mention one of the 
American examples in which a lawyer breached the duty of confidentiality; recalling these 
American examples is valuable. The model guidelines provide a real example in this area. In 
general it would be preferable to use an Australian example instead of an American one, as 
Australian lawyers could potentially better relate to an Australian example. Research in this 
area did not reveal any Australian examples to date.  
 
Some of the guidelines recommend actions for lawyers to take to prevent breaching their duty 
of confidentiality. The Commissioner’s Office’s draft guidelines recommend that lawyers be 
careful that their privacy settings on social media only permit appropriate people to see their 
social media pages, ‘and that inadvertent access or disclosure of confidential information 
cannot occur’.
197
 The comment in the Commissioner’s Office’s draft guidelines is a useful 
one, but in practice, lawyers may not be able to rely on their privacy settings to ensure that 
they maintain their duty of confidentiality on social media. People whom lawyers did not 
intend to see confidential information may then see it. Additionally, even if lawyers have 
very strict privacy settings, their friends on social media may not. This may result in friends 
of their friends being able to see confidential information on lawyers’ social media pages. 
The Commissioner’s Office draft guidelines also recommend that lawyers do not post 
confidential information on social media without obtaining their client’s permission first.
198
 
Lawyers clearly need to think carefully before asking a client for permission to post 
confidential information on social media; such a request may offend a client. If the lawyer 
does not obtain the client’s permission to post the confidential information on social media, 
then he or she must not post it.  
 
Members of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 amended the Model Rules to recommend 
that lawyers take ‘reasonable efforts’
199
 to ensure that they do not breach their duty of 
confidentiality. They do not define the words ‘reasonable efforts’. The Law Society of Upper 
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Canada’s online document ‘Professional Responsibilities When Using Technology’ has a 
section titled ‘Maintain Confidentiality’
200
 that similarly recommends that lawyers use the 
same standards of confidentiality that they use in other forms of communication in electronic 
communication. However, lawyers may want to consider approaching confidentiality on 
social media differently than they would other electronic communication because of how 
quickly and effortlessly confidential information can be sent to millions of people. The 
Canadian Bar Association’s Guidelines for Practising Ethically with New Information 
Technologies state that lawyers need to ensure that their communication with or about a client 
is ‘secure and not accessible to unauthorized individuals’.
201
 More information should be 
given about what ‘secure’ means, because some lawyers may be unaware of how to ensure 
that the information that they post on social media is secure. Knowing how to use social 
media and knowing about online security are quite different. This document and the British 
Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan guidelines recommend 
that lawyers think critically about the risks of a specific type of technology prior to sharing 
confidential information on it.
202
 This is a good recommendation and is included in the model 
guidelines. A cookie cutter approach to client confidentiality on social media may not be 
appropriate given that new types of technology emerge all the time.  
 
3.6.3.7 Deciding What Information is Confidential 
 
Canadian lawyer Michelle Allinotte recommends that when deciding whether information 
about a client is confidential, ‘ask yourself if the client would know you are talking about 
them when they read it. If the answer is yes, you either need to get their consent or you need 
to change the content of the post so that they cannot identify themselves’.
203
 Allinotte’s test is 
likely too narrow, because there may be situations where the client would not know whether 
the lawyer was talking about him or her, yet client confidentiality would still be breached. 
For example, for Australian lawyers, it may be better to think about whether they would post 
information of a kind listed in the Solicitors’ Rules’ explanation of the word ‘confidential’. 
This includes information that directly concerns a client or could assist a client’s rival. This 
helps to ensure that lawyers comply with their existing professional obligations. It is possible 
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that lawyers may have questions about whether they can post certain information on social 
media that is outside of the Solicitors’ Rules’ explanation of social media, yet which they 
may not instinctively feel right about posting. For example, if a judge delivered a judgment 
wherein a lawyer won a case, the lawyer may want to post on social media ‘I won at court 
today! My client, the plaintiff, won three millions dollars! I love lawyering!’ This comment 
does not appear to fall under the explanation of the word ‘confidential’ in the Solicitors’ 
Rules. Due to the open justice principle, the public probably could attend the hearing to see 
the judge deliver the judgment first hand. This principle is examined in more detail in 
Chapter Five. It might be argued that the post breaches the Solicitors’ Rule to avoid bringing 
the profession into disrepute. 
 
3.6.3.8 Internal Law Firm Policy on Social Media 
 
If a law firm has its own internal policy on social media, the policy can inform lawyers that 
they need to be careful that they do not disclose confidential information.
204
 Having an 
internal law firm policy on this issue is a good idea, because it reinforces that lawyers must 
take their duty of confidentiality seriously in the social media context. It also increases the 
possibility that lawyers will read a document about their ethical obligations while using social 
media (they can read the model guidelines and their law firm’s policy). Lawyers can also try 
to use their social media privacy settings to reduce the chances that they will breach their 
duty of confidentiality.
205
 For example, they can ensure that they have very strict privacy 
settings for their clients, to make it less likely that other people can see the information that 
they exchange with clients. Lawyers can then have more flexible privacy settings with their 
friends. Lawyers should remember that their privacy settings can change frequently. 
 
This section of the chapter has argued that written ethical guidelines for lawyers are 
necessary to advise lawyers about their duties of confidentiality while using social media. 
The following section will argue for the necessity of standalone national ethical guidelines on 
social media for Australian lawyers. 
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3.7 Recommendation: Create Uniform National Ethical Guidelines on Social Media 
 
Our brick and mortar world is receding into a virtual landscape. There is an online realm where 
hundreds of millions of people are conversing, networking, and logging the details of their 
lives. This new mode of human interaction does not fit neatly into any discovery statutes, case 
law precedents, or ethics codes. Indeed, the administration of justice is struggling to adapt to 
this emergent reality with little guidance. The social networking era, marked by the creation of 
instant communities and depots of personal information, is pushing legal practice towards the 




It is disputed whether written ethical guidelines about lawyers’ social media use are 
necessary. Some people believe that current ethical rules are sufficient and can be applied to 
social media use, while others believe that new ethical rules are necessary.
207
 Taylor states 
that rules of conduct for lawyers should not be amended to address social media because 
technology constantly changes. He adds that the new rules would ‘become obsolete over a 
very short period of time.’
208
 Just as society and its views on ethical behaviour change over 
time, ethical guidelines for lawyers must change over time. This chapter argues that written 
ethical guidelines are necessary for Australian lawyers in relation to social media, despite 
how often technology changes. Technology does not change so quickly that general ethical 
guidelines about social media use would become obsolete overnight. For example, the New 
South Wales Law Society’s guidelines are over a year old
209
 and do not appear outdated. The 
Canadian Bar Association’s ‘Guidelines for Practising Ethically with New Information 
Technologies’ is over four years old,
210
 yet it is still sufficiently relevant that that this chapter 
has referred to parts of it. 
 
Some people may argue that model ethical guidelines about lawyers’ social media use are not 
necessary because if lawyers experience ethical challenges while using social media, they 
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should cease using it. Given how many lawyers already use social media and its previously 
mentioned benefits to them, it is unlikely that this would happen. A much better solution is to 
release model ethical guidelines about this issue such as the ones in Appendix A of this 
thesis.  
 
Model ethical guidelines about social media use for Australian lawyers should be separate 
from the Solicitors’ Rules, Barristers’ Rules and other Professional Rules. Staff of Canadian 
and British ethical bodies, the Institute, the Commissioner’s Office and the New South Wales 
and Queensland Law Societies have released standalone guidelines. The American Bar 
Association appears to be the only organisation that modified its existing professional 
conduct rules to apply to social media. Creating a separate set of ethical guidelines is 
recommended, as opposed to modifying the Solicitors’ Rules and Barristers’ Rules, because it 
would be easier to update a shorter, more specific set of guidelines every few years as 
necessary, than to update various parts of the lengthy Solicitors’ Rules and Barristers’ Rules. 
Given how busy lawyers are known to be, it may also be easier to encourage lawyers to read 
a three to seven page ethical document about social media than a lengthier document. Law 
societies in Australia offer many standalone ethical guidelines on various topics;
211
 
standalone ethical guidelines on lawyers’ social media use should be similarly available. 
Clear ethical standards for Australian lawyers regarding social media use will help prevent 
lawyers from breaching the Solicitors’ Rules, the Barristers’ Rules and other Professional 
Rules. As a result, the public’s confidence in the legal profession will be maintained. 
 
It is recommended that legal regulators create a uniform set of guidelines for lawyers 
nationwide (or that they adopt the model guidelines in this thesis) because of the profession’s 
current stance towards uniformity. If legal regulators from some States’ and Territories’ law 
societies want to modify the uniform guidelines slightly, that could be provided for. Uniform 
ethical guidelines will also be useful for ensuring that the lawyers in each State and Territory 
have easy access to ethical guidelines on this issue. Single model guidelines may also signify 
to lawyers the importance of this issue; more lawyers nationally may read uniform national 
guidelines than when only a few states have guidelines. The drafters of such uniform 
guidelines may then receive more feedback about how to improve them.  
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Admittedly, the creation of national model guidelines for Australian lawyers such as the 
model guidelines in this thesis does not ensure that lawyers will read them. However, if 
single uniform national guidelines were created, lawyers could easily find them online. 
Furthermore, it would be possible to help more lawyers become aware of national model 
guidelines by offering professional development sessions about them. This would be 
preferable to the current situation, in which lawyers in the States and Territories that do not 
have guidelines have to make a comparatively large effort to examine the separate websites 
of the Law Institute of Victoria, the Commissioner’s Office and the New South Wales and 
Queensland Law Societies to find those organisations’ guidelines.  
 
Of the respondents to the International Bar Association’s survey on bar associations and 
social media, 80 per cent thought that ethical guidelines for lawyers should be modified to 
include social media.
212
 This adds further weight to the recommendation that model 
guidelines for Australian lawyers are necessary. 
 
Jared Correia suggests that the reason for the lack of ethical standards for lawyers on social 
media use is that the people responsible for creating these ethical standards do not have 
sufficient knowledge of social media and similar technologies.
213
 This may be true, because 
social media has only existed for approximately 10 years. If this is true, then the people who 
create ethical standards for the profession can consult lawyers who use social media or 
information technology professionals to acquire the relevant knowledge to prepare uniform 
national ethical guidelines or adapt the model guidelines in this thesis.  
 
Since lawyers in Victoria requested guidelines about social media from the Law Institute of 
Victoria,
214
 it is reasonable to assume that lawyers in the rest of Australia want guidelines on 
this issue also. Mark, Gordon and Shackel of the Commissioner’s Office believe that flexible 
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and educational guidelines are necessary for Australian lawyers.
215
 In particular, they believe 
that ethical guidelines should address the security and confidentiality challenges that lawyers 
experience with social media.
216
 They state that  
 
existing approaches to ethical standards, professional responsibility and regulation of legal 
practices, which reflect the normative values and methodologies of traditional legal practice 
and legal professionalism, are in urgent need of recalibration. Confronting this challenge is 
necessary to maintain consumer confidence, ensure consumer protection, encourage appropriate 
competition practices in the legal services marketplace and provide appropriate guidelines to 




Mark, Gordon and Shackel appear to take a wide view of the implications of drafting ethical 
standards for lawyers. The existence of ethical standards for lawyers’ social media use may 
increase public confidence in the legal profession. This idea accords with Mark, Gordon and 







Representatives of the Law Society of England and Wales state that social media ‘is an 
increasingly growing area and one that the whole legal profession should be aware of and be 
considering’.
219
 This is particularly the case with lawyers using social media, because social 
media results in unique ethical situations that lawyers may not have experienced before. 
 
Commentators note that ‘the ethics of lawyer participation in social media outlets is and will 
remain a hot topic. As social networking continues to evolve, so too will ethical 
considerations unique to attorneys’.
220
 This chapter has examined some of these ethical 
considerations: unintended and faulty retainers, a lawyer’s duty to the court and a lawyer’s 
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duty of confidentiality. Lawyers may want to consider ethical guidelines about social media 
use pertaining to jurisdictions besides those mentioned in this chapter.  
 
As more lawyers use social media,
221
 it is important to release uniform guidelines as soon as 
possible (such as the model guidelines in this thesis) to minimise the risk of inappropriate 
social media use by lawyers. Inappropriate use of social media by lawyers could decrease 
public confidence in the legal profession. 
 
Until national standalone uniform ethical guidelines are created, Australian lawyers can read 
the guidelines issued by the Law Institute of Victoria, the Commissioner’s Office and the 
New South Wales and Queensland Law Societies, as well as the model ethical guidelines in 
Appendix A of this thesis. If lawyers face an ethical challenge while using social media that 
existing guidelines do not address, they can consider seeking advice from senior lawyers or 
sending a query to the ethical committee of the law society or barrister association in their 
State or Territory. Lastly, lawyers should always consider their professional ethical 
obligations while using social media.  
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Judge Marilyn Huff of the District Court for the Southern District of California in the United 
States states that  
 
(although I don’t know how to do it) apparently I can put something on YouTube. Apparently 
it’s pretty easy to do. In this election, President-elect Obama was able to energize the whole 





Many courts are currently contemplating the idea that Her Honour raises here: using social 
media to inform and engage the public (the survey conducted in the present research provides 
examples of this). It is important that courts inform the public about their work and processes. 
Courts give information to the public primarily through websites and through providing 
information to members of the media, who then distribute the information. This has typically 
been the most important method for courts to provide information to the public. At the 
moment, the traditional media’s provision of information to the public has decreased, while 




The author wanted to find out whether courts are expanding the amount of information that 
they provide to the public. Between May and July 2013, she emailed a survey to 23 different 
staff of courts in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose 
of the survey was to find examples of whether courts had created social media accounts in 
order to engage the public. For those courts not using social media, the survey asked them 
why. The author received 15 completed surveys. Appendix C to this thesis contains the 
participants’ consent information and the survey questions. Appendix D contains the 
information letter for participants that accompanied the survey. Appendix E contains the 
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survey questions with the answers received.
3
 Appendix B contains a list of the URLs for the 
social media accounts of the courts surveyed who stated that they have social media accounts.  
 
This chapter discusses the relationship between the courts and the public and examines the 
benefits that using social media can bring to Australian courts. It also introduces the survey 
that was conducted to obtain examples of this relationship. It then discusses some of the 
reasons why some courts in Australia do not use social media. The chapter then goes on to 
examine which social media Australian courts can best use and what content they can post. 
Suggestions are offered as to how courts can start to use social media. Ultimately, it is argued 
that Australian courts that do not use social media would benefit from starting to use it as 
soon as possible, with the aim of improving the public’s knowledge of and confidence in the 
courts and the judiciary.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is limited to court staff using social media for work purposes in 
their capacity as court representatives, as opposed to court staff who use social media for 
personal reasons. The survey is also confined to this focus. The discussion of social media in 
this chapter is limited to three main social media: Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. This is in 
accordance with the thesis’s primary focus on Twitter and Facebook (as explained in Chapter 
One). The survey also enquired about YouTube because it was found during preliminary 
research that some courts use YouTube to engage the public.  
 
4.2 The Relationship Between the Courts and the Public 
 
In the opinion of Patricia Seguin, the Community Outreach Director of the Superior Court of 
Arizona in Maricopa County, the public are often misinformed or uninformed about the work 
of the courts.
4
 Chief Justice Paul de Jersey of the Supreme Court of Queensland believes that 
some people think that judges are ‘detached from the community’, particularly regarding 
                                                             
3 The author modified some of the answers provided to take out information that was not relevant to the 
thesis.  
4
 Patricia Seguin, The Use of Social Media in Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County (2011) Superior 






giving offenders lenient sentences.
5
 The public often have negative ideas about the courts. 
Some think that court processes are expensive and unfair to different races and ethnicities.
6
 




Some members of the public complain that the courts do not sufficiently inform the public 
about the work that they do.
8
 It is said that the judiciary are the ‘least understood’ part of the 
Government;
9
 the Chief Justice of Victoria, Marilyn Warren, believes that some people only 
read the headline and the first two paragraphs of a story about a court in the media and then 
criticise the judiciary.
10
 Word of mouth also affects people’s perceptions of the courts and the 
judiciary: people who interact with the court may tell other people about their experiences 




As a result, many Australian courts have information officers who communicate with the 
media and the public.
12
 The information officers also try to increase the public’s confidence 
in the courts and the judiciary by publishing judges’ reasons for decisions, hosting open days 
and distributing educational information.
13
 Judges also speak to community organisations and 
on the radio from time to time.
14
 Increasing court communications using social media may 
increase the confidence that the public has in the courts and the judiciary, in addition to 
creating many other benefits.  
 
4.3 Benefits of Courts Using Social Media 
 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria states that ‘[t]he courts are getting to a 
stage where they have had enough of the inappropriate criticism, the skewing of information 
in the media, and [they] really need to try and seize the day [themselves] and give some 
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information to the community’.
15
 This view of the Chief Justice is indicative of one approach 
to how court officials can use social media: the Output Only approach. This section 
establishes two categories of approaches to courts’ use of social media: the Output Only 
approach and the Input Output approach. 
 
The Output Only approach involves courts using social media to inform the public where the 
public cannot post or comment in reply on the courts’ social media pages. The courts can 
easily provide information to the public this way. According to this method, the public would 
not be able to retweet a court’s tweet, follow a court on Twitter, write on a court’s Facebook 
wall or become friends with a court on Facebook. In contrast, the Input Output approach 
permits the public to post comments or replies to information that courts post. Under this 
approach, members of the public would be able to retweet the tweets of courts, follow courts 
on Twitter, write on courts’ Facebook walls or become friends with courts on Facebook. 
 
4.3.1 Benefits of the Output Only Approach 
 
Applying the Output Only approach, a benefit to courts of using social media would be that 
courts could communicate directly with people with whom they would not normally 
communicate,
16
 for example, people who use social media but not traditional media such as 
newspapers and television.
17
 Social media users may gain new knowledge about the courts, 
which could help increase their confidence in them. Judge Gibson states that ‘a vital part of 
courts communicating with and dispensing justice is interaction with the community, 
particularly with the shrinking role of the jury’.
18
 This makes sense: if judicial officers use 
juries less, then the public may come into contact with the judicial system less. 
 
In particular, courts can provide information directly to the public when they choose to 
through social media, instead of waiting for journalists to write a story or for a webmaster to 
update the court’s website.
19
 A consequence of this is that courts are able to provide 
                                                             
15 Ibid [3].  
16
 Laura Click, From Sketch Pads to Smart Phones: How Social Media Has Changed Coverage of the Judiciary 
(2011) National Center for State Courts, 48 
<http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctmedia/id/30>. 
17
 Salaz, Hodson and Davey, above n 2, 40.  
18
 ABC Radio National, ‘Justice Tweeted Is Justice Done’, The Law Report, 9 July 2013 (Judith Gibson J). 
19 Seguin, above n 4, 14.  
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information to the public without delay.
20
 It has been found in the United States that when 
courts give information to the public immediately, fewer members of the public call the court 
and fewer journalists attend court.
21
 This conserves the court’s resources. Courts can also put 
information into a proper context when they post information on social media, which the 
mainstream media may not do.
22
 It is suggested that courts may be better able to put 
information into context by using Facebook as opposed to Twitter, because of Twitter’s 140-
character limit on tweets. 
 
It is also possible that courts’ use of social media could support the open justice principle and 
increase the public’s confidence in the judiciary.
23
 When members of the public have the 
same information about a trial as a judge, they are more likely to agree with the sentence that 
the judge gave the offender.
24
 If information that explains an offender’s sentence or a link to 
a judgment that explains the sentence is posted on a court’s social media page, then the public 
may find the sentence that the judge gave an offender more acceptable.  
 
The use of YouTube is rare by Australian courts at this point in time. When courts upload 
videos to YouTube, the videos are saved externally, so the videos do not require space on 
courts’ computer servers.
25
 This also helps to conserve the court’s resources.  
 
4.3.2 Benefits of the Input Output Approach 
 
Courts can also benefit from an Input Output approach to social media. For example, 
members of the public can ask the courts questions and receive immediate responses. This 
occurred on 31 July 2013, when a member of the public, Neil Conway, wrote 
‘@SCVSupremeCourt I don't seem to be able to open your links on my iPad, is there an app 
other than a windows app for this[?]’ on the Supreme Court of Victoria’s Twitter page. On 
                                                             
20 See Alysia Blackham and George Williams, ‘Australian Courts and Social Media’ (2013) 38(3) Alternative Law 
Journal 170, 174 for a discussion suggesting that if courts provide information to the public by social media 
instantly, it may be unfair to those people who do not use social media.  
21 Seguin, above n 4, 14–15.  
22 Reynolds National Center for Courts and Media et al, above n 1, 6.  
23
 Blackham and Williams, above n 20. Note that Blackham and Williams argue in the same article that if the 
courts use social media it could lower confidence in the judiciary also.  
24
 Dr Karen Gelb, Predictors of Confidence: Community Views in Victoria (August 2011) Sentencing Advisory 
Council <https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-
documents/Predictors%20of%20Confidence%20Community%20Views%20in%20Victoria.pdf>. 
25 Salaz, Hodson, and Davey, above n 2, 57.  
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the same day the Court responded on the Court’s Twitter page with ‘@1958noelconway 
Sorry, works best with Explorer, dictated by mothership.’ The Court’s staff’s response to 
Conway may have increased Conway’s confidence in the courts. It may also have given a 
sense of a human connection to the courts. Further, the people who read the response may 
have been impressed by the Court staff’s response and their confidence in the courts may 
have increased.  
 
If members of the public are able to comment on courts’ social media pages, they may 
develop a sense that the courts listen to them, accompanied by an increased trust in the 
courts.
26
 The public may also feel that the courts are more transparent. Users can appear 
anonymously on social media or change their name, so they may be more likely to provide 
courts with honest feedback.
27
 By the same token, the anonymity that social media can 
provide may encourage some people to write negative comments. Staff of the Family Court 
of Australia did not find that the public tweeted negative comments to their Twitter account, 
despite their initial worries that this might occur.
28
 It would be reasonable to assume that the 
public would similarly not post negative comments on other Australian courts’ social media 
accounts.  
 
It may be possible to design a social media application to help courts censor comments that 
are made on the courts’ social media pages. Courts may also become aware of negative views 
that the public may have about aspects of the courts (e.g. if they think that a sentence was not 
long enough for a particular offender)
29
 and thereby, if they choose to, address the criticism. 
Other online entities, such as news outlets, have allowed users to post comments underneath 
online articles for over a decade, and it is always possible that readers will write offensive 
comments about the articles. Courts that use social media may be able to learn from the 
experiences of news media about that issue.  
                                                             
26 Travis Olson and Christine O’Clock, The Role of Social-Networking Tools in Judicial Systems (2010) National 
Center for State Courts, 165 <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctmedia/id/21>. 
27 Social Media Subcommittee of the Judicial Outreach Committee, Recommendations for the Court’s Use of 
Social Media (February 2012) Utah State Courts, 9 
<http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/WIRE/06072012/6FinalReportUtah.pdf>. 
28
 Survey answers by email from the Media & Public Affairs Manager, Family Court of Australia to Marilyn 
Krawitz, 12 August 2013. 
29
 For discussion about Australians’ views that judges’ sentences are too lenient, see Kate Warner et al, ‘Public 
Judgement on Sentencing: Final Results from the Tasmanian Jury Sentencing Study’ (2011) 407 Trends and 
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1 and David Indermaur, ‘Public Perception of Sentencing in Perth, Western 




Users may learn from each other in an Input Output approach to court social media 
communication. For example, on 20 November 2013, staff of the Supreme Court of Victoria 
posted information on their Facebook page stating that the Chief Justice would speak at an 
event about female lawyers. A member of the public, Marissa Fay Chorn, reposted this 
information on her Facebook page. Then three other members of the public commented with 
their views about this issue under the post on the Supreme Court of Victoria’s Facebook 
page.  
 
Courts can also use Twitter to follow journalists
30
 and check whether journalists are 
accurately commenting on court proceedings. There are some benefits and problems with this 
practice. Some benefits are that the court could ensure that correct information is provided to 
the public and find out if journalists are breaching any court orders (e.g., suppression orders). 
One problem with the practice is that there could be hundreds or even thousands of 
journalists reporting on the courts. The number of citizen journalists online would further 
inflate this number. The court may not have the time to follow and check all of the Twitter 
accounts of these journalists. 
 
Courts can also use social media to easily and quickly communicate with other courts that use 
social media.
31
 Courts may obtain ideas about new ways to use social media, events to 
organise or information to provide to the public. Courts can also use social media to receive 
updates about the work of legal academics who use social media and apply this information 
or provide it to other courts. For example, if a court employee reads a tweet on an academic’s 
Twitter page stating that the academic has published a new article about judges using social 
media, the court employee can then email judges’ associates so that they can inform the 
judiciary.  
 
Using an Input Output approach, the public can quickly and easily inform courts about 
mistakes that courts have made. This could result in several thousands of people acting as 
quality control for courts, which would be useful. For example, on 31 July 2013, a Twitter 
account called PracLawEmployment wrote on the JudiciaryUK Twitter account that a 
                                                             
30
 Survey answers by email from the Strategic Communication Manager, the Supreme Court of Victoria to 
Marilyn Krawitz, 21 June 2013. 
31
 Survey answers by email from the Manager, Magistrates’ Support Services, Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, to 
Marilyn Krawitz, 26 July 2013. 
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‘judgment on judiciary.gov.uk only contains odd-numbered pages’. The tweeter requested 
assistance with this. That same day, the JudiciaryUK Twitter account tweeted ‘[t]hanks, this 
has now been corrected http://bit.ly/13ZqSD0’. Thousands of people acting as quality control 
for the courts could have resource implications for courts. By the same token, courts may be 
expected to make more changes to their websites and its social media accounts than they 
normally would.  
 
Whether courts take an Output Only approach or an Input Output approach to social media 
affects whether they follow other entities’ Twitter accounts. Courts in other jurisdictions 
address this situation differently. The Nova Scotia Courts’ and the Family Court of 
Australia’s Twitter accounts do not follow anyone, while the three Twitter accounts of the 
Supreme Court, County Court and Magistrates’ Court in Victoria do. Australian courts would 
benefit most from an Input Output approach because it affords the most advantages from 
using social media. The Input Output approach takes advantage of one of the most distinctive 
aspects of social media: its interactivity. If courts use an Output Only approach, then the 
court’s social media accounts may resemble ordinary websites rather than interactive social 
media accounts. 
 
The Facebook page of the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County does not allow 
users to comment on the Court’s posts because this ‘could lead to unwarranted criticism and 
the need to respond and comment in a timely manner’.
32
 The Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom’s Twitter account takes an Input Output approach, and the social media policy on 
its website states that its staff cannot guarantee a response to all public comments to its 
Twitter accounts.
33
 If Australian courts were to adopt an Input Output approach, they could 
use a disclaimer similar to the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s. This could assist in 
managing the expectations of the public who post on the account. A disclaimer for Australian 
courts’ social media presence could also state that third parties’ views do not reflect the 
court’s views.
34
 This could assist if a member of the public was to write something rude or 
derogatory on the court’s social media pages.  
                                                             
32
 Seguin, above n 4, 38.  
33
 Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Twitter Policy for the UK Supreme Court (February 2012) [3] 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/twitter-policy.html>. 
34
 See, eg, the website of the Family Court of Australia, which states ‘[t]he Court does not endorse, and is not 
accountable for any views expressed by third parties using that site’, Family Court of Australia, Official Use of 
111 
 
4.3.3 Benefits of Both Approaches 
 
Courts and the judiciary may receive additional benefits from using social media, irrespective 
of whether they take an Output Only or an Input Output approach. One benefit is maintaining 
control over their social media presence. It is possible for people who do not work for a court 
to create unofficial social media pages for the court.
35
 These unofficial pages may state the 
court’s name and appear to represent the court, even though they do not. They may mislead 
the public
36
 or damage a judicial officer’s reputation.
37
 The simplest way to prevent the 
public from being misled by unofficial social media pages is for courts to create their own 
official social media accounts.
38
 The official social media pages can contain the court’s logo 
and URL to show that the pages are official, as well as specifically stating that they are the 
court’s ‘official’ social media pages, like the Family Court of Australia’s Twitter page.  
 
Another potential benefit is that courts may use social media to assist self-represented 
litigants.
39
 They can post informational videos to answer questions that self-represented 
litigants often ask.
40
 Courts can also directly answer questions that self-represented litigants 
post on Twitter or Facebook. Admittedly, this may take a lot of time, but it could be worth it 
if self-represented litigants are then better prepared at court.
41
 If courts use social media to 
assist self-represented litigants, then potential self-represented litigants may feel less 
overwhelmed by the courts. This may affect their decision to pursue their matter in the courts 
as opposed to simply avoiding the process altogether because it is too difficult. Social media 
is usually free to use,
42
 so it should not directly require any of the courts’ financial resources. 
This issue is explored in more detail in section 4.5.2.1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Twitter by the Family Court, [17] 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FCOA/home/about/Social_media/>. 
35 Katherine Bladow and Joyce Raby, Using Social Media to Support Self-Represented Litigants and Increase 
Access to Justice (2011) National Center for State Courts, 37 
<http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctmedia/id/29>.  
36 Ibid.  
37 See, eg, Lorne Sossin and Meredith Bacal, ‘Judicial Ethics in a Digital Age’ (2013) 46(3) University of British 
Columbia Law Review 629, 637. 
38
 Bladow and Raby, above n 35, 37.  
39
 Ibid 35.  
40
 Ibid 36.  
41
 Ibid 36.  
42 Social Media Subcommittee of the Judicial Outreach Committee, above n 27, 9.  
112 
 
Some of the court-run social media pages are popular. The public has viewed the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s YouTube videos over 137 000 times.
43
 The Magistrates’ Court of Victoria’s 
Twitter page has 1145 followers and the Supreme Court of Victoria’s Twitter page has 2074 
followers.
44
 The large number of people who currently view or follow courts’ social media 
pages likely indicates that the public is becoming more knowledgeable about the courts, 
which could potentially increase their confidence in them. It also shows that the public may 
be interested in journalists tweeting from the courtroom. The issue of journalists using social 
media from the courtroom will be explored in more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
There is some encouraging research about responses to courts using social media. The Family 
Court of Australia received ‘positive’ comments about its social media use.
45
 The Superior 
Court of Arizona in Maricopa County emailed a survey to 58 members of the media and 
posted a survey to its 512 Twitter followers. There were 24 responses. The people who 
responded to the survey stated that they ‘frequently’ checked the Court’s Twitter page;
46
 27 
per cent ‘strongly agreed’ and another 27 per cent ‘agreed’ that the Court’s tweets ‘help[ed] 
[them] to generate news stories’.
47
 In addition, 17 per cent ‘strongly agreed’ and 25 per cent 
‘agreed’ that the Court’s Twitter page helped to ‘guide [them] to more in-depth information 
on Court programs’.
48
 Admittedly, due to its small sample size, the study may not be very 
reliable; additionally, because many of the people who answered the survey were part of the 
media, the results may not be applicable to the general public. Nevertheless, this supports 
courts continuing to update their Twitter pages. The survey indicates that the media use court 
Twitter pages and receive benefits from doing so.  
 
A 2012 survey of 623 court employees by the staff of the Conference of Court Public 
Information Officers in the United States found that 15.6 per cent of people surveyed 
‘strongly agree[d]’ and 23.9 per cent ‘agree[d]’ that ‘[n]ew media, such as Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube, are necessary court tools for public outreach’
49
. It is significant that court 
employees are in favour of using social media, because they should know the best ways to 
                                                             
43 Bladow and Raby, above n 35, 36.  
44 Based on the author’s viewing the Twitter pages on 1 August 2013.  
45 Survey answers by email from the Media & Public Affairs Manager, Family Court of Australia to Marilyn 
Krawitz, 12 August 2013. 
46
 Seguin, above n 4, 31.  
47
 Conference of Court Public Information Officers, 2012 CCPIO New Media Survey (31 July 2012) 66 
<http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CCOIO-2012-New-Media-ReportFINAL.pdf>. 
48
 Ibid 68.  
49 Ibid 30. 
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engage the public. They should also be aware of how they can potentially improve the 
public’s confidence in the courts.  
 
Due to social media being relatively new, it is understandable that few studies exist about 
their benefits to the courts. To convince Australian courts that they should use social media, 
researchers could consider undertaking more studies about social media’s benefits to the 
courts. To learn about the benefits that can result from courts using social media, it may be 
possible for courts to examine existing research about the benefits of using social media in 
similar contexts. For example, they could consider the success of Australian police with their 
social media use. While there may be differences between how Australian courts use social 
media and how the police use social media, there still may be some information that can be 
gained by the comparison. Staff of the Family Court of Australia implemented a pilot project 
in which they used social media for six months.
50
 Afterwards the Court evaluated the project 
and decided to continue to use it.
51
 The report on the pilot project stated that the pilot ‘should 
be considered a success’ because (1) over 400 users followed its Twitter page, even though 
Family Court staff did little to promote it; (2) they did not experience any security 
problems;
52
 and (3) they received many benefits,
53
 such as positive feedback from the media 




The survey conducted for this thesis revealed that courts that have used social media to date 
have experienced benefits from using it (see the comments made by some courts about this 
issue in Appendix E). For example, the Strategic Communication Manager of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria perceived that the public was more aware of the activities of the Court as a 
result of her social media use.
55
 The Director of Communications of the Nova Scotia 
                                                             
50
 Family Court of Australia, ‘Family Court of Australia Twitter Account’ (2013) (12) Family Court Bulletin 11 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FCOA/home/about/publications/Bulletin/FCOA_fcb_Jul_
13>.  
51 Ibid.  
52
 Twitter Pilot Review from Phil Hocking to CEO’s Management Advisory Group Family Court of Australia, 10 
April 2013, [4]. 
53
  Ibid.  
54
  Ibid [3.2.2], [3.2.3]. 
55
 Survey answers by email from the Strategic Communication Manager, the Supreme Court of Victoria to 
Marilyn Krawitz, 21 June 2013. 
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Judiciary found that more people viewed the Nova Scotia Courts’ website after he created 




As time passes, the number of people who use social media will likely increase. 
Consequently, more people may expect that courts will use social media. The public may one 
day view social media accounts the same way they currently view websites: it will be 
expected that every court have one, and a lack of one may lower the public’s confidence in 
the courts. It is inevitable that in the future new technology will be created that will afford 
different and improved forms of social media. It may help courts to adopt such new 
technology if they are already competent at using current technology. 
 




As previously stated, the author sent a survey to 23 different courts between May and July 
2013. The survey asked courts about whether they used social media to engage the public, 
and if not, why not. The Human Research Ethics Committee of Murdoch University 
approved the use of the survey.
57
 The materials used included survey questions and consent 
information in a single Word document that was attached to an email that the author sent to 
each participant (see Appendix C for a copy of the survey questions). The email also 
contained an information letter as another Word attachment (see Appendix D for a copy of 
the information letter). 
 
After the survey participants completed the survey, they emailed their answers to the author. 
The author did not offer any benefits to the participants in the survey, except that she would 
inform them of her findings. On 18 December 2013, the author emailed each person who 
participated in the survey a short description of her findings.  
 
                                                             
56
 Survey answers by email from the Director of Communications, the Nova Scotia Judiciary to Marilyn Krawitz, 
30 May 2013. 





The author emailed the survey and the information letter to 12 Australian courts, nine 
Canadian courts, one American court and one British court.
58
 These countries were chosen 
because they are all common law countries in which courts speak English. The majority of 
the surveys were sent to Australian courts because this thesis focuses on Australian courts; 
the rest of the courts were chosen randomly.  
 
The survey was sent to the court staff who are usually responsible for the court’s media 
activities, in anticipation that they would be the most likely to be able to provide information 
about the courts’ social media activities. The author found the names and emails of these 
contact people by searching the websites of the relevant courts. If a court staff member did 
not respond to the email that the author sent within approximately a week, the author 
telephoned him or her to confirm that he or she had received the survey and to encourage him 
or her to complete it. Fifteen courts completed the survey: nine in Australia, four in Canada, 




The author felt that it was important to provide the name of the court where the participant 
worked and their position when she used information from the completed surveys. As a 
result, the information letter provided included the following paragraph: 
 
You should be aware that this survey is anonymous and no personal details are being collected 
or used, though I will state the name of the relevant court and the position of the person who 
provided information to me in my thesis or other scholarly work.  
 
The ‘participant consent’ document that accompanied the survey questions also stated ‘I 
understand that the findings of this study may be published’. The author included this 
statement to ensure that she could use any information from the participants’ answers to the 
survey in this thesis.  
 
                                                             
58
 Note, where the person who the author initially contacted did not fill in the survey, but recommended that 
the author send the survey to someone else, she did not include the initial contact.  
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4.5 Discussion of the Survey Results: Court’s Social Media Use 
 
Since 15 responses were received from the total of 23 surveys sent out, it can be inferred that 
the relevant courts are interested in the issue of engaging the public by using social media. 
All responses were included in the analysis of results, as it was found that something useful 
could be learned from each survey. One indication from the admittedly limited sample is that 
courts in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have embraced social 
media to varying degrees. This section will discuss the efforts (or lack thereof) that the courts 
have taken. 
 
4.5.1 Courts Currently Using Social Media Accounts 
 
4.5.1.1 Social Media in Australian Courts 
 
Few courts in Australia have social media accounts. Four Australian courts out of nine 
surveyed by the author use social media.
59
 The Magistrates’ Court of Victoria has a Twitter 
account,
60
 the County Court of Victoria has a Twitter account
61
 and the Supreme Court of 
Victoria has a Twitter account,
62
 a YouTube account
63
 and a Facebook account.
64
 The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales
65
 and Family Court of Australia have Twitter accounts.
66
 
Alysia Blackham and George Williams state that Australian courts take a ‘cautious’ approach 
to social media as opposed to a proactive one.
67
 This is accurate: few State Courts in 
Australia use social media and only one Federal Court in Australia uses social media. The 
Victorian Supreme Court YouTube account has two videos: one about directions to the jury 
and the other about an inaugural law library event in Victoria. It is interesting that the 
                                                             
59 It’s noted that the NSW Supreme Court stated in the survey that it did not use social media, but it 
commenced using social media whilst the author was finalising this thesis for submission. 
 See, New South Wales Supreme Court, Twitter Account <https://twitter.com/NSWSupCt>. 
60 Survey answers by email from the Manager, Magistrates’ Support Services to Marilyn Krawitz, 26 July 2013; 
see Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, Twitter Account, <https://twitter.com/magcourtvic>.  
61
 See County Court of Victoria, Twitter Account, <https://twitter.com/CCVMedia>. 
62 See Supreme Court of Victoria, Twitter Account, <https://twitter.com/SCVSupremeCourt>. 
63 Survey answers by email from the Strategic Communication Manager, the Supreme Court of Victoria, 21 
June 2013; see Supreme Court of Victoria, Twitter Account <https://twitter.com/SCVSupremeCourt>; Supreme 
Court of Victoria, YouTube Channel <http://www.youtube.com/user/SupremeCourtVictoria?feature=guide>. 
64
 Supreme Court of Victoria, Facebook Account, <https://www.facebook.com/SupremeCourtVic?ref=br_tf>.  
65
 New South Wales Supreme Court, Twitter Account, <https://twitter.com/NSWSupCt>. 
66
 See Family Court of Australia, Twitter Account, <https://twitter.com/FamilyCourtAU>; survey answers by 
email from the Media & Public Affairs Manager, Family Court of Australia to Marilyn Krawitz, 12 August 2013. 
67 Blackham and Williams, above n 20, 170.  
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Victorian Supreme Court has videos on YouTube, as opposed to the lower courts in Victoria. 
In particular, many self-represented litigants could probably benefit if the Magistrates’ Court 
of Victoria had a YouTube account that posted useful videos. It is also worth noting that each 
level of State Court in Victoria appears to have a social media account.  
 
4.5.1.2 Social Media in American Courts 
 
As of April 2013, courts in at least 24 states in the United States use at least one type of 
social media.
68
 Nine of these states have courts that use Facebook, 22 that use Twitter and 
nine that use YouTube.
69
 The United States Supreme Court’s staff use Twitter.
70
 The 
relatively large number of courts in the United States that use social media is not surprising 
due to the system of electing judges.
71
 Social media are helpful to judicial candidates in 
influencing the public to vote for them. The American Bar Association states that websites 
and social media involved with ‘promoting the candidacy of a judge or judicial candidate 
may be established and maintained by campaign committees’. It further states that some 





4.5.1.3 Social Media in Canadian Courts 
 
In Canada, the Saskatchewan Law Courts’ staff currently use Twitter and YouTube.
73
 Nova 
Scotian Courts were the first in the country to use social media,
74
 and currently maintain five 
Twitter accounts.
75
 The Nova Scotia Twitter accounts are: ‘news of the courts’, ‘notices to 
                                                             
68 Knowledge and Information Services Division, AOCs and High Courts Using New Media (24 April 2013) 
National Center for State Courts   
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69 Ibid.  
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Australian Bar Review 281, 281. 
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Krawitz, 14 June 2013.  
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the legal profession’, ‘amendments to the civil procedure rules’, ‘changes to the online 
dockets’, ‘decisions of the court of appeal’, ‘decisions of the supreme court’, ‘decisions of the 
provincial court’ and ‘decisions of the small claims court’.
76
 It may take up a lot of time to 
manage five different Twitter accounts. However, these separate accounts likely make it 
easier for people who visit the Twitter accounts to find the information that they seek. In 
particular, the Nova Scotian Courts’ organisation of their Twitter accounts probably makes it 
easy for three common stakeholders who visit the Twitter accounts to find information. These 
stakeholders are journalists, lawyers and the public. So, for example, lawyers only need to 
check the ‘notices to the legal profession’ Twitter account to find notices for them, as 
opposed to scrolling down a single Twitter account to find the notices among judgments and 




4.5.2 Courts not Currently Using Social Media Accounts 
 
It appears that there are two main reasons why courts that responded to the survey do not use 
social media: (1) a lack of resources; and (2) uncertainty about the benefits that they may 
receive from using it. This section of the chapter deals with resource-related issues, including 
strategies for mitigating resource issues. The survey response reporting uncertainty about the 
benefits of social media is briefly addressed.  
 
4.5.2.1 Lack of Resources: Information from the Survey 
 
The Social Media Subcommittee of the Judicial Outreach Committee of the Utah State Courts 
states that  
 
[e]ffective use of social media requires resources and a strong commitment to increasing 
judicial outreach through technology. In the age of austere budgets, it is a challenge to fund all 
but the essentials of administering justice. It is the subcommittee’s view, however, that adapting 
to the new mobile, social media-driven world is essential to maintaining public trust and 
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 The Courts of Nova Scotia, above n 74, [4] - [6].  
77
 Supreme Court of United Kingdom, Twitter Account <https://twitter.com/UKSupremeCourt>. 
78 Social Media Subcommittee of the Judicial Outreach Committee, above n 27, 4.  
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Five courts out of the 15 that answered the survey do not use social media because of a lack 
of resources. The Children’s Court of Victoria,
79
 South Australian Courts
80
 and the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia stated in their surveys that they do not use social media due to a 
lack of resources,
81
 but did not state the type of specific resources that they lack. The survey 
answered by the Manager of Media and Public Liaison for the Courts at the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia stated that the Court does not have social media accounts because of ‘the 
practical issues of constant maintenance of the sites’.
82
 The Court of Queen’s Bench in 
Alberta, Canada does not use social media because of a lack of staff to administer it.
83
 Given 
that both the Supreme Court of Western Australia and the Court of Queen’s Bench in Alberta 
have websites, it is possible that their staff may not require much more effort to maintain a 
social media site. They might be able to simply cut and paste links onto Twitter. 
 
Since some courts state that they lack the resources to use social media, one should consider 
what resources creating social media accounts would require. The report by staff of the 
Family Court of Australia about its pilot project involving Twitter use stated that staff 
members were ‘able to cope with the additional work generated by the creation of tweets 
without any impact on their other duties’.
84
 It also stated that the ‘costs associated with the 
creation and maintenance of a new Twitter account are the time and effort of the content 
management group in developing new materials for tweeting, and a minor cost ($120 per 
annum) to license Hootsuite to assist in managing the account’.
85
 Courts could potentially 
benefit from economies of scale if their staff purchase several Hootsuite licences. This 
comment provides support that Australian courts would not need to use many resources to 
commence and maintain a social media account.  
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4.5.2.2 Resources That Other Courts Have Used to Commence Using Social Media 
 
A survey of clerks in the American Federal Court system revealed that it took staff one or 
two days to create a social media site for the Court and that staff update the site daily or else 
once a week.
86
 Australian courts may find that there are other time-consuming aspects of 
creating a social media site, such as creating a policy for the staff who use social media, 
obtaining approval from senior staff for the policy, and obtaining feedback from other staff 
about the policy. Nevertheless, courts can save time by seeking guidance about these policies 
from employees at other courts who already use social media.  
 
Courts would want to consider maintaining a court’s social media page after creating it, 
which would result in ongoing consumption of staff’s time. Travis Olsen and Christine 
O’Clock state that the public become more engaged with the courts when courts post content 
on social media often,
87
 and recommend that courts post on social media daily.
88
 If courts 
create a social medium account and then rarely maintain it, this might create a poor public 
impression. Courts that currently have social media pages differ regarding how often they 
update them. Staff at the following Courts update their pages quite regularly: the New Jersey 
Courts, who update the Courts’ Facebook page daily,
89
 and the Superior Court of Arizona in 
Maricopa County, who tweet several times daily.
90
 Staff at the following courts update their 
pages less regularly: the Family Court of Australia staff tweet a minimum of three times 
weekly,
91
 staff at the United Kingdom Supreme Court tweet two to three times weekly,
92
 and 
staff at the Saskatchewan Law Courts normally update their Twitter account three to four 




                                                             
86 National Center for State Courts, Social Media Use in the US Federal Courts (May 2013) [4] 
<http://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Connected/2013/May.aspx>. 
87 Olson and O’Clock, above n 26, 168.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Winnie Comfort and Tammy Kendig, ‘Judiciary Uses Social Media to Keep Court Users Informed’ (Media 
Release, 18 August 2009) [6] <http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2009/pr090818a.htm>. 
90
 Seguin, above n 4, 38.  
91
 Family Court of Australia, above n 50, [2]  
92
 Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, above n 33, [2].  
93
 Survey answers by email from the Courts Communications Officer, Saskatchewan Law Courts to Marilyn 
Krawitz, 14 June 2013. 
121 
 
4.5.2.3 How to Lower the Amount of Resources Required for Courts to Use Social 
Media 
 
Maintaining social media accounts may not take as much time as the courts surveyed believe. 
As already mentioned, courts can copy and paste relevant information that would normally go 
onto the court’s webpage and post it to social media as well. This would probably only take 
seconds to do. Courts can also update the court’s social media accounts on a weekly, as 
opposed to daily, basis. Staff of courts that lack resources might start with a Twitter account, 
for example, because of Twitter’s 140-character limit, and tweet once every week. 
Admittedly, staff would need to be extra careful that they post correct information. If they 
make a significant mistake while using social media, millions of people would quickly be 
able to see it. Staff of courts with additional resources might create a Facebook page, which 
would allow staff to post more information and photos. Courts that have access to even more 
resources could create and maintain a Twitter account, a Facebook account and a YouTube 
account. The YouTube account would likely take the most time of the three accounts to 
maintain, because it would involve obtaining or creating videos. Videos are possibly the most 
beneficial medium for self-represented litigants, who would benefit from both visual and 
audio aids as opposed to only visual ones. In particular, self-represented litigants who are 
visual learners would receive great benefit from watching a court’s YouTube videos. Courts 
might be able to outsource the creation of their YouTube videos; for example, they might ask 
an academic in drama to ask his or her students to make videos for the court as an assessment 
task.  
 
Another way that courts can save resources is to establish social media accounts that are 
Output Only. This could save courts time in that they would not need to monitor the public’s 
response to their posts.  
 
Twitter currently offers an option for users to have their tweets ‘protected’.
94
 This means that 
the owner of a Twitter account would need to approve each Twitter user who wanted to 
follow him or her, and only people whom the account holder selected could see the tweets. 
Other users could not retweet the tweets.
95
 This may not be a good idea, because one of the 
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most important aspects of courts having social media accounts is ease of public access. It 
would also create extra work for courts to have to approve each person who wanted to follow 
their Twitter page. 
 
Staff at the British Columbia Court of Appeal have stated that they do not use social media 
because of a lack of financial resources.
96
 However, signing up and using social media is 
usually free,
97
 so a lack of financial resources should not be a barrier. Indeed, courts could 
save resources by using social media. For example, if a court is holding an open day, staff can 
simply post information about the event on social media, reaching many people quickly and 
for free. The interactive nature of social media also means that users reading about the event 
can instantly notify others about the event by re-tweeting or re-posting the event’s details. 
This is in contrast to courts spending money on placing advertisements in newspapers, radios, 
on billboards and on television about the event.  
 
Courts can conserve resources by creating a single social medium account for a few courts in 
a single jurisdiction. An alternative to different courts in a single state each having individual 
social media accounts would be for there to be a single Twitter account for all the courts in a 
state, similar to the system used in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada. This would require 
staff from different courts to work together. Nevertheless, it is probably easy for the public to 
find the information that they seek by being able to visit the social medium account of a 
specific court, as opposed to a few courts combined.  
 
4.5.2.4 Uncertainty of Benefits 
 
The Children’s Court of Victoria would ‘need to be convinced that there is a good case to 
support any decision to start [using social media]’.
98
 It makes sense that courts would want 
more information about the benefits of using social media before starting to use it. This 
Chapter looked at the benefits that courts can receive as a result of using social media. As 
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time passes and new social media are created, it is possible that social media will offer even 
more benefits to courts than they currently do.  
 
4.5.3 Courts not Currently Using Social Media, but Thinking About It 
 
In a survey provided to representatives from 135 American Federal Courts, 15.6 per cent of 
respondents stated that they used social media, and 12.6 per cent stated that they would use 
social media in the future.
99
 Staff at the following Australian courts are considering whether 
they should create social media accounts for their Court in the future: the Children’s Court of 
Victoria,
100
 the Federal Magistrates’ Court
101
 and the Northern Territory Supreme Court.
102
 
Staff at the Federal Court of Australia do not use social media, but are part of a working 
group considering this issue.
103
 Outside of Australia, staff at the Massachusetts Court 
System
104
 and the British Columbia Court of Appeal
105
 are considering using social media. A 
recent survey of 62 judicial officers, court staff and academics in Australia found that there 





Australian courts may be persuaded to use social media if more information about the 
benefits of social media is made available. While it is good that courts take a cautious 
approach to social media, it is hoped that they will not spend too long considering the issue. 
If they do, they risk failing to capitalise on a significant opportunity to improve the public’s 
confidence in the courts with little or no financial cost. If courts do decide to use social 
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media, they will need to decide what types of information they may post; this question will be 
discussed in the following section.  
 
4.6 Types of Information Courts May Post on Social Media 
 
The information that courts post on social media can be categorised into urgently required 
information and static information. Urgently required information is information that the 
public needs to know as soon as possible. Static information is information that the public 
does not need to know immediately.  
 
4.6.1 Urgently Required Information 
 
Examples of urgently required information are sentences and judgments, which would 
normally appear on a court’s website, but may be communicated more immediately using 
Twitter.
107
 Staff of the Supreme Court of New South Wales tweeted the following on 13 
December 2013: ‘Justice Schmidt sentences Jonathon Stenberg to 25 years 4 months for 
murder, 19 years non-parole. Remarks posted once available’. Other examples of urgently 
required information are media releases and practical matters, such as court closures due to 
bad weather
108
. Tennessee Courts use Twitter to share links to documents that are posted at 
the last minute during public executions.
109
 This timely information is very helpful to 
journalists. 
 
Courts can also use social media to inform the public about problems with a court’s website. 
For example, the Family Court of Australia’s Twitter account informed the public that the 
Court’s website did not work on 29 July 2013. When urgently required information is added 
to courts’ social media accounts quickly, it can improve the public’s confidence in the courts 
and help demonstrate that courts are efficient. Courts that use social media to inform the 
public about court closures can make the public’s lives easier by saving them a trip to the 
court. This could increase general public confidence in the courts.  
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4.6.2 Static Information 
 
There are many different kinds of static information that courts may need to share. Staff of 
the County Court of Victoria post job opportunities and practice notes. For example, on 14 
June 2013 the County Court tweeted ‘[g]ood job available at the County Court working with 
the Chief Judge: http://www.countycourt.vic.gov.au/news-and-alerts’. On 26 June 2013, staff 
tweeted ‘[p]ractice note for operation of new County Koori Court in Melbourne now online’.  
 
The New Jersey Court posts photos of events and general information about courts on 
Facebook.
110
 Photos of court events could make the courts’ environment seem more familiar 
to the public. They could become less apprehensive about the courts should they need to enter 
them. Courts may post information about jury duty and state that jurors cannot use social 
media to discuss a trial. The issue of jurors using social media inappropriately during a trial is 
examined in Chapter Six.  
 
Staff of the Supreme Court of Victoria also tweet information about upcoming court events. 
For example, on 26 July 2013, they tweeted ‘[d]on’t forget to visit Court of Appeal tomorrow 
10am–4pm as part of @OpenHouseMelb #loveOHM.’ Staff of the Magistrates’ Court of 




Courts can use social media to inform the public about volunteer opportunities at the court. 
Staff at the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County do so on Facebook.
112
 Courts can 
also inform the public about future judgments on social media. For example, the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom tweeted the following on 16 May 2013: ‘[j]udgment next Weds 
0945: Vestergaard Frandsen v Bestnet Europe re confidence and trade secrets’. 
 
Courts can post videos on YouTube that have information for the public that is not urgently 
required. For example, the New Jersey Courts’ YouTube page has a video about the Courts’ 
mediation program for mortgage foreclosures.
113
 Courts can also post videos that show past 
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 Staff at the United Kingdom Supreme Court also post YouTube 
videos of the Court’s events on the Court’s Twitter account. For example, on 22 July 2013 
they tweeted ‘UK Supreme Court  @UKSupremeCourt 22 Jul Watch back this morning’s 
swearing-in of Lady Hale as Deputy President of the Supreme Court’. Underneath was posted 
an eight-minute and 24-second video from YouTube that contained part of the ceremony. The 
United Kingdom Supreme Court’s Twitter page has over 80 videos. The majority of the 
videos are of new judges’ swearing-in ceremonies and judicial officers delivering judgments. 
There is one video about the Supreme Court itself that has received over 6000 views. Most of 
the Supreme Court’s videos have been viewed over a hundred times, and some videos have 
received over 100 views on YouTube.  
 
It is worth considering why staff of the United Kingdom Supreme Court posted so many 
videos on the Court’s YouTube page but their Australian and Canadian counterparts have not. 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court already has video cameras in each courtroom.
115
 As a 
result, it is probably very easy to video what takes place in the courtrooms and post the 
videos onto YouTube. The attitude of the Supreme Court towards video cameras indicates 
that it is open-minded about technology. 
 
The Supreme Court of Victoria’s YouTube page has two videos: one about jury directions 
and the other about an event at the law library of Victoria.
116
 At the time of writing, the jury 
video had received 311 views and the law library video had received 461 views.
117
 The 
Saskatchewan Courts’ YouTube channel has one video about attending court (e.g., it states 
that one needs to be quiet while in the courtroom), and the video also directs viewers to the 
Courts’ website. It has received 334 views.
118
 The Saskatchewan video has the potential to be 
very helpful to members of the public who attend court for the first time. There is 
considerable potential for Australian courts to post YouTube videos, particularly 
informational videos for self-represented litigants. Videos for lawyers who are just starting 
their careers might also be useful. The videos could show new lawyers common errors that 
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lawyers make in the courtroom or basic examples of good advocacy. Admittedly, some may 
say that the staff of law societies or bar associations should be responsible for imparting this 
knowledge. Nevertheless, it could be helpful to receive this information from a judge’s point 
of view, as imparted to courts.  
 
It is also possible that courts provide information to potential jurors and witnesses on social 
media. The information to jurors could inform them about what jury duty is like and warn 
them, for instance, that they must never discuss the trial that they are attending on social 
media. Information for witnesses could inform them about the trial process and that they 
should not discuss the case with other witnesses. This type of information could also be 
shared using videos. The Indiana Supreme Court, New Jersey Supreme Court and the 





It is more likely that courts would be able to share static, as opposed to urgently required 
information. The Saskatchewan Courts’ Twitter page currently posts judgments only. 
Certainly this means that Saskatchewan courts do not use social media to its fullest extent. 
Nevertheless, it is better than no social media presence at all. Their posting of judgments 
could be helpful to people who urgently need or want to know when judgments are handed 
down.  
 
A survey of 25 people who visited the Facebook page of the Superior Court of Arizona in 
Maricopa County stated that information that they would like to be able to read on the 
Court’s Facebook page includes events, current news, job openings and emergency 
information.
120
 Admittedly, this is a small sample, and a bigger sample may provide different 
responses.  
 
Katherine Bladow and Joyce Raby recommend that courts ‘consider using Twitter as an 
online help desk. This has been extremely successful for businesses, such as Comcast, Home 
Depot, and Southwest Airlines’.
121
 One assumes that this would mean that the public could 
post as many questions as they wanted on a court’s social medium account and that the court 
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would answer all of them. This would likely take a lot of the court’s time. Nevertheless, 
courts have a greater need to answer questions than a typical business. One could argue that it 
is more important that the public are satisfied with a court’s service than that of an everyday 
business. If the public can ask courts questions by posting them on social media, they may 
become more satisfied with their court experience. The public may find this more convenient 
than calling or visiting the court to ask questions; courts’ telephone lines can be busy and 
there can be long lines at the court’s registry. 
 
Staff at the Children’s Court of Victoria expressed concern that they would not have a 
sufficient amount of content to post on social media because they publish few written 
decisions.
122
 However, there would still be plenty of static information that they could post, 
such as new court rules, public court events and job openings. 
 
In deciding what information to post on social media, courts must consider which 
stakeholders they most want to appeal to (e.g., the public, lawyers, journalists) and then post 
content accordingly. The most important stakeholder is the public. It is important to engage 
them and do whatever possible (within reason) to ensure that they have confidence in the 
courts. While journalists and lawyers are also important stakeholders, they likely know where 
to find information about the courts for themselves, in contrast to an average member of the 
public. Besides deciding what kind of information courts will post on social media, courts 
will also need to decide which types of social media they will use; this will be the topic of the 
following section.  
 
4.7 Types of Social Media Courts May Use 
 
An important question that courts should consider if they decide to use social media is which 
social media they could use. Twitter is the most common social medium that courts in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom currently use. Some of the courts also use 
Facebook and YouTube. It is expected that the social media that courts use will change as 
new social media are created.  
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4.8 Court Staff Who Could Be Responsible for the Social Media Account 
 
Another issue that court staff need to consider if they decide to start using social media is 
who will be in charge of the social medium account. Currently, a number of different staff 
working in different roles are responsible for courts’ social media accounts. Two members of 
staff at the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria are responsible for its social media: the Manager of 
Magistrates’ Support Services and the Court Advice Officer (Operations).
123
 Three members 
of staff at the Family Court of Australia are responsible for its Twitter account.
124
 The Courts 
Communication Officer of the Saskatchewan Courts is responsible for maintaining the 
Courts’ social media accounts.
125
 The Manager of Publications (Decisions) and the Director 
of Communications at Nova Scotia Courts are responsible for the Courts’ social media 
activities.
126
 The Maricopa County Superior Court has a full-time staff member who works 




If two people are responsible for a court’s social media account, one person could work in the 
court’s media department and the other could work on the court’s public engagement. Both 
staff members’ perspectives would be useful. It is valuable to have more than one staff 
member responsible for the account, for the sake of maintaining consistency if, for example, 
one of the staff members takes leave.
128
 If courts decide to use social media, there are some 
important actions that they can consider taking to start the process. 
 
4.9 How to Get Started 
 
If courts decide to use social media, they must first learn about it. They may find it valuable 
to discuss their upcoming use of social media with staff from other courts, and to think about 
their communication goals generally and how using social media could help to accomplish 
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 Bladow and Raby recommend that, when courts decide to implement a social media 
strategy, they first establish a small goal that they want to accomplish, then pick the correct 
social platform, then ‘pilot the project’. This involves choosing the appropriate staff for the 





Staff of the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County have a policy on Facebook and 
Twitter use for employees who create and use social media on behalf of the Court.
131
 
Australian courts could examine this policy and those of Australian courts who currently use 
social media as starting points for creating their own. Court policies on social media use 




Having established a social media presence, courts should post a link from the homepage of 
their website to their social media account. They could also use email to inform the court’s 
stakeholders of the new account to ensure that they are aware of it as soon as possible. The 
public may assume that each court has a webpage, but they may not assume that each court 
has a social media account. This is especially because few Australian courts have social 
media accounts.  
 
Courts should ensure that they have proper technological security in place so that it is 
difficult for someone to hack into their social media accounts.
133
 One would assume that 
courts have strong security in place for their existing websites; this experience could provide 
a useful basis for similarly securing social media accounts. 
 
4.10 Key Recommendations of this Chapter 
 
Ideally, courts could use all three types of social media that this chapter discusses — Twitter, 
Facebook and YouTube — to engage as many people as possible. Twitter would probably be 
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the best social network for courts to use if they only decide to use one, because it requires 
few resources. The Twitter account should use the Input Output approach to take full 
advantage of the interactivity of social media. Lastly, ideally at least two staff members 
should be responsible for the social media accounts, so that one staff member can manage the 
accounts while the other is on leave. However, if two staff members are not available, one 




‘Courts are notoriously slow to adapt to change, but it is imperative to understand the 
growing phenomenon of social media’.
134
 If courts do not embrace the use of social media, 
then they are missing a wonderful opportunity to engage the public and potentially increase 
the public’s confidence in them. This chapter has examined many benefits that courts and 
courts’ stakeholders can accrue in using social media. It has also examined reasons why some 
courts have not yet adopted social media. The main reasons appear to be a lack of resources 
and a lack of appreciation by courts of the potential benefits of using social media.  
 
Regardless of whether or not courts adopt social media, ‘the spread of these tools will not 
make them disappear or diminish their impact in society’.
135
 Rather, social media will only 
become more widely used. The public may begin to perceive that courts are out of touch if 
they fail to adopt contemporary means of communication. On the other hand, if courts take a 
generally positive attitude towards social media, they may be more likely to permit journalists 
to use social media in the courtroom. The next chapter of this thesis discusses the use of 
social media by journalists in the courtroom.  
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Chapter 5: Why Australian Judicial Officers Should Permit Journalists to Use Social 




People living in Western countries expect to be able to obtain information instantly.
1
 If 
someone is driving and wants to find out if there is a traffic jam ahead that could delay them 
in reaching their destination, he or she can check social media and find out right away.
2
 If 
someone wants to learn if his or her favourite store is having a sale, he or she can just browse 
the store’s Twitter page to find out.
3
 In this context, people may also expect to obtain 
information just as quickly on what occurs during court proceedings. In Australia, ‘[t]he 
media's right to contemporaneously and fully report proceedings in [its] courts is properly 




Jane Johnston communicated with seven different Australian court information officers about 
their courts’ current social media policies.
5
 Five of the seven court information officers said 
that ‘they were aware of the use of Twitter by the news media in the coverage of courts in 
their jurisdiction.’
6




This chapter discusses the issue of journalists using social media in the courtroom. After a 
short description of the relationship between courts and the media, and how social media has 
changed the media industry, it looks at several important issues regarding journalists using 
social media in the courtroom. It then considers the actions that courts in four common law 
jurisdictions have taken on this issue. This chapter ultimately concludes that Australian courts 
should release a standard policy that permits journalists to use social media in the courtroom 
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in support of the open justice principle. A draft of such a policy is provided in Appendix F. 




5.2 The Relationship Between Courts and the Media 
 
The relationship between courts and the media is complex, and has changed over time. At the 
heart of this relationship is the open justice principle, which states that ‘judicial proceedings 




Courts and the media have an interdependent relationship. Courts depend on the media to 
inform the public about court matters.
10
 The media provides courts with ‘the means by which 
justice is seen to be done’.
11
 When a judge imposes a sentence on an accused to try to deter 
others from committing a similar crime, the deterrence only works if the public is aware of 
the sentence. Judicial officers depend on the media to inform the public about the sentence, 
thereby implementing the deterrent effect.
12
 Journalists depend on courts to provide them 
with information that they can report to the public.  
 
The relationship between judicial officers and the media has some challenges. Judicial 
officers sometimes find that media reports about court proceedings are very different from 
what actually occurred. They become concerned that the public may not know the truth about 
what actually happened or that they may receive a biased view.
13
 Journalists have also 
criticised courts for not providing them with sufficient access to court documents and 
proceedings.
14
 To prevent this from occurring, most Australian courts now have a media or 
public information officer. The media or public information officer’s work ‘involves bridging 
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the gap between the judiciary and the media’.
15
 He or she provides court documents to 
journalists (e.g., transcripts) and he or she liaises between the media and the judiciary.
16
 
Judicial officers hope that media or public information officers help to improve the accuracy 




John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales
18
 (“Fairfax”) provides 
exceptions to the open justice principle that are mentioned or applied in subsequent cases.
19
 
One of the exceptions occurs when open justice would negatively impact the attainment of 
justice in a specific case or generally. For example, if open justice is permitted when a police 
informant testifies in court, this may discourage police informants from providing evidence. 
The second exception occurs when open justice could hurt the public interest, such as when a 





Judicial officers therefore can decide that traditional media cannot report on cases that 
involve an exception to the open justice principle.
21
 Similarly, judicial officers can decide 
that journalists cannot use social media when the proceedings involve an exception to the 
open justice principle.  
 
5.3 How Social Media Has Changed the Media Industry 
 
The creation of and significant worldwide use of the internet and social media has had an 
impact on print media.
22
 The circulation of newspapers has decreased since the mid-2000s. 
Some newspapers have ceased operation,
23
 while others have stopped publishing their paper 
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version and started publishing a small online version instead.
24
 Print newspapers’ advertising 
revenue has decreased, while online newspaper advertising has increased.
25
 The staff at many 
online newspapers are experienced journalists who have left their previous print or broadcast 
news occupations.
26
 Mainstream news media use social media as a way to quickly release 
breaking news.
27
 The number of journalists who use social media as part of their reporting 
has increased internationally.
28
 In 2009 a survey co-researched by George Washington 
University in the United States revealed that over half of the 371 journalists who participated 
in the survey believed that social media was important to the stories that they created. A 
survey by the Society for New Communications Research of over 200 journalists in 2011 
revealed that 75 per cent use Facebook when they report news and over 69 per cent use 
Twitter. Of the journalists surveyed, 90 per cent were American and 96 per cent were from 
North America; information about the survey did not state where the other 4 per cent were 
located.
29
 Given that social media is an increasingly common way of providing news to the 
public in general, journalists should be able to use social media in the courtroom to provide 
courtroom news and information to social media users. 
 
The rise of social media can mean that journalists are pressured to submit articles as quickly 
as possible, which can result in mistakes.
30 
Jordaan observes that journalists use social media 
to add to their personal research and writing, to obtain story ideas or to obtain readers’ 
opinions about various topics.
31
 Using social media is an easy way for journalists to quickly 
obtain their readers’ opinions; indeed, journalists may receive so many of such opinions that 
they do not have sufficient time to read them all. 
 
Citizen journalists are a new type of journalist that has emerged recently on the internet and 
social media. Citizen journalists may write for online newspapers with few staff that depend 
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for State Courts, 41 <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctmedia/id/32>. 
25 Marenet Jordaan, Social Media in the Newspaper Newsroom: The Professional Use of Facebook and Twitter 
at Rapport and the Mail & Guardian (MPhil (Journalism) Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2012) 3 
<http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/20101>. 
26 Kostouros, above n 24, 42.  
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on articles from contributors, who are often community activists or advocates for a specific 
cause. Community foundations often finance citizen journalists. The quality and accuracy of 
citizen journalism varies.
32
 Because of this increase in citizen journalism, the scope of the 
term ‘journalist’ has become uncertain.
33
 Citizen journalists may not know the law that 




Traditional court reporters used to write notes while they were in the courtroom, and later 
filed their writing outside the courtroom.
35
 Technology has removed court reporters’ need to 
leave the courtroom to file their writing.
36
 Prior to the internet and social media, people who 
were not professional journalists would find it challenging to disseminate their own articles 
about court proceedings. Social media have changed the ease with which articles can be 
disseminated widely. Social media and the internet enable any person to sit in a courtroom 
and post information for the public to read, provided that a judicial officer permits it.
37
 This 
could potentially increase the public’s level of engagement with the courts. 
 
By the same token, social media has caused some challenges for courts. When a high-profile 
trial occurs, courts must decide which journalists will receive reserved seating, and whether 
citizen journalists should be allowed to sit in the area reserved for journalists. Courts must 
decide whether or not to provide citizen journalists with the court records that they request.
38 
Courts may not know how much journalists understand about court etiquette or suppression 
orders. Some citizen journalists may have few readers while others may have many. In that 
case, it is arguable that the more popular citizen journalists should receive priority seating in 
a courtroom over less popular citizen journalists.  
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The entry of many inexperienced journalists into online reporting has caused courts to 
consider how they can ensure the accuracy of articles about court proceedings.
39
 Some courts 
distribute their media releases to citizen journalists. Several courts prepare materials in the 
form of news stories that inexperienced journalists can easily understand. Some court 
agencies, such as the Minnesota Court Information Office in the United States, allow citizen 
journalists to attend the same training that they provide to professional journalists.
40
 Courts 
also post media guides on their websites to help inexperienced journalists.
41
 Since courts have 
adapted their procedures to include citizen journalists, they should consider similarly 
adapting their procedures to permit journalists to use social media in the courtroom. 
 
5.4 Journalists Can Engage with the Public and Improve Their Accuracy by Using 
Social Media 
 
The Utah Judicial Council Study Committee on Technology into the Courtroom states that 
 
the potential public benefits flowing from electronic media coverage of open judicial 
proceedings are substantial. While relatively few judicial proceedings are likely to attract 
electronic media coverage, those that do are likely to be of significant public interest and 
concern. Permitting electronic media coverage will allow the public to actually see and hear 





When journalists tweet from the courtroom, they can inform the public of what occurs at 
court more quickly than traditional media.
43
 This may raise levels of public engagement with 
the courts,
44
 which in turn may increase confidence in the judiciary. When journalists can 
access social media from inside the courtroom, they do not miss any of the court proceedings 
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due to having to leave to access social media or submit a story.
45
 This could potentially make 
journalists’ stories more accurate. Journalists who use social media in the courtroom cause 
less disruption in the courtroom than journalists who must constantly leave the courtroom to 




It may well be that many people enjoy reading news from the courtroom on social media. For 
example, in Wichita, Kansas, journalist Ron Sylvester of The Wichita Eagle was allowed to 
use Twitter while he sat in the courtroom during Theodore Burnett’s trial.
47
 Burnett was 
accused of being paid to murder a pregnant 14-year-old girl.
48
 At the end of the first day of 
the trial, many people who read Sylvester’s tweets from inside the courtroom sent him emails 




Using social media in the courtroom can ensure that courts face ‘greater scrutiny’.
50
 Dean 
argues that the more the public can access a trial, the better it is for the accused, because this 
increased scrutiny lessens the likelihood of perjury or misconduct occurring.
51
 People may be 
deterred from committing perjury or misconduct by the increased probability that they will be 
found out. It would also be better for the prosecution. These effects suggested by Dean may 
not actually occur when journalists use social media in the courtroom if trial participants do 
know that journalists are using social media; trial participants may assume that journalists are 
simply using their laptops or texting work colleagues. 
 
5.5 An Example of Journalists Using Social Media in the Courtroom Successfully 
 
Journalists who use social media in the courtroom can help people who want to attend court 
to watch a trial, but who cannot handle the emotional repercussions of being in court. They 
                                                             
45 ‘Opening Courts to Social Media Proposed by Panel’, CBC (online), 26 October 2012 
<http://www.cbc.ca/m/rich/technology/story/2012/10/26/tec-social-media-courts.html>.  
46 Newsgathering Committee, Defense Counsel Section, Media Law Resource Center, Model Policy on Access 
and Use of Electronic Portable Devices in Courthouses and Courtrooms & Memorandum in Support for MLRC’s 
Model Policy on Electronic Devices (2010) Supreme Court of Arizona, 13. 
47 Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Capital Murder Trial Chronicled Via Twitter’ (15 May 2008) ABA Journal, [2] 
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/reporter_covers_murder_trial_on_twitter>.  
48 Ibid [1].  
49
 Ron Sylvester, ‘A Community Watches a Story Unfold’ (2011) Nieman Reports, [6] 
<http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102627/A-Community-Watches-a-Story-Unfold.aspx>.  
50
 David Banks, ‘Tweeting in Court: Why Reporters Must Be Given Guidelines’, The Guardian (online), 15 
December 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/dec/15/tweeting-court-reporters-julian-assange>. 
51
 Jacob E Dean, ‘To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Twitter, “Broadcasting,” and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
53’ (2010) 79(2) University of Cincinnati Law Review 769, 787. 
139 
 
can also help people who want to attend a trial, but cannot because the court is too far away.
52
 
US v WR Grace
53
 is an example of this. The trial involved asbestos contamination in Libby, 
Montana. The prosecution submitted that the defendant’s employees knew that their mine 
released toxic mine dust into the town. About 18 per cent of the people who lived in Libby 
who were x-rayed had asbestos in their lungs. Libby is a four hour drive from Missoula, 
where the trial occurred; therefore, some Libby residents could not travel to Missoula to 
attend the trial. Thirty-one law and journalism students tweeted about the case consistently 
during the trial and also blogged about the trial every few hours.
54
 For some of the people 
affected by the asbestos in Libby, it was too hard to attend court, and these people were quite 
pleased to read updates about the trial on social media.
55
 If journalists are able to use social 
media in the courtroom, they can also help people who cannot attend court for work or other 
personal reasons to know immediately what is occurring in a trial. 
 
5.6 Some Examples of Journalists Using Social Media in the Courtroom 
Inappropriately 
 
Some people believe that journalists should not be allowed to use social media in the 
courtroom because they may decide to take photos or record the proceedings, which may 
disrupt a trial.
56
 The trial may be disrupted because a judge needs to tell a journalist to cease 
his or her behaviour and examine the effect of the journalist’s actions on the trial. Journalists 
may also post information that they are not allowed to. For example, Jamie Jackson, a sports 
reporter for British newspaper the Guardian, tweeted from the Southwark Crown Court 
during a trial.
57
 Jackson was allowed to tweet because the Lord Chief Justice had previously 
released a practice guidance that permitted journalists to use social media in court.
58
 After the 
jury was chosen, Jackson tweeted the name of a juror in the trial.
59
 In the United Kingdom 
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jurors’ names are not provided to the public or the parties.
60
 Judge Anthony Leonard QC of 
the Southeastern Circuit Court dismissed the juror who Jackson named and replaced him or 
her.
61
 The Attorney General also investigated Jackson’s actions to decide whether to 
prosecute him for his tweets.
62
 Jackson’s mistake may have been because he was a sports 
reporter, as opposed to being professionally trained in court rules. Citizen journalists who are 
similarly untrained in court rules may make mistakes similar to Jackson’s.  
 
In Kansas, United States, Austin Tabor was on trial for allegedly shooting two people, one of 
whom died.
63
 The judge at the trial allowed journalists to use camera phones and to tweet in 
the courtroom, provided that they did not photograph the jury.
64
 Ann Marie Bush, a journalist 
for the Topeka Capital-Journal, accidentally photographed a juror in the courtroom and 
tweeted the photo.
65




Despite these occurrences, it is not necessarily the case that, if judicial officers permit 
journalists to use social media in the courtroom, journalists will take photographs or publish 
information that they should not. Judicial officers should release official policies clarifying 
that journalists cannot take photographs in court or publish jurors’ names. National uniform 
guidelines can state that judicial officers will not permit journalists to use social media in the 
courtroom if it will infringe upon the exceptions to the open justice principle. If some 
journalists occasionally fail to follow these guidelines, judicial officers can punish them 
accordingly. Judicial officers can also forbid journalists who do not follow court rules from 
entering courtrooms in the future. Admittedly, some professionally trained journalists may 
breach court guidelines accidentally (such as Ann Marie Bush), but these cases would be rare.  
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5.7 Problems for Victims of Crime 
 
Journalists tweeting from the courtrooms of criminal trials can cause problems for victims of 
crimes.
67
 According to South Australian Victims of Crime Commissioner Michael 
O’Connell, ‘tweets are only 140 characters, and that carries with it the risk of making a case 
sound more sinister’.
68
 Journalists can make a case appear worse than it actually is in any 
kind of media, no matter the length. Victims also have the choice to refrain from reading 
about a trial on social media if it disturbs them. If journalists are properly trained, this might 
lessen the chance that they make a case sound ‘more sinister’.  
 
5.8 Problems with the Length of a Tweet 
 
Similarly, since a tweet is only 140 characters, some argue that it may be difficult for a 
journalist to include the context of a case.
69
 If a journalist wants to inform readers about the 
context of a case that he or she has tweeted about, the journalist can tweet links to webpages 
containing additional information that is not restricted to 140 characters.
70
 It is also possible 
that a reader might already know the context of a case in great detail, which is why he or she 
wants to read tweets about it. In this situation, the reader would not require the journalist to 
provide the context of the tweets. 
 
Some people think that the public may find it difficult to understand journalists’ short posts 
and tweets.
71
 It is true that some members of the public may have problems understanding 
court proceedings from a single tweet. These people can obtain additional information if they 
choose to, from online articles. Reading a tweet about a trial can still be helpful to these 
people if they are looking for a short update on what has occurred in the courtroom very 
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recently. Journalists can also tweet several times about the same topic when they want to 
avoid being constrained by Twitter’s 140-character limit.  
 
5.9 The Immediacy of Journalists’ Posts or Tweets 
 
Other problems with journalists using social media in the courtroom relate to the immediacy 
of the journalists’ posts or tweets. Lili Levi claims that when journalists post news on social 
media, the news may not be accurate
72
 because they post information so quickly.
73
 For 
example, in Kansas in the United States, reporter Jared Cerullo tweeted from the courtroom 
that an accused pleaded guilty to a murder charge. This was incorrect. The accused had 
entered a plea of not guilty. Cerullo’s employer fired him as a result and Cerullo sued his 
employer for defamation and breach of contract.
74
 Cerullo’s lawsuit may set precedent in this 
area in the United States. 
 
5.10 Additional Fact Checking and Defamatory Content 
 
Lawyers rarely, if ever, check the content that journalists post on social media prior to 
posting, so journalists may risk posting content that is defamatory and results in litigation.
75
 
The content may also require fact checking, but journalists may not go through this process 
because it can be challenging or inconvenient in the immediate environment of social 
media.
76
 On the other hand, simply because a journalist posts information immediately on 
social media, does not necessarily mean that it is inaccurate or is defamatory. Staff of media 
outlets can teach journalists how to increase the chances that their social media tweets and 
posts are accurate. It may be necessary for staff of media organisations to try to choose more 
experienced journalists to use social media in the courtroom. While more experienced 
journalists may be more likely to post or tweet accurate information, it is also possible that 
more experienced or older journalists might not be as knowledgeable about using social 
media as younger journalists.  
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5.11 Suppression Orders 
 
A judicial officer may decide that information at court should be subject to a suppression 
order after a journalist has already posted or tweeted that information on social media. 
Consequently, the suppression order would not be effective. In November 2011, Magistrate 
Peter Mealy of the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court forbade journalists from using Twitter 
during Simon Artz’s committal hearing.
77
 Artz was accused of leaking police information 
about an organised anti-terror raid
78
 to The Australian.
79
 His Honour stated that using Twitter 
at court was ‘inappropriate’ because at Artz’s committal hearing tweets might contain 
information that he would later order to be suppressed.
80
 If a judicial officer believes that 
information in a court proceeding will need to be suppressed, he or she should inform 
journalists as early as possible that they cannot use social media during the hearing. He or she 
can also instruct court officers to take journalists’ electronic devices from them while they are 
in the relevant courtroom. Judicial officers can also require journalists to wait for a certain 
period (for example, 20 minutes) after evidence is tendered or a witness finishes testifying 






Some judicial officers think that journalists using social media in the courtroom can be 
disruptive. Judge Charles Burns of the Cook County Court in Illinois, United States, forbade 
anyone, including journalists, from using social media during William Balfour’s trial.
 
Balfour 
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was accused of killing Oscar winner Jennifer Hudson’s family.
82
 Judge Burns’ media liaison, 
Irv Miller, stated that ‘[t]weeting takes away from the dignity of a courtroom’
83
 and that 
Burns J thought that journalists constantly tweeting would be disruptive.
84
 Judge Burns may 
have thought that journalists tweeting ‘takes away from the dignity of the courtroom’ because 
Twitter has a reputation for providing inaccurate information.
85
 Journalist Tim Leberecht said 
that Twitter is ‘prone to propaganda and misinformation’.
86
 Any type of media can provide 
information that is inaccurate, whether in print or online. As long as it is professional 
journalists who tweet from inside the courtroom (as opposed to people without proper 
journalistic training or citizen journalists), the information tweeted should usually be 
accurate. This accuracy is expected because Australian journalists follow ethical codes that 




Journalists tweeting in the courtroom need not be disruptive. In courtrooms where judicial 
staff already permit journalists to type notes on their laptops, the sounds created by posting 
on social media are no different. It is possible for journalists to adjust the settings on their 
technological devices so that they do not make noise while typing. The benefits of journalists 
using social media in the courtroom appear to outweigh the potential risks involved. 
Nevertheless, only some courts already permit journalists to use social media in the 
courtroom; the next section discusses this in depth. 
 
5.13 Judicial Officers Already Using or Requesting Permission to Use Social Media 
 
Canadian, American, British and Australian courts currently have different approaches to 
permitting journalists to use social media in the courtroom. Justice Frances Kitely, of the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canada, stated that the courts in Canadian ‘provinces are 
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struggling with what to do with this’.
88
 Still, Canadian, British and Welsh judicial officers 
made the earliest efforts to address this issue.  
 
This section will examine judicial officers’ actions, or lack thereof, on this issue to date in the 
four jurisdictions mentioned. On a micro level, judicial officers decide the issue for specific 
cases. On a macro level, judicial officers or the government make decisions about this issue 
for entire courts or jurisdictions. 
 
5.13.1 Micro Level 
 
5.13.1.1 Allowing Social Media Use for Individual Cases 
 
Judicial officers may decide that they will allow journalists to use social media in the 
courtroom for a specific trial because journalists have already begun or have requested 
permission to do so. In these situations, they do not apply existing law about other media to 
the case. An example of this is Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [No 3],
89
 a Sydney 
Federal Court case about whether an internet service provider breached copyright laws when 
its subscribers illegally downloaded movies.
90
 Two technology journalists, Andrew Colley 
from The Australian and Liam Tun from ZDNet Australia, tweeted from the courtroom using 
their laptops.
91
 Their Twitter pages stated their names and the media companies that they 
worked for.
92
 Hundreds of people followed Colley and Tun’s tweets.
93
 When Justice Dennis 
Cowdroy discovered that the two men were tweeting in the courtroom, he did not stop 
them.
94
 Justice Cowdroy stated 
 
[t]his proceeding has attracted widespread interest both here in Australia and abroad, and both 
within the legal community and the general public. So much so that I understand this is the first 
Australian trial to be twittered or tweeted. I granted approval for this to occur in view of the 
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Staff of the High Court later stated that they would ban all live tweeting during the final 
appeal of the case, because they ban social media from the courtroom in general.
96
 It is 
possible that High Court judicial officers might make a different decision about tweeting in 
the courtroom if this case were to come before the High Court today, because the High Court 




At Julian Assange’s bail hearing at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, journalists 
requested Judge Howard Riddle’s permission to use social media in the courtroom.
98
 Judge 
Riddle permitted the journalists to use social media from inside the courtroom,
99
 provided 
that they were ‘quiet and did not interfere with court business’.
100
 Later that week, Assange 
had another bail hearing at the High Court.
101
 At the High Court Justice Duncan Ouseley 
refused to let the journalists use social media in the courtroom.
102
 He stated that ‘the issues 
involving Twitter go beyond the possible relationship to sound recording, and may include 
the potential for distraction and disruption to the appropriate atmosphere of the court — what 
might be termed, perhaps a bit pompously, its dignity.’
103
 Justice Ouseley also stated that ‘a 
considered policy decision’ on the issue was required.
104
 The Lord Chief Justice for England 
and Wales subsequently published a policy on social media in the court.
105
 As previously 
stated, the use of social media by journalists in the courtroom need not be distracting. 
Journalists can sit at the back of the courtroom, if necessary.  
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Some American judges release decorum orders relating to a specific trial and state various 
requirements for that trial in particular, such as whether the media are permitted to use social 
media in the courtroom.
106
 Releasing individual decorum orders is not the ideal way to decide 
whether journalists can use social media in the courtroom. It is not sufficiently predictable for 
the journalists who cover trials. A better solution is for courts to release a standard policy, 
which is a macro level solution. 
 
5.13.1.2 Applying Existing Law to Decide Whether to Allow Social Media Use 
 
There are few reported cases on this issue to date. Three American judgments on the topic 
involve applying existing law. In United States v Shelnutt,
107
 a journalist at the Columbus 
Ledger-Enquirer newspaper requested permission from Judge Clay Land to tweet during a 
criminal trial.
108
 The prosecution did not argue the issue.
109
 Judge Land applied Rule 53 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
110
 to make his decision. Rule 53 states, ‘[t]he court 
must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the 
broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom.’
111
 His Honour used a dictionary 
definition to define the word ‘broadcast’: ‘casing or scattering in all directions’ and ‘the act 
of making widely known’.
112
 Judge Land felt that tweeting would ‘cast’ information from the 




Rule 53 was originally drafted to apply to television and radio broadcasts of trials. Prior to 
2002, the rule stated that the ‘taking of photographs’ and ‘radio broadcasting’ were not 
allowed. In 2002, Rule 53 was amended and the word ‘radio’ was deleted from broadcasting. 
The Rule simply stated that broadcasting was forbidden. The change was made to create a 
wider interpretation of the word ‘broadcasting’.
114
 Adriana Cervantes states that Land J in 
Shelnutt 
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did not properly discuss why tweeting is unlike the broadcasting of audio or visual information 
in reaching its decision to include Twitter under the blanket prohibition of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 53. Hopefully, subsequent courts will make this distinction since the coverage that each 




Susan Brenner also believes that Land J in Shelnutt erred in refusing to permit journalists to 
tweet during the trial.
116
 She states that the goal of Rule 53
117
 was to prevent journalists from 
disrupting trials,
118
 adding that ‘there seems to be no reason why a reporter tweeting during a 
criminal trial is any more disruptive than letting a reporter take notes by hand or on a laptop 
during a trial or letting an artist create sketches that will later be broadcast to the public via 
television.’
119
 Brenner’s view is similar to the views already stated in this section that 
journalists who use social media in the courtroom can be relatively quiet. Dean states that the 
definition that Land J used in Shelnutt was ‘over-inclusive’ because, if one uses his dictionary 
definition of broadcasting,  
 
any form of press would be broadcasting because it takes facts and disseminates them to the 
population at large. Under this interpretation, newspaper, magazine, and television reporting 
would all be prohibited under Rule 53. Any individual who attended a criminal trial and talked 
to others about his or her experience would be broadcasting. The result is untenable; therefore, 
broadcasting cannot be defined so broadly as to prohibit anything that casts or scatters in all 




Dean’s statement is too broad. A small local paper, which is a type of press, would probably 
not ‘scatter in all directions’,
121
 but an online article might. Using Land J’s definition of 
broadcasting, online articles about trials would not be allowed. If online articles about trials 
were not allowed, it would be a disaster for the staff of news organisations that had shifted 
their efforts from print to online, and for the millions of people who read the news online. 
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In Connecticut v Komisarjevsky, the accused was charged with capital felony and sexual 
assault in the first degree. The accused applied to Judge Jon Blue to forbid journalists from 
using Twitter at his trial. Judge Blue applied Connecticut Rules of Court §1–11(b) (2008), 
which stated that when an accused is charged with sexual assault, ‘[n]o broadcasting, 




Judge Blue stated that this law clearly forbids journalists from using television and radio at 
trials, but it was ‘not clear whether new electronic forms of communication, particularly 
communication by the real-time information network known as Twitter, are similarly 
prohibited’.
123
 His Honour then attempted to find a definition for the term ‘broadcast.’ He 
found dictionary and legal definitions for the word out of date and unhelpful.
124
 He stated that 
he would interpret the word ‘broadcast’ by constructing ‘an interpretation that comports with 





Judge Blue explained that the purpose of §1–11(b) was to protect a victim of sexual assault 
from having to contend with ‘the indignity of having his or her ordeal vividly conveyed to the 
world by the use of actual voices and photographic or televised images from the courtroom’. 
However, this protection ‘cannot sensibly extend beyond voices and photographic or 
televised images to the actual words spoken in court or descriptions of courtroom events’.
126
 
Judge Blue stated that judicial officers usually act cautiously when they apply existing 
legislation to new technology,
127
 but held that §1–11(b) did not apply to Twitter and 
journalists could use it at Komisarjevsky’s trial. Nevertheless, if journalists were ‘disruptive 
of the court proceeding’ while tweeting in court, then he would forbid them from doing so. 
For example, if a journalist was noisy while typing in court, Blue J would forbid him or her 




Judge Blue’s decision that §1–11(b) did not apply to Twitter is reasonable, given that 
journalists tweeting from court need not take photographs at court or record voices or images. 
                                                             




 Ibid 406–7.   
125
 Ibid 407.  
126
 Ibid.  
127
 Ibid 408.  
128 Ibid 413.  
150 
 
It is interesting that Blue J could not find a definition of the word broadcast that was not out 
of date, while Land J did not find this to be a problem. Judge Land used his definition of 
broadcast approximately two years before Blue J stated that he could not find a definition for 
broadcast that was not out of date. Judge Blue most likely would have known about Land J’s 
judgment and rejected Land J’s definition of broadcast. This adds further weight to the idea 
that there were problems with Land J’s definition. If the two cases had appeared in an 
Australian jurisdiction, the judicial officer may have applied the open justice exceptions to 
the case and found that neither case would have fallen under an exception to open justice, 





In Pennsylvania, Centre County Court judicial officers forbade electronic communications 
from being used in the courtroom.
130
 Judge John Cleland overturned this rule for the 
preliminary hearing in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Sandusky.
131
 Sandusky was a 
former football defensive coordinator for Pennsylvania State University, charged with 
sexually abusing children.
132
 Judge Cleland met with print and electronic journalists to 
‘anticipate and resolve media coverage issues that might arise during the trial’.
133
 On 30 May 
2012 Judge Cleland released a ‘Decorum Order Governing Jury Selection and Trial’ 
(“Order”). The Order laid out policies for the public and press who attended court to follow. 
Paragraph 7 of the Order stated: 
 
7. Electronic Devices:  
 
a. No member of the public will be permitted to possess in Courtroom 1 any cell phone, laptop 
computer, smart phone, or similar electronic device. Anyone possessing such a device will not 
be permitted to pass security and enter the Courthouse. 
b. Only reporters with proper credentials, as determined by the Sheriff, will be permitted to 
possess or use in Courtroom 1 or the satellite courtroom any cell phone, laptop computer, smart 
phone, or similar electronic device. Such devices may be used during trial for electronic based 
communications. 
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However, the devices may not be used to take or transmit photographs in Courtroom 1 or 
the satellite courtroom; or to record or broadcast any verbatim account of the 




At issue was whether journalists could publish direct quotations from court using ‘electronic 
based communications’
135
. Journalists requested that Cleland J clarify paragraph 7 of the 
Order to state whether they could use direct quotations from the courtroom using electronic 
based communications.
136
 Judge Cleland stated that the relevant law was Criminal Procedure 
Rule 112 of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
137
 Paragraph (A) of the Rule states: 
 
The court or issuing authority shall: 
 
prohibit the taking of photographs, video or motion pictures of any judicial proceedings or in 
the hearing room or courtroom or its environs during the judicial proceeding; and 
prohibit the transmission of communications by telephone, radio, television, or advanced 
communication technology from the hearing room or the courtroom or its environs during the 





Paragraph © of Rule 112 states: 
 
Except as provided in paragraph (D), the stenographic, mechanical, or electronic recording, or 
the recording using any advanced communication technology, of any judicial proceedings by 
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Additionally, Canon 3(A)(7) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct states: 
 
Unless otherwise provided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, judges should prohibit 
broadcasting, televising, recording or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas 




Both pieces of legislation use the word ‘broadcasting’, so Cleland J interpreted this term. His 
Honour interpreted the term to mean ‘that it prohibited the simultaneous transmission of a 
verbatim account of the proceeding and, therefore, the Rule would not prohibit tweeting or 




Around the same time that Cleland J released his Order, the Pennsylvania Rules Committee 
released a report
142 
stating that Pennsylvania trial judges who interpreted the word ‘broadcast’ 
in Rule of Criminal Procedure 112
143
 and Canon 3(A)(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
144
 
to permit using electronic communication from the courtroom misunderstood the law.
145
 
Judge Cleland said that his interpretation of the word broadcasting was ‘confusing to 
reporters, unworkable, and therefore, likely, unenforceable’.
146
 Judge Cleland then modified 
paragraph 7 of the Order to state that  
 
while credentialed reporters admitted to Courtroom 1 or the satellite courtroom may possess 
and use specified electronic devices as ‘tools of the trade’ such devices shall not be set in a 
mode that permits transmission of any form of communication to any person or device either in 




Criminal Procedure Rule 112(A)(2) of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
148
 appears to 
clearly state that people (which would include journalists) cannot use social media in the 
courtroom. Therefore, it is interesting that Cleland J and other judges misinterpreted the rule. 
It is hard to understand why Cleland J originally permitted journalists to post or tweet general 
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comments from the courtroom, but not direct quotations. Judicial officers should allow 
journalists to post or tweet both general comments and direct quotations. If this case had been 
tried in Australia and the exceptions to the open justice principle
149
 were applied to the 
subject matter, it is possible that the judicial officer would have found posting or tweeting 
neither general comments nor direct quotes from the case to be a problem. This could have 
prevented the confusion that resulted from Cleland J originally stating that journalists could 
post general comments from the courtroom on social media, but not direct quotes.  
 
In Wichita, Kansas, Thomas Marten J of the US District Court permitted journalist Ron 
Sylvester of The Wichita Eagle to tweet from the Federal Court at the trial of six gang 
members.
150
 Judge Marten permitted Sylvester to tweet from the courtroom by applying 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b).
151
 This rule states 
 
[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and the 
local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for 
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district rules 





Since the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) is so wide, it makes sense that Marten J 
could permit Sylvester to tweet from the courtroom as a result. 
 
5.13.2 Macro Level 
 
5.13.2.1 Consolidated Practice Directions and Court Rules 
 
The consolidated practice directions of the Supreme Courts of Western Australia and 
Queensland generally address the question of whether journalists are allowed to use social 
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media in the courtroom.
153
 The Queensland practice directions state that ‘laptop computers 
that do not communicate via a cellular network may be used during court proceedings 
provided doing so does not interrupt proceedings’.
154
 Queensland Chief Justice Paul de Jersey 




Even though it appears that journalists are permitted to use social media in the courtroom in 
Queensland, courts in Queensland should consider releasing a policy on the issue so that 
journalists learn the limitations on their social media use in the courtroom. The Western 
Australian practice directions forbid anyone from using a mobile telephone in its courtrooms 
because it causes difficulties for the Court’s electronic recording devices.
156
 As a 
consequence of this and the prohibition of internet-connected laptops, social media use is not 
possible. 
 
The Court Security Regulations 2011 (NSW) permit journalists to use social media in the 
courtroom ‘for the purposes of a media report on the proceedings concerned’.
157
 The 
regulations do not define ‘journalist’ or ‘proceedings concerned’. The lack of definition of 
‘journalist’ is problematic, because citizen journalists may try to argue that they are included 
in this term. Members of the public who use social media to comment about court 
proceedings may submit that they are also included. It is still a positive step that this 
regulation exists in New South Wales, because it permits journalists to use social media in the 
courtroom without requiring a judicial officer’s permission to do so. 
 
In South Australia, the Supreme Court Civil Rules and District Court Rules state that ‘a bona 
fide member of the media’ may use social media.
158
 The rules do not define ‘a bona fide 
member of the media’, which could pose a problem similar to the one discussed above in 
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regards to the New South Wales regulation. If journalists in the South Australian Supreme 
Court want to write about evidence tendered or submissions made at court on social media, 
they must wait for 15 minutes after the tender or submissions are made, or until a judicial 
officer rules on any suppression orders or objections related to the evidence or submissions, 
whichever occurs later.
159
 This requirement is unique: no other court policy or rule in the 
jurisdictions researched has one similar. This rule could be an effective way to deal with one 
of the major criticisms of allowing journalists to use social media in the courtroom: that 
journalists will comment on social media about information that a judge later supresses. 
Perhaps courts in other jurisdictions that implement policies and rules about journalists using 
social media in the courtroom could do well to consider following the South Australian 
Supreme Court’s lead on this issue.  
 
5.13.2.2 Unofficial Court Policies 
 
The Federal Court of Australia has an unofficial policy that individual Judges of the Court 
can decide whether they will allow journalists to use social media in the courtroom.
160
 The 
Federal Court of Australia could consider publishing an official policy on this issue. Other 
Australian courts could also consider publishing official policies on this issue, if they have 
not done so already. Publishing official policies would give journalists clarity on whether 
they can use social media in the courtroom and whether there are any limitations on such use. 
It could also make it easier for judicial officers to punish journalists who violate their 
instructions on this issue, because the policy could clearly lay out the sanctions that 
journalists will face if they breach the policy. It would also help to uphold the open justice 
principle.  
 
5.13.2.3 Official Court Social Media Policies and Model Policies 
 
Johnston recommends that courts give journalists ‘clear guidelines’ about social media use in 
the courtroom and that courts update those guidelines regularly.
161
 Courts could consider 
their own specific requirements in drafting these guidelines. It may not be appropriate for 
courts to allow journalists to use social media in some courts. For example, family courts 
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may not want to allow journalists to use social media in their courtrooms because of the 
sensitive nature of their cases. Lower courts could permit journalists to use social media in 
courtrooms because it shows the public that ‘minor crimes are being dealt with’.
162
 On the 
other hand, though reassuring, the public may not find tweets about minor crimes sufficiently 
interesting to read. Former New South Wales Attorney General John Hatzistergos 
recommends that when considering whether courts should allow electronic media to be used 
in the courtroom, one must also consider ‘any adverse impact on the rights of victims of 
crime and the protection of witnesses’.
163
 These are practical considerations for criminal trials 
in particular.  
 
Australian courts could consider adopting an official model policy that allows journalists to 
use social media in the courtroom. A model policy would be better than a court rule, because 
a policy is a document that stands on its own, so it is likely easier to modify. Since social 
media is so new, courts may want the flexibility to change the policy easily over the next few 
years while they experiment to create the best policy. Australian courts can examine the 
policies of other jurisdictions to decide on a model policy; they can also consider using the 
model policy found in Appendix F of this thesis, or parts thereof. While courts in the 
Australian jurisdiction of Victoria have an official policy that expressly permits journalists to 
use social media in the courtroom,
164
 courts in the other states may not want to adopt it 
because it requires journalists to obtain permission prior to using social media in the 
courtroom.  
 
All Courts in Quebec, Canada have released a policy that forbids journalists from using social 
media in all courtrooms.
165
 A spokesperson for the Courts stated that ‘the guidelines were 
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 Nicole Duval Hesler CJ, Francois Rolland CJ and Elizabeth Corte CJ, Guidelines Concerning the Use of 




drafted after careful consideration, with the issue of decorum in mind’.
166
 The Quebec 
judiciary’s stance is surprising, because courts in several other Canadian provinces have 
released policies permitting social media in the courtroom.
167
 Additionally, the Quebec policy 
was released after courts in the other Canadian provinces had released their policies, implying 
that the Quebecois court considered the other provinces’ policies and rejected them. Under 
this policy, the Quebecois people cannot enjoy the benefits of journalistic use of social media 
in the courtroom. The words ‘decorum in mind’ appear to be vague. It would be helpful if the 
Quebecois court gave more concrete reasons about why they do not permit journalists to use 
social media in the courtroom to enable those affected to better understand their decision. 
 
Common law jurisdictions that currently have policies on electronic media in the courtroom 
permitting its journalistic use include: Victoria, Australia;
168
 England and Wales;
169
 the 
Federal Court of Canada
170













 Staff of the 
Canadian Centre for Court Technology (“CCCT”)
177
 and the American Media Law Resource 
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Most of the policies have similar definitions for electronic communication devices. For 
example, the CCCT defines electronic communication devices as ‘all forms of computers, 
personal electronic and digital devices, and mobile, cellular and smart phones’.
179
 The 
Albertan policy has a definition of electronic and wireless devices that ‘includes computers, 
laptops, tablets, notebooks, cellular phones, smartphones, PDAs, iPhones, iPads, iPods, and 






 and MLRC policies
182













 and England 
and Wales
189
 permit journalists to use social media in the courtroom without requesting the 
judicial officer’s permission. The English and Welsh policy (which covers all courts except 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court) explains why its judicial officers do not require 
journalists to seek judicial officers’ permission as follows: 
 
[i]t is presumed that a representative of the media or a legal commentator using live, text-based 
communications from court does not pose a danger of interference to the proper administration 
of justice in the individual case. This is because the most obvious purpose of permitting the use 
of live, text-based communications would be to enable the media to produce fair and accurate 
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This explanation appears to be forward thinking. It also assumes that most journalists who 
use social media in the courtroom have good intentions, since they are using social media to 
provide the public with honest reports. The present research in this area supports this idea. 
After searching academic databases and the internet, the author could not find any reports of 
journalists using social media from the courtroom for any reason other than providing the 
public with honest reports.  
 
The Saskatchewan and British Columbian policies refer to ‘accredited’
191
 media being able to 
use social media in the courtroom without seeking the courts’ permission. The Saskatchewan 
policy states that media ‘who have been accredited by the Court Services Division of the 
Ministry of Justice’ can use social media in court.
192
 Similarly, the British Columbian policy 
states that accredited media ‘means media personnel who are accredited pursuant to the 
Courts’ Media Accreditation Policy’.
193
 There is a separate British Columbian policy that 
relates to journalists becoming accredited.
194
 The policy states that the relevant journalist has 
read and will follow the Court’s Policy for the Use of Electronic Devices in Courtrooms and 
the publication The Canadian Justice System and the Media.
195
 A committee of professional 
journalists decide whether journalists can become accredited.
196
 Australian courts could 
implement an accreditation system for journalists who use social media in the courtroom 
similar to the one used in British Columbia. This would help to ensure that only journalists 
who have a basic knowledge of courtroom etiquette can use social media in Australian courts.  
 
The MLRC model policy is broader than the other policies regarding which journalists may 
use social media in the courtroom. It states that ‘bloggers and other observers seated in the 
courtroom may use electronic devices to prepare and post online news accounts and 
commentary during the proceedings’, provided that they do not ‘interfere with the 
administration of justice, pose any threat to safety or security, or compromise the integrity of 
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 Court of Appeal of British Columbia, Supreme Court of British Columbia and Provincial Court of British 
Columbia, ‘New Policy on Use of Electronic Devices in the Courtroom’ (Media Release, 1 August 2012) 





 Research for this chapter, which involved searching academic databases 
and the internet, could not find that individual bloggers or any other observers in Australian 
courts belong to a professional society that can provide them with training about court rules. 
If bloggers and other observers can find some way to join a relevant professional society and 
receive the requisite training, then courts may also decide to allow them to use social media 
in the courtroom, as part of the open justice principle.  
 
The British Columbian policy states that it is within the individual judge’s discretion not to 
permit journalists to use social media in their courtroom.
198
 If this statement is included in a 
model policy for Australian courts, it will ensure that judicial officers can forbid journalists 
from using social media in the courtroom where it would infringe upon the exceptions to the 
open justice principle mentioned in Fairfax.
199
 Some existing court rules and court policies in 
Australian jurisdictions already provide judicial officers with an overarching ability to forbid 




Some of the policies state limitations on journalistic use of social media in the courtroom. 
The British Columbian policy states that  
 
an electronic device may not be used in a courtroom: 
(a) in a manner that interferes with the court sound system or other technology; 
(b) in a manner that interferes with courtroom decorum, is inconsistent with the court 
functions, or otherwise impedes the administration of justice; 
(c) in a manner that generates sound or requires speaking into the device; 
(d) to take photographs or video images; 
(e) to record or digitally transcribe the proceedings except as permitted by this policy.201 
 
The Albertan and Ontarian policies
202
 and the South Australian Supreme Court Rules
203
 list 
similar limitations. The British and Welsh policy (for all courts except the United Kingdom 
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Supreme Court) prohibits taking photographs in the courtroom.
204
 It also prohibits recording 
the proceedings without permission.
205
 Similar limitations could be inserted into the 
Australian policy because taking photographs and recording proceedings without permission 
would negatively affect the court’s decorum. It could also make jurors’ identities public, 
which would be a serious problem. 
 
Some of the policies include penalties that journalists may face if they do not follow them. 
The British Columbian policy states that if the policy is violated then the relevant person may 
be subject to various sanctions, which may include a direction to turn off his or her electronic 
device, to leave the courtroom, or be found in contempt of court.
206
 The Albertan policy has a 
similar penalties section.
207
 Potential sanctions could put pressure on journalists to abide by 
the policy and help ensure that the exceptions to the open justice principle are not breached.  
 
Appendix F of this thesis contains a model policy on journalistic use of social media in the 
courtroom that the author created for Australian courts to consider using. Australian courts 
could also consider developing an accompanying accreditation policy for journalists who 
may use social media in the courtroom that is similar to the one used by British Columbia’s 
courts. The model policy in this thesis is based on the other courts’ existing policies, which 
respect the open justice principle and its exceptions.  
 
The Chief Justice of Victoria’s positive stance towards social media may be the reason why 
the Victorian Supreme Court was the first in Australia to permit journalists to use social 
media in the courtroom. The Chief Justice is ‘committed to accelerating the use of social 




It is noteworthy that Canadian, English and Welsh courts took actions on this issue ahead of 
Australian courts. Judicial officers in some other common law jurisdictions are currently 
considering whether they should draft social media policies for journalists attending their 
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courts. For example, the Lord President of Scotland is considering the English and Welsh 
guidelines on this issue and intends to create similar guidelines for Scotland.
209
 The fact that 
many different organisations are considering this issue likely increases the research and 
publications available on this topic. This is a good outcome for all.  
 
5.14 Safeguards that Judicial Officers Can Use if they Permit Journalists to Use Social 
Media in Court 
 
Some judicial officers and politicians are taking additional steps to ensure that they make the 
right decision for their court or jurisdiction on this issue, as opposed to simply drafting 
policies about this issue and publishing them. If judicial officers consider organising 
committees to discuss this issue it could ensure that judicial officers make the best decisions 
for their courts. Additionally, judicial officers could consult with journalists to understand 
journalists’ point of view. 
 
Members of the Supreme Court Criminal Procedure Rules Committee in Pennsylvania, 
United States, have announced that they will evaluate whether they will allow journalists to 
tweet in court.
210
 In the United Kingdom, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales 
published an interim practice guidance about using social media in the courtroom on 20 
December 2010.
211 
After issuing the interim guidelines, the Lord Chief Justice consulted 
many stakeholders about the issue between February and May 2011.
212
 The stakeholders 
included the judiciary, the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Bar 
Council and the Society of Editors.
213
 In December 2011, the Lord Chief Justice provided 




The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada also recommends that courts share best 
practices with each other.
215
 Australian courts may find it useful to consult with courts in 
Canada and the United Kingdom about this issue. Australian courts could benefit from what 
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courts in those countries have learned so far from implementing their policies. Even after 
such consultation, however, it is possible that Australian court officials may still be hesitant 
about permitting journalists to use social media in the courtroom. They may want to consider 
taking action similar to that taken by Burns J in the United States, especially if they are 
presiding over a trial where it would not be appropriate for journalists to use social media. 
Judge Burns of the Cook County Court, forbade anyone, including journalists, from using 
social media during the trial of the man accused of killing Oscar winner Jennifer Hudson’s 
family.
216
 To ensure that the media did not use social media in court, he had a member of the 
sheriff’s department follow journalists’ Twitter accounts while the court was in session. 




Staff of news organisations can also take steps to ensure that journalists properly follow court 
policies on social media use. Staff of the Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom 
provided media law revision sessions to their journalists after their sports reporter Jamie 
Jackson tweeted a juror’s name during a trial.
218
 Staff of Australian newspapers could 
consider offering information sessions about social media to their staff. Journalists who use 




If judicial officers decide not to allow journalists to use social media in any courtroom 
proceedings, they may provide alternative options to journalists. For example, some judicial 
officers allow journalists to use social media in a courtroom that is separate from where a trial 
takes place. For example, in Edmonton, Canada, Justice Terry Clackson of the Court of 
Queen’s Bench forbade electronic devices from being used during the first degree murder 
trial of Mark Twitchell.
219
 Instead, Clackson J allowed journalists to use computers and social 
media in a separate courtroom that received a delayed audio recording of the proceedings.
220
 
Judge Land in Shelnutt would not permit journalists to use social media in the courtroom, but 
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he made a room near the courtroom available to journalists for social media use.
221
 However, 
there may be technical problems with a delayed audio recording. This alternative also 
requires courts to give additional space to journalists, when the additional space may not be 
available.  
 
Federal Judge Federico Moreno of the United States District Court of the Southern District of 
Florida does not allow journalists to use social media in the courtroom, but he allows them to 
use social media in the court’s halls outside the courtroom.
222
 If journalists can use social 
media in the court’s halls, but not in courtrooms, journalists may need to frequent ly run in 
and out of court. The court’s halls may become very crowded. The journalists may also 
disrupt court proceedings with their frequent movements. 
 
It is also possible for judicial officers to permit court proceedings to be webcast. This 
involves courts recording their own proceedings and posting the proceedings on their 
website. Webcasting can provide the public with access to images very quickly, to the point 
that it is almost live.
223
 Stepniak argues that providing webcasts to the media results in more 
accurate articles about court proceedings because journalists are able to check what they 
wrote against the webcast.
224
 Some Australian courts webcast their trials and hearings and 
stream them on their websites,
225
 though most do not.
226
 For example, the Victorian Supreme 
Court tapes the audio of sentences and civil judgments and then uploads them, sometimes 
within half an hour of the hearing.
227
 Some Australian courts do not webcast proceedings due 
to insufficient resources.
228
 This has resulted in the media giving proceedings that are 
webcast more attention than they would have received otherwise.
229
 The High Court of 
Australia will post audio and visual recordings from the Court on their website.
230
 The 
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Webcasting trials is an excellent idea. It allows courts to have control over what journalists 
and the public can see, and helps ensure that journalists receive accurate information. 
However, webcasting trials, on its own, is probably insufficient to replace journalists using 
social media in the courtroom, because it does not provide the public with instant written 
information online about the relevant proceeding. It can take a reader seconds to read a tweet, 
but it can take several minutes to find the correct part of a webcast to watch.  
 
5.16 Key Recommendations of this Chapter 
 
Australian judicial officers may want to consider drafting a policy that permits journalists to 
use social media in the courtroom, or else use the model policy provided in Appendix F of 
this thesis, or any parts of it that they find relevant. This would support the open justice 
principle while also giving journalists a clear understanding of judicial officers’ expectations 
of their social media use in the courtroom. Important aspects of the policy are: (1) no 
photographs or recordings are permitted in court; (2) judges can apply their discretion to 
whether they permit journalists to use social media in the courtroom; (3) penalties are laid out 
for violation of the policy; and (4) a definition of ‘journalist’ is provided that excludes citizen 
journalists unless they receive proper training about court rules. 
 
Australian judicial officers may also want to consider drafting an accreditation policy for 
journalists to follow in order to be permitted to use social media in the courtroom. This could 
help to ensure that journalists who use social media in the courtroom have certain minimum 




According to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, ‘as the 
media invent and re-invent themselves, so must judicial understanding evolve of how we 
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relate to the media. We must look forward; we dare not hang back’.
232
 For Australian courts 
to move forward, their judicial officials should consider releasing a policy that permits 
journalists to use social media in the courtroom. Besides supporting the principle of open 
justice, it can give journalists a clear understanding of judicial officials’ expectations of their 
social media use in the courtroom.  
 
While ‘(c)riticism of the courts, like death and taxes, is guaranteed’,
233
 it does not need to be 
on this issue. Australian judicial officials can examine the success of the Canadian and the 
English and Welsh policies mentioned in this chapter, if possible, prior to releasing their final 
policy about journalists using social media in the courtroom. Australian judicial officials can 
also consider consulting Australian journalist organisations prior to releasing their final 
policy to better understand journalists’ point of view. Finally, Australian judicial officials can 
consider using the model policy provided in Appendix F of this thesis, or any parts of it that 
they find helpful.  
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Consider the following situation: you are a criminal lawyer. You have worked night and day 
for several months to represent your client, who has been charged with conspiracy to supply 
heroin and amphetamines. Eight co-accused have also been charged with similar offences. At 
the beginning of the trial, the judge instructs the jury not to use the internet to read about 
anything connected with the trial. He also instructs them that they are forbidden from basing 
their verdict on information that they hear outside of court. The judge repeats these 
instructions consistently during the trial.  
 
The jury subsequently deliver verdicts for some of your client’s co-accused: some are found 
guilty and some are found innocent. A verdict has not yet been delivered for your client. You 
then receive some startling news: one of the jurors in the trial chatted with a co-accused who 
was found innocent yesterday. Their conversation occurred entirely on Facebook messenger 
and they discussed the trial.  
 
You are outraged on behalf of your client about what the juror did. You are left wondering 
about what you should do as a result of the juror’s actions. You also wonder what the judge 
will do if he finds out.  
 
The above scenario is based on a real trial in the United Kingdom: Attorney General v 
Fraill.
1
 In this case, Ouseley J sentenced the juror to eight months’ imprisonment because she 




Modern-day juries are ‘a touchstone of the democratic administration of justice’
3
 and require 
‘twelve good citizens and true, selected at random, coming to court and listening to the 
case’
4
. Juries are said to allow the public to be part of the ‘administration of justice’
5
. There 
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were over 4300 jury trials in Australia in 2011–2012.
6
 More than 150 000 trials by jury occur 





The circumstances of the jury have changed many times since its origin. The availability of 
social media to jurors is another one of these changes. A Reuters Legal study demonstrates 
that jurors are among the millions of people who use social media. Over three weeks during 
November and December 2010, a Reuters Legal staff member regularly visited Twitter. He 
typed the words ‘jury duty’ into the Twitter search engine and found tweets from people in 
the United States regarding their prospective or actual jury service at the rate of one almost 
every three minutes.
8
 While some of the tweets were complaints about people being called 
for jury duty or jury duty being boring, ‘a significant number’ tweeted about the accused’s 
guilt or innocence. For example, one wrote ‘looking forward to a not guilty verdict regardless 
of evidence’. Admittedly, Reuters Legal staff were unlikely to know for certain whether the 
tweeters were actual jurors or not. Assuming that actual jurors wrote all the tweets that 
Reuters Legal staff found, the frequency of tweets about jury duty appears high. The study 




A survey in the United Kingdom of 239 jurors who participated in 20 different trials in the 
Crown Courts in Greater London found that three per cent of jurors discussed their jury duty 
on social media. One per cent of those surveyed blogged about their jury service or discussed 
it with other people on the internet.
10
 One of the positive features of this study is that actual 
jurors participated in it. This survey shows that some jurors in the United Kingdom use social 
media, although not many.  
 
Johnston et al’s survey in February 2013 of 62 Australian judges, magistrates, court 
administrators and others working in Australian courts found that survey participants 
believed that jurors using social media inappropriately was the biggest ‘challenge’ involving 
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social media that courts face.
11
 It is noteworthy that the survey participants believed this, 
because there have been few published reports of Australian jurors using social media 
inappropriately to date. It is positive that the survey participants were aware that the 
inappropriate use by jurors of social media is a problem, since it can pose significant 
problems for a fair trial. Social media provides today’s jurors with more temptation to contact 
third parties than ever before.
12
 The issue is so serious that some judicial officers have 
modified their instructions to jurors to discuss social media, though there is disagreement 




There is nothing new about jurors acting inappropriately. Historically, if a judge told jurors 
not to discuss their case, then there was little chance that a juror would be caught talking to 
others about it. Social media is different.
14
 Many people, including jurors who use social 
media, treat social media as if it were their own private conversation with others. In reality, 
many people can view these conversations and other personal information.
15
 According to 
Leonard Niehoff, ‘the faux intimacy of social media seduces users into believing that their 










 three in the United Kingdom
19
 and 17 in the United States.
20
 It is possible that 
many jurors are inappropriately using social media in Australia, but judicial officers do not 
know about it because no one reports it. The problem may continue to grow in the future due 
to the increasing number of Australians who use social media. 
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Jurors using social media inappropriately is the most written about ethical social media issue 
that courts currently face. This could be because jurors are people who are not trained in the 
law, as opposed to judicial officers (discussed in Chapter Two) or lawyers (discussed in 
Chapter Three). Jurors may be more likely to use social media inappropriately than other 
people involved in the courts.  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the current knowledge surrounding jurors using 
social media inappropriately, because of the impact that this behaviour can have on providing 
a fair trial to an accused.
21
 After a short discussion of the problems associated with jurors 
using social media inappropriately, this chapter will examine why jurors engage in this 
behaviour, and provide recommendations on how to prevent this from occurring. The chapter 
will also examine how judicial officers can respond when they learn that a juror has used 
social media inappropriately.  
 
6.2 Why Jurors Who Use Social Media Inappropriately Are a Problem 
 
There are several reasons why jurors create problems if they use social media inappropriately 
to communicate about a trial.
22
 The first reason is that a juror’s verdict is required to be based 
on the evidence and argument that the juror saw at court, during the trial.
23
 At trial, the judge 
and lawyers can ensure that the rules of evidence are applied to all evidence tendered. When 
jurors use social media, the rules of evidence are not applied to the information or comments 
that jurors read.
24
 When one juror uses social media to access additional evidence, it means 




Jurors must also be ‘indifferent’ to the trial before them.
26
 Social media may give jurors 
access to information that could affect their impartiality and ability to be ‘indifferent’.
27
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Jurors may then form an opinion about a case prior to seeing all of the evidence in the trial.
28
 
Once jurors form the opinion, it may be difficult to change. Jurors may also form an opinion 
about one of the parties in the trial or one of the witnesses. This could ultimately affect their 
opinion about the outcome of the trial.  
 
Jurors should not communicate with any third party about the trial they are involved in
29
 in 
case the third party affects the juror’s decision.
30
 This type of juror behaviour can result in a 
presumption that the juror is prejudiced.
31
 Jurors can easily communicate with a huge number 
of third parties on social media about the trial, whether they know those third parties or not. If 
jurors are able to use social media while in the courtroom, it is also possible that they may not 




Juror comments about a trial on social media can also breach the confidentiality required of 
them.
33
 Such actions challenge ‘the confidential nature of jury deliberations, may inhibit 
robust and free-flowing discussion and may have an adverse effect upon the deliberative 
process’.
34
 Jurors may not participate as much as they normally would in conversations in the 
jury room if they feel that another juror might write their comments on social media.
35
 Also, 
‘freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made 




It is also possible that social media could affect a juror’s conscious or subconscious mind and 
counsel at trial would not be able to question the juror about it.
37
 The information that jurors 
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read on social media may be inaccurate or wrong, so it is arguably even more unfair to the 




6.2.1 Problems Due to the Nature of Social Media Itself 
 
Other reasons that jurors’ use of social media can be problematic involve the nature of social 
media itself: such remarks can be preserved permanently online.
39
 If the court deletes the 
remarks, future jurors may still be able to find them and be influenced by them. The United 
States Library of Congress has kept a copy of all public tweets since Twitter’s inception in 
2006. It is easy for any member of the public to read these tweets, even if a Twitter user 
thought that he or she had deleted them.
40
 If a juror tweets during a trial, and a judicial officer 
decides to hold a new trial as a result, it might even be possible for a new juror to visit the 
Library and read the tweets of the juror in the original trial.
41
 Social media also provides 
jurors with an ability to easily contact more people than has been possible in the past.
42
 If a 
juror writes about a trial on social media, there is a greater probability that someone will read 
it than if a juror discusses a trial through other means (e.g., talks to his or her family about 
it).
43
 Since social media is accessible worldwide, it would be futile if a judicial officer tried to 
move a trial to another jurisdiction to avoid any consequences arising from a juror in the 
original jurisdiction commenting inappropriately about a trial on social media.  
 
Social media can also help a juror to find the accused or a witness and contact him or her. 
Social media provides a far easier method than trying to contact the accused or a witness by 
traditional means.
44
 The impartiality of a juror can be affected by his or her contacting an 
accused or a witness in a trial.
45
 Since social media can make finding an accused or a witness 
easy, jurors may be more tempted to make contact than they would be otherwise. Otherwise, 
jurors may simply look at an accused’s or a witness’ social media page and not actually 
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contact him or her, thinking that no one will know if they do so. However, if jurors do this 
they may obtain information that could affect their impartiality. There have been a handful of 
cases in the relevant jurisdictions to date in which a juror contacted the accused or a witness 
online.
46
 If a juror simply looks at an accused’s or a witness’s social media page and does not 
contact him or her, it could be harder for a judicial officer to find out, if the accused or 
witness does not inform the judicial officer. The judicial officer would probably have to rely 
upon the juror informing him or her.  
 
6.2.2 Waste of Court Resources 
 
The inappropriate use of social media by jurors can waste court resources. Judicial officers 
need to spend time carefully considering how they will handle the juror and the consequences 
for the trial. The judicial officers can declare a mistrial if the trial is still in progress, or they 
can grant an appeal if a verdict has already been delivered.
47
 This can waste considerable 
public resources and force many of the people involved in the first trial to undergo the 
headache of another trial.
48
 If jurors use social media inappropriately, this can result in a 
longer trial or a delayed trial,
49
 which can be problematic for victims who must attend the 
trial. Criminal trials cause the victims involved psychological damage. In particular, 
providing testimony and seeing the accused with the public watching can be very stressful for 
them.
50
 It is in the interests of victims of crime to avoid delaying or increasing the length of a 
trial. Jurors who use social media inappropriately may have no idea about the repercussions 
on court resources or victims that can result from their actions. If they were aware, perhaps 
they would not use social media inappropriately.  
 
Of the people affected when jurors use social media inappropriately, the accused is arguably 
affected the most. The lawyers for both sides are also affected in that they may need to 
prepare for additional court proceedings as a result of the juror’s behaviour. Lawyers for an 
accused who work pro bono may have to work many more hours without pay preparing for 
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court and appearing at court as a result of the juror’s actions. If an accused must spend more 
time in gaol while he or she awaits a new trial date, then prison officers may be indirectly 
affected by the juror’s actions. 
 
If courts have learned that a juror has used social media inappropriately, the public will 
probably also become aware of the occurrence fairly quickly due to social media. This is 
especially the case if journalists are permitted to use social media in the courtroom, as is 
recommended in Chapter Five of this thesis. The public may lose confidence in the judiciary 
and the courts if they learn about an accused who did not receive a fair trial because a juror 
used social media inappropriately.  
 
Jurors may be affected by videos that they watch or photos that they see in addition to 
information that they read on social media. For example, a juror’s daughter in Shannon 
Gatliff’s assault trial in the United States found a video on YouTube of the alleged assault. 
The juror may have seen the video.
51
 The accused applied for a new trial as a result of the 
video, but was unsuccessful.
52
 In Wilgus and Ors v F/V Sirius Inc.,
53
 a juror found pictures on 
the plaintiffs’ Facebook pages that made him think that the plaintiffs supported using 
mushrooms, smoking and binge drinking.
54
 The majority of cases to date in which a juror 
used social media inappropriately involve comments that a juror posted on social media, as 
opposed to videos or photos that he or she saw. This could be because it is easier and quicker 
to post comments on social media than it is to post videos or photos.  
 
Even jurors who do not use social media inappropriately can face challenges if their fellow 
jurors do so. For example, a juror may use social media to chat with a witness in a trial. The 
juror may then discuss the social media conversation with other jurors. The other jurors may 
then become biased towards the accused, even though they never used social media 
inappropriately themselves, nor did they have any intention to. A judge could decide to 
dismiss the jurors who discussed the social media chat (in addition to the juror who 
participated in the chat) even though they were arguably blameless.  
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6.2.3 Prevalence of Jurors Using Social Media Inappropriately 
 
Studies such as that of the Federal Judicial Center confirm that jurors’ inappropriate social 
media use is problematic. Staff of the Federal Judicial Center in the United States sent an 
electronic survey to 952 District Court Judges about jurors’ social media use in their 
courtrooms; of these, 508 completed the survey.
55
 The survey asked judges whether they had 
experienced jurors using social media to communicate during a trial or deliberations and if 




Six per cent, or 30 judges who completed the survey had experienced instances of jurors 
using social media at some point during a trial or deliberations. Of these 30, 28 judges 
reported that this had occurred only once or twice. Jurors’ social media use occurred more 
often during trials than during deliberations: 23 judges reported that the jurors’ social media 
use occurred during trials and 12 judges reported that the occurrences happened during 
deliberations.
57
 Three of the judges stated that jurors used social media to contact 
‘participants in the case’.
58
 Three of the judges wrote that jurors used or tried to use social 
media to ‘friend’ ‘participants’ in the trial.
59
 Three of the judges wrote that jurors had used 
social media to provide information about the trial, though no judge wrote that a juror had 
used social media to provide information about the trial that was confidential.
60
 Two judges 
wrote that jurors contacted people and provided ‘case-specific information’.
61
 One judge 
wrote about a juror who had contacted a former staff member of the plaintiff and stated the 
probable verdict.
62
 Another judge wrote about an alternate juror who had contacted a lawyer 
in the case while the jury deliberated and stated the probable verdict.
63
 It appears from this 
survey that the number of jurors who use social media inappropriately is small. It is possible 
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that the number of jurors who use social media inappropriately will increase as more people 
use social media. 
 
The judges’ reactions to the jurors’ social media use varied. Nine judges dismissed the 
relevant juror, eight judges reprimanded the relevant juror but permitted him or her to stay on 
the jury, and four judges declared the cases as mistrials.
64
 Three judges stated that they 
questioned the juror about his or her social media use.
65
 Decisions to dismiss jurors and 
declare mistrials clearly show that jurors using social media inappropriately cause problems.  
 
A high proportion of lawyers also believe that jurors using social media inappropriately can 
be a problem. Lawyers can probably understand better than a layperson the ramifications for 
trials if jurors use social media inappropriately. Staff of the International Bar Association, 
based in London, United Kingdom, implemented a survey about social media and the law. 
The survey was sent to bar associations globally
66
 and was answered by staff from 60 bar 
associations in 47 different countries,
67





Some of the goals of the survey were to learn the views of staff of bar associations on ‘the 
posting of comments or opinions on online social networks by lawyers, judges, jurors and 
journalists about one another or the cases in which they are involved’
69
 and ‘the adequateness 
of routine jury instructions versus the need for specific instructions limiting their online 
communications and use of online social networking’.
70
 Association staff found that the 
members of approximately 80 per cent of the bar associations who answered the survey (and 
who used juries) felt that it was unacceptable for jurors, parties or witnesses in a trial to 
contact each other by social media or any other method.
71
 The survey also asked whether it 
was acceptable for jurors to write comments about judges, lawyers, parties or the trial itself 
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on social media. Members from approximately half of the bar associations who completed the 
survey wrote that the question did not apply to them because they did not use juries, and the 
other half wrote that they disagreed.
72
 As a result of the survey, members of the International 
Bar Association intend to establish an advisory group on the issue of social media and the 
law.
73
 This survey appears to show that the lawyers in the bar associations surveyed are 
aware of the problems that can result when jurors use social media inappropriately.  
 
This section demonstrates that when jurors use social media inappropriately, an accused’s 
right to a fair trial may be affected in several ways. It is important for courts to understand 
why jurors use social media in order to decide how to deal with jurors who use social media 
inappropriately. 
 
6.3 Reasons Why Jurors Use Social Media Inappropriately 
 
There are several reasons why jurors may use social media inappropriately during a trial.
74
 In 
2009, a juror tweeted ‘Wow. Jury duty. First time ever. Can I be excused because I can’t be 
offline for that long?’
75
 While the juror’s tweet appears humorous, it captures one of several 
reasons why jurors use social media: some people are addicted to it.
76
 Even if judicial officers 
instruct them not to use it, some jurors cannot comply. Jurors may also feel empowered about 
making the final decision in a trial, and therefore feel the urge to use social media to tell 




Jurors may not believe that there is anything wrong with discussing a trial on social media. 
They may use social media because it is part of their daily lives.
78
 Additionally, jurors may 
not understand the consequences of using social media to write about a trial or they may not 
take the responsibilities of being a juror sufficiently seriously.
79
 Some jurors may comment 
about a trial on social media because they feel that they must explain why they have not 
posted comments on social media during the days or weeks that they have served as jurors. 
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Some jurors may post information about a trial on social media because they think that other 
people will find the information interesting. This may be more likely to happen when a juror 
is involved in a high-profile case. 
 
Many jurors comment about trials on Twitter because it feels ‘more like a private 
conversation’.
80
 Some jurors may find that using social media is ‘an extension of thinking’.
81
 
Social media can also encourage impulsive behaviour. A juror may take action on social 
media in an impulsive moment;
82
 for example, in New York v Rios,
83
 a juror attempted to 
befriend a witness in a trial during the jury’s deliberations.
84
 The juror later stated at court 
that she had acted impulsively.
85
 Jurors may use social media to obtain an explanation if they 
do not know a specific law or they are confused about it; even if the information that they 
read on social media is inaccurate,
86
 jurors may not be aware of its inaccuracy. They may not 
even think of analysing the probability that the information that they read on social media is 
accurate. Jurors may also use social media to communicate information because they require 




Thaddeus Hoffmeister adds that jurors seek information from outside the courts because they 
receive restricted information from the courts. Judges permit jurors to hear only certain 
evidence. Jurors may have no intention of disobeying a judge’s instruction not to use social 
media. Currently, potential jurors who already possess information about the parties, 
witnesses or facts in a case do not normally proceed to actual jury duty. Consequently, jurors 
become curious during a case.
88
 Potential and actual jurors may resent judicial officers telling 
them that they cannot obtain information online, and so they do the opposite of what they are 
told.
89
 It may be particularly difficult to stop these types of jurors from using social media 
inappropriately, because judges’ explanations about why they cannot use social media and 
the negative consequences of using them may not have an impact. Professor Mo Bahk from 
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California State University explains that people communicate their opinions online because 
‘[t]he Internet provides us with opportunities to “participate” rather than passively receive 
information.’
90
 This may apply to jurors because jurors often need to spend many days in a 
courtroom passively receiving information. 
 
The reasons that jurors use social media demonstrate that jurors generally do not use social 
media inappropriately to anger judicial officers or deliberately to sabotage an accused’s right 
to receive a fair trial. Rather, jurors are accustomed to using social media regularly or they 
want more information about a trial to assist with their decision making. Knowing these 
reasons can assist judicial officers to decide how they will try to prevent jurors from using 
social media inappropriately and how they may deal with jurors who do use social media 
inappropriately.  
 
6.4 How to Prevent Jurors from Using Social Media Inappropriately 
 
Methods of preventing jurors from using social media inappropriately during the trial process 
may fall into one of two categories: high interference and low interference. High interference 
methods have significant effect on jurors’ daily lives (e.g., sequestering them). Low 
interference methods barely interfere with jurors’ daily lives (e.g., instructing jurors not to 
use social media to discuss the trial). The preventative measures discussed below attempt to 
spare judicial officers the wasted resources that result from jurors using social media 
inappropriately. The aim of this section is to identify preventative measures that would be the 
most appropriate for Australian courts to implement. 
 
6.4.1 Ban Mobile Devices such as Phones and iPods 
 
If judicial officers ban jurors from using their mobile devices during trial, jurors cannot 
access social media.
91
 In Australia, judicial officers’ approaches to regulating jurors’ mobile 
phone use are different across jurisdictions, though in the majority of jurisdictions courts take 
jurors’ mobile phones from them at some point. In Western Australia a jury officer takes 
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jurors’ mobile phones from them while they consider their verdict.
92
 In New South Wales, 
court officers or sheriff officers take jurors’ mobile phones from them while they are at 
court.
93
 In Victoria, mobile phones are not confiscated, but jurors are told that they must not 
be used in the courtroom or while the jury deliberates.
94
 Jurors may use their mobile phones 
in the jury pool room.
95
 In the Supreme Court in Tasmania, jurors need to leave their mobile 
phones and any other technological items with the court’s receptionist each day that they 
attend court.
96
 In the Australian Capital Territory, jurors must give their mobile phones and 




In Canada, most judges do not allow jurors to take their mobile phones into the jury room.
98
 
In the United States, different court systems have different rules about jurors using their 
mobile phones; for example, judicial officers at the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia ban jurors from entering the courthouse with mobile phones.
99
 
American jurors at the District Court of the Southern District of Florida may bring their 





In the Federal Judicial Center study previously mentioned, 147 judges (28.9 per cent) 
surveyed confiscated mobile devices while jurors deliberate.
101
 Another 113 judges (22.2 per 
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cent) confiscated mobile devices at the beginning of each day of the trial.
102
 It appears that 
banning mobile devices is occurring in at least a quarter of American trials.  
 
To help jurors feel more comfortable about attending court without their mobile phones, 
courts can provide jurors with a court telephone number to give to their family and friends. 
This enables jurors’ family and friends to call them in the event of an emergency.
103
 
Admittedly, some of the jurors’ family and friends may have different opinions about what 
constitutes an emergency. Even so, it is still a good idea to have an emergency telephone 
number ready in case a true emergency occurs. This way the juror and his or her family and 
friends may not find it as challenging for the juror to participate in jury duty. Some 





Forbidding jurors from using their mobile phones during a trial makes jury duty more 
inconvenient for some,
105
 and can be described as a medium interference solution. It is also 
inconvenient for the jurors who would not use social media inappropriately on their mobile 
phones.
106
 One possibility to make this restriction less onerous is to forbid jurors from using 
mobile phones while in the jury box and while in the deliberation room, but allow them to use 
their mobile phones during their breaks and during the evening.
107
 It would be extremely 
difficult for courts to forbid jurors to use social media during the evening, because jurors can 
use social media on any computer with an internet connection that they can access. It is 
debatable whether it is a good idea to permit jurors to use their mobile phones during their 
breaks. Jurors may find it convenient to use their mobile phones during their breaks, but 
jurors may be thinking about the trial at those times, so they may be more likely to use social 
media inappropriately then in contrast to their using social media in the evening after court 
finishes for the day.  
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In Maryland v Dixon, court staff confiscated jurors’ electronic devices while they 
deliberated.
108
 After deliberating, the jury convicted Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon on one 
count of receiving a gift card donated to the poor of the City of Baltimore, valued in excess of 
$500.00, and using it herself.
109
 The jurors became friends with each other on Facebook 
about a week before they delivered their verdict.
110
 They also wrote about the case in posts 
online during their deliberations.
111
 This case shows that confiscating jurors’ electronic 
devices during deliberation may not be sufficient to prevent them from using social media 
inappropriately during a trial. It is worth considering whether the jurors in this case would 
still have contacted each other if courts had confiscated the jurors’ technological devices for 
the entirety of the trial. This case is one of the few that the author found in which the 
judgment stated that the court had confiscated the jurors’ electronic devices at some point 
during a trial. It is possible that this case is an anomaly and that confiscating jurors’ 
electronic devices lessens the probability that jurors will use social media inappropriately. 
 
When Australian courts take jurors’ mobile phones from them while they are at court, it 
makes it somewhat harder for jurors to use social media to comment about the trial. They 
cannot do it immediately and impulsively, but rather must wait until they go home at night. 
Making it even slightly harder for jurors to comment about a trial on social media could have 
significant positive repercussions. When court staff take jurors’ mobile phones, they may 
want to consider explaining why they are doing so; otherwise, jurors may feel resentful when 
it occurs. The explanation will also serve to emphasise for jurors that their part in the trial 
affects their lives and their use of technology. It may result in jurors thinking twice before 
using social media to discuss a trial. When court staff take jurors’ mobile phones from them, 
it results in more administrative work for them. Courts also need to ensure that the mobile 
phones are placed in a very secure area where no one can steal them. This work is so 
important, however, that it is worth the extra time spent on taking the mobile phones and 
returning them.  
 
It would be futile for courts to try to cut jurors off from all social media for the duration of a 
trial (e.g., by not returning the devices to the jurors at the end of each day.) That would not 
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prevent jurors from using other people’s devices (which can be easily available) to access 
their social media accounts. Courts can also try to pay attention to advances in technology. 
They can try to be aware of all technology that jurors might use to access social media and 




6.4.2 Sequestering Jurors 
 
Another possible preventative solution is to sequester jurors.
113
 This means isolating jurors 
from the public. Its purpose is to ‘shield jurors from biasing outside influences that might 
vitiate the integrity of the trial and deprive defendants of their right to verdicts based on law 
and evidence’.
114
 It could be the most successful method of ensuring that juries follow rules 




Sequestration is no longer widely used. When used, it is mostly for high-profile trials.
116
 
Sequestration is still used, for example, in Florida, United States where it is required in death 
penalty cases, but it is rare in civil cases.
117
 In Australia, sequestering jurors used to be 
common, but is not anymore.
118
 Chief Justice James Spigelman of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales suggested sequestration as a method of preventing jurors from searching the 
internet during trials.
119
 Judicial officers in some Australian States, such as New South 
Wales, South Australia and Victoria permit juror sequestrations,
120
 though they are rare. 
Juries are sometimes sequestered in cases that receive a lot of media attention; for example, 
the jury in the Queensland case of Jayant Patel was sequestered.
121
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Sequestration can be very expensive for courts and can be difficult for jurors.
122
 For example, 
the cost of sequestering jurors in the OJ Simpson criminal trial in the United States was 
approximately $1 million.
123
 If the trial were held today, it might be even more expensive to 
sequester the jurors due to inflation. Sequestration may increase the number of potential 
jurors who decline their summons to participate in jury duty
124
 because many jurors cannot be 
isolated from their family and job.
125
 Increased frequency of sequestration can bring about 
negative public relations repercussions for the courts.
126
 Sequestration can also demotivate 
jurors and encourage them to deliver verdicts more quickly than they might otherwise.
127
 
Jurors may resent being sequestered and take their resentment out on the prosecution or the 




If courts were to commence sequestering all juries to avoid having jurors using their social 
media, it would be a significant change to the work involved with juries. It would be a highly 
time-consuming and impractical high-interference solution. There is considerable discussion 
in the media about Australian courts’ lack of resources.
129
 Chapter Four of this thesis also 
discussed surveys completed by courts that stated this lack of resources. It would be unlikely 
that the court could afford to sequester every jury. It is also possible that sequestered jurors 
may be able to access social media despite courts’ best intentions to prevent that from 
happening. For example, a juror sequestered at a hotel may ask another visitor at the hotel to 
borrow the visitor’s mobile phone. The juror may then use the visitor’s mobile phone to 
access social media. Nevertheless, sequestering jurors is likely the solution that would most 
effectively prevent jurors from using social media inappropriately during a trial. However, it  
is also the solution that is probably of the greatest interference to their lives.  
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6.4.3 Jury Instructions 
 
Another possible preventative solution is to expressly instruct jurors not to use social media 
during a trial and subsequent deliberations.
130
 Traditional instructions to jurors state that they 
should not talk with anyone about their case
131
 nor read or listen to any information about the 
case outside the courtroom.
132
 Courts have consistently used instructions to jurors as a 




A study by the staff of the New Media Committee of the Conference of Court Public 
Information Officers (“Committee”) shows that instructing juries not to use social media is 
becoming common in the United States. In 2011, staff from the Committee sent an electronic 
survey about social media to approximately 15 000 people working in American State Courts. 
They did not include Federal Courts. A total of 713 people answered the survey, of whom 33 
per cent were judicial officers. The Committee had implemented a similar survey in 2010.
134
 
The goal of the surveys was to provide the ‘first year-to-year comparison data further 
unravelling how social media, cultural changes evoked by new media technologies, and the 
broader changes in the media industry are impacting judges and the courts’.
135
 Some of the 
relevant survey findings were: 60 per cent of judicial officers reported that they included 
some information about social media use in their instructions to juries. This had increased 




In the United States, instructions to jurors differ from courtroom to courtroom.
137
 American 
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6.4.3.1 Model Jury Instructions 
 
In the United States, staff of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and 
Case Management (“Judicial Committee”) prepared model jury instructions (“Model 
Instructions”) against the use of social media.
139




You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within the 
four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, 
search the internet, websites, blogs, or any other electronic tools to obtain information about 
this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to find out information from any 
sources outside the confines of this courtroom. 
 
Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your fellow 
jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your fellow jurors, 
but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the case 
is at an end. I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy. I know that many 
of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of technology. You also must 
not talk to anyone about this case or use these tools to communicate electronically with anyone 
about the case. This includes your family and friends. You may not communicate with anyone 
about the case on your cell phone, through email, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on 
Twitter, through any blog or website, through any internet chat room, or by way of any other 
social networking websites, including Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube. 
 
At the Close of the Case: 
 
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to 
anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as 
a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer; the internet, any internet 
service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any internet chat room, blog or website 
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such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any 





In 2012, staff of the Federal Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management released an amended version of the Model 
Instructions.
141
 The only significant change appears to be the addition of Google+ to the list 
of technology that jurors may not use to communicate about the case in the second last 
paragraph. This change shows that the Committee’s staff pay attention to the creation of new 
social media. The Judicial Committee’s staff have missed some other new social media, such 
as Flickr. Increasingly, it will be difficult to include mentions of all social media.  
 
The staff of the Judicial Committee made significant changes to their Model Instructions for 
use at the close of the case. After the words ‘I accept your verdict’ they added the following: 
 
In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone, or 
electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You can only discuss the case in the 
jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as soon as 
you become aware of another juror’s violations of these instructions. 
 
You may not use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because 
it is important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this 
courtroom. Information on the internet or available through social media might be wrong, 
incomplete, or inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with your fellow jurors 
during deliberations because they have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In our 
judicial system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of this 
courtroom. Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you and not 
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6.4.3.2 Characteristics of Good Jury Instructions 
 
Instructions for jurors should use language that jurors can understand and should contain 
examples of inappropriate behaviour.
143
 The Model Instructions appear to satisfy both of 
these requirements, though it is acknowledged that the author is a practicing lawyer and does 
not examine the Model Instructions through a layperson’s eyes.  
 
The instructions should list as many different types of social media as possible.
144
 This could 
help to avoid a situation like the one that occurred in Seattle, where a judicial officer 
dismissed a juror for blogging about a robbery trial. The juror said that although the judge 
had specifically stated that jurors could not tweet, the judge had not expressly mentioned that 
blogging was forbidden.
145
 Admittedly, if some types of social media are listed, one can 
assume that a juror can extrapolate that he or she must not use any other types of social 
media. It may be difficult for a judicial officer to list every single popular type of social 
media if many more new social media are created in the future.  
 
Instructions for jurors should also state that jurors should inform courts if they learn that 
other jurors have not followed the judicial officer’s instructions about social media use.
146
 
This is important because it is hard for courts to become aware of inappropriate juror 
behaviour unless other jurors or the jurors who behaved inappropriately themselves inform 
them.
147
 The amended Model Instructions to be given at the close of the trial fulfil this 
requirement. The amended Model Instructions to be given before trial do not, nor do the 
original Model Instructions. The amended Model Instructions to be given before trial should 
be modified to fulfil this requirement.  
 
Instructions should provide reasons as to why they are necessary.
148
 This gives the 
instructions more meaning and makes jurors more likely to follow them.
149
 Providing 
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instructions to jurors without giving reasons for them can make jurors become hostile.
150
 The 
amended Model Instructions for the close of the trial fulfil this requirement, but the amended 
Model Instructions for before trial do not and could be more useful if they were amended.  
 
The Model Instructions were provided to all judges in the United States Federal District 
Courts. The Model Instructions may assist in maintaining uniformity in Federal Courts, even 
though judges can apply their discretion about using them.
151
 Currently, no uniform 




Giving instructions to jurors about social media ‘treats jurors with respect’ and is ‘consistent 
with the long-standing presumption that jurors will follow a judge’s instructions’.
153
 While 
providing jurors with instructions will not altogether prevent jurors from using social media 
inappropriately, it may help to lessen the number of occurrences.
154
 Judges can also instruct 
jurors about social media use during their opening and closing comments to the jury, and 
occasionally during the trial.
155
 Hoffmeister states that the sooner that judicial officers give 
instructions about social media use, such as when they first arrive at court, the more likely it 
is that jurors will follow them
156
. He recommends that judicial officers repeat instructions 
often, otherwise jurors may forget them. He suggests that reminders to jurors should be given 
during their breaks and that instructions should be given again before jurors commence their 
deliberating. The more frequently instructions are provided to jurors, the more likely it is that 
jurors will follow them. However, courts should be aware that if they instruct jurors about 
inappropriate social media use too often, this might annoy jurors, who might then feel 
tempted to use social media inappropriately. 
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When judicial officers provide instructions, they might warn jurors that using social media 
inappropriately can lead to a mistrial.
157
 The Model Instructions do not do this, nor do the 
amended Model Instructions. Officers can further inform jurors that new trials waste a lot of 
the court’s resources, which come from the jurors’ taxes,
158
 and a new trial could indicate that 
the original jurors’ time was wasted. Judges can also remind jurors that the public has a ‘great 




Staff of the Arizona Criminal Jury Instruction Committee proposed instructions to jurors that 
provide explanations for why they cannot use social media during the trial. The proposed 
instructions state that  
 
one reason for these prohibitions is because the trial process works by each side knowing 
exactly what evidence is being considered by you and what law you are applying to the facts 
you find. As I previously told you, the only evidence you are to consider in this matter is that 
which is introduced in the courtroom. The law that you are to apply is the law that I give you in 




These instructions use language that is easy to understand. Unfortunately, the instructions do 
not specify which outside sources jurors should not use. Jurors may be left wondering about 
this. The instructions also do not mention the importance of providing an accused with a fair 
trial, which is highly relevant.  
 
6.4.3.3 Other American Jury Instructions on Social Media 
 







instruct jurors not to use social media. Judicial officers in other states, including Colorado, 
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Florida and Georgia, are currently deciding whether they should amend their jury instructions 
to include information about social media.
164
 In the states where judicial officers do not have 
existing instructions for jurors about social media, it is possible that the rates of jurors using 
social media inappropriately are higher than in the states where judicial officers use 
instructions; however, the author could not find research to confirm this. 
 
6.4.3.4 Jury Instructions in England and Wales Regarding Social Media 
 
In England and Wales, the Judicial College recommends that judges instruct jurors against 
using social media inappropriately prior to the opening of the prosecution case. The 
instruction is as follows: 
 
Jurors should not discuss the case with anyone, not least family and friends whose views they 
trust, when they are away from court, either face to face, or over the telephone, or over the 
internet via chat lines or, for example, Facebook or MySpace. If they were to do so they would 




Judges are not bound to use this instruction.
166
 There are several problems with the 
instruction that are similar to those with the amended Model Instructions, such as that they 
list few examples of popular social media. 
 
6.4.3.5 Jury Instructions in Canada on Social Media 
 
The Canadian Judicial Council’s model instructions for jurors state that jurors should not use 
social media to discuss the trial that they are deciding,
167
 and include examples of social 
media.
168
 Canadian judges are not required to use the model instructions.
169
 The model 
instructions do not explain why jurors should not use social media to discuss the trial, so they 
might not be as effective as they would be if they provided reasons. 
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6.4.3.6 Jury Instructions in Australia on Social Media 
 
In Australia, judicial officers take different approaches towards instructing jurors about the 
inappropriate use of social media, depending on which State they are in. In New South 
Wales, a recommendation exists for judges to use during jury empanelling to warn jurors 
against social media use. Specifically, judicial officers are to instruct jurors not to obtain 
information about the trial on their own for the entirety of the trial. The instruction states that: 
 
[i]t is a serious criminal offence for a member of the jury to make any inquiry for the purpose 
of obtaining information about the accused, or any other matter relevant to the trial. It is so 
serious that it can be punished by imprisonment. This prohibition continues from the time the 
juror is empanelled until the juror is discharged. It includes asking a question of any person 




The instructions continue that if the judge ‘considers it appropriate’, he or she should add the 
following: 
 
[y]ou should keep away from the internet and the other communication sources which may pass 
comment upon the issues in this trial. You may not communicate with anyone about the case on 
your mobile phone, smart phone, through email, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any 
blog or website, any internet chatroom, or by way of any other social networking websites 
including Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn and YouTube. You should avoid any communication 




The second paragraph of the New South Wales instructions lists the most popular forms of 
social media. It also uses clear language that jurors are likely to understand. It is noteworthy 
that judges should only use it if they ‘consider it appropriate’, as opposed to using it in every 
trial. Judicial officers in Australia could consider using the second paragraph to instruct the 
jury for every trial because a juror in any trial has the potential to use social media 
inappropriately.  
 
In Victoria, there is a direction to jurors that specifically mentions social media. It states that: 
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[y]ou must also avoid talking to anyone other than your fellow jurors about the case. This 
includes your family and friends. You must not discuss the case on social media sites, such as 
Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, blogs or anything else like that. Of course, you can tell your 
family and friends that you are on a jury, and about general matters such as when the trial is 
expected to finish. But do not discuss the case itself. It is your judgment, not theirs, that is 
sought. You should not risk that judgment being influenced by their views – which will 





In Queensland, judges do not instruct jurors specifically not to use social media. Instead, 
judges tell jurors at the beginning of the trial that they cannot discuss the case with anyone 
orally or ‘by electronic means’, with the exception of other jurors.
173
 Western Australian 





Research undertaken could not find any judges’ instructions to the jury that discussed using 
social media inappropriately for South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory 
or the Northern Territory. The information that staff from the above states provide for jurors 
online does not address social media use as at the completion of this thesis.  
 
Judicial officers in Australia could consider using a modified version of the New South 
Wales instructions. Some potential modifications could be that (1) they provide reasons, (2) 
they recommend that jurors inform court staff if they learn that other jurors have used social 
media inappropriately, and (3) they state the punishment that jurors may face if they use 
social media inappropriately.  
 
6.4.3.7 When Judicial Officers Should Consider Using Instructions about Social Media 
Use 
 
Judicial officers could consider using the instructions at other times besides jury empanelling. 
The instructions could be stated prior to each occasion that jurors have the opportunity to use 
social media again during the trial. At a minimum, the instructions could be stated each day. 
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If courts return the jurors’ technological devices to them at the end of each day of trial, then 
the instructions could be given at the end of each day of trial. The instructions may be a 
helpful reminder to the jurors not to use social media to discuss the trial. Another possibility 
could be for judicial officers of all Australian States to implement the amended Model 
Instructions. If this happens, the amended Model Instructions could be tailored to Australians. 
For example, the list of social media that jurors cannot use to communicate about the trial 
could be modified to include the social media that Australians use most.  
 
6.4.3.8 Using Instructions About Inappropriate Social Media Use Can Make It Easier to 
Decide How to Punish the Juror 
 
Another positive aspect of using specific instructions to the jury to avoid using social media 
inappropriately during a trial is that if a juror violates the instructions, courts can more easily 
decide how to deal with the juror. It is a simple matter for them to state that the juror violated 





Dimas-Martinez v Arkansas involved a jury convicting the appellant of capital murder and 
aggravated robbery.
176
 The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and death. The 
appellant applied for a new trial on two bases: one was that a juror tweeted during the trial, in 
breach of Judge David Clinger’s instructions not to. Before opening statements, Judge 
Clinger specifically instructed jurors not to tweet.
177
 At every recess during the trial, the 
Judge instructed the jurors not to discuss the trial with anyone.
178
 The appellant argued that 
the juror did not follow the Judge’s instructions.
179
 The appellant’s second basis for an appeal 
was that a juror fell asleep during his trial, which was also inappropriate juror behaviour.
180
 A 
Circuit Court Judge rejected the appellant’s application for a new trial.
181
 Subsequently, the 
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A party alleging juror misconduct has the burden to prove the misconduct and ‘that a 
reasonable possibility of prejudice resulted from it’.
183
 He or she must also prove that the 
‘alleged misconduct prejudiced his chances for a fair trial’.
184
 The juror who tweeted during 
the trial did so on the day that evidence was tendered for the sentencing of the appellant.
185
 
The juror’s tweet read as follows: ‘[c]hoices to be made. Hearts to be broken. We each define 
the great line.’
186
 The appellant argued that the juror’s tweets constituted misconduct for the 
following reasons: 
 
1. They were about the trial, because they were posted during the trial; 
2. They breached the judicial officer’s instructions, which demonstrated that the juror 
‘could not follow the court’s instructions’; and 
3. A journalist followed the juror’s tweets.187 
 
After the juror tweeted, but before the jurors delivered a verdict, the judicial officer and 
counsel for both sides asked the juror questions about the tweet.
 
The juror replied  
 
what it means was, um, not only like to pertain to this case but also to future stuff. Um, 
obviously, whatever we as a jury decide — you know, I’m not necessarily saying I know 
what’s going to be decided, but we have to decide — make a huge decision. Either way, you 
know, if we do decide something like it’s just gonna — a lot of people are either going to be 
mad about it watching the news because, you know, people have expressed to me you’re on that 
court case, right? I can’t talk about it. So I leave. So there’s a ton of people watching this. And 
either way we decide, people are either going to be angry or people are going to be hurt either 
way. So what I was meaning by that was, you know, we have to define the great line of, you 
know, where we stand on a subject and, you know, what we have to choose — decide in the 
future. And also “Define the Great Line” was an Underoath album, and I thought I’d throw that 




The juror’s comments appear to indicate that he was not biased towards the appellant. The 
comments appear general in nature, and could apply to any trial that he sat on. This raises the 
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issue: are trivial or general comments that a juror makes about a trial inappropriate? This is a 
challenging issue, in particular because it is a subjective matter whether comments are trivial 
or general. Perhaps a reasonable person test could be created and applied to this situation. 
The test could be: would a reasonable person think that the comments that the juror made on 
social media were about the trial? It does not seem fair to punish jurors for making comments 
that are general in nature about a trial. However, if jurors are allowed to make general 
comments about a trial, it may also encourage them to make specific comments about a trial 
later on. 
 
The judicial officer also asked the juror whether he had already decided the verdict when he 
tweeted. The juror responded that he had not, and that the other jurors would assist him to.
189
 
The appellant’s solicitors requested that the juror be disqualified, because he did not follow 
the judicial officer’s instructions.
190
 The judicial officer rejected this request, because the 




After being questioned about his tweeting and specifically instructed not to talk about the 
trial, the juror tweeted again twice, while the jurors deliberated the appellant’s sentence. The 
juror made the following two tweets: 
 
1. ‘if its wisdom we seek…we should run to the strong tower’; and 
2. ‘its over.’192 
 
The Appeal Court Judges decided that the juror had prejudiced the appellant’s case — not 
from his tweet, but by failing to follow the trial judge’s instructions.
193
 They stated that the 
‘appellant was denied a fair trial in this case where Juror 2 disregarded the Circuit Court’s 
instructions and tweeted about the case and Juror 1 slept through part of the trial’.
194
 They 
added, ‘This court has recognized the importance that jurors not be allowed to post musings, 
thoughts, or any other information about trials on any online forums. The possibility for 
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prejudice is simply too high’.
195
 As a result of the juror’s actions and for other reasons, the 
Appeal Court Judges reversed the appellant’s conviction and sentence. They decided that a 




In July 2012, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder and aggravated robbery. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
197
 The appellant avoided the death penalty 
because he pleaded guilty rather than being found guilty by a jury.
198
 The appellant was able 
to be housed with the general prison population because he avoided the death penalty. If he 
had been sentenced to the death penalty, the appellant would be in solitary confinement for 
23 hours daily before his execution.
199
 This shows how jurors using social media 
inappropriately can indirectly impact on an offender’s sentence.  
 
A reason why this case is particularly interesting is that a judicial officer warned the relevant 
juror individually not to use social media inappropriately after learning that he did so, yet the 
juror did not listen to the judicial officer’s instructions and used social media again. One 
might assume that after judicial officers have scolded a juror for using social media 
inappropriately and individually instructed a juror not to use it, the juror would obey the 
instructions. This case also shows that judicial officers should consider dismissing jurors after 
they use social media inappropriately during a trial, because the jurors may use social media 
inappropriately again if they are not dismissed.  
 
If judicial officers instruct jurors specifically not to use social media and a juror uses social 
media inappropriately, then judicial officers can punish the juror for contempt of court for not 
obeying the instruction. In contrast, if judicial officers do not instruct the juror specifically 
not to use social media, judicial officers face a lengthier process to decide what they should 
do. This lengthy process typically involves the following: if a verdict has not yet been 
delivered, the judge in the relevant trial instructs a court officer to speak to the relevant juror 
about the incident and examine the juror’s social media profiles.
200
 Depending on what the 
court officer learns, the judicial officer then calls the juror allegedly involved in the 
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misconduct to court. The judicial officer then asks the juror a series of questions about his or 
her post, tweet or message on social media.
201
 The judicial officer tries to determine whether 
the relevant juror has formed a view about the accused and whether he or she shared that 
view with other jurors.
202
 The judicial officer then decides whether to cease the trial or 
whether to dismiss the jurors.
203
 The judicial officer can also decide whether the juror’s 
actions were inappropriate and if so, whether or not to dismiss the juror. The judge may also 




If courts learn that a juror used social media inappropriately after a verdict has been 
delivered, then the side against whom the juror was allegedly biased may request an appeal of 
the verdict on the grounds of juror misconduct. The appeal judge then summons the relevant 
juror and the judge and the parties’ counsel ask them similar questions. The appeal judge then 
considers whether the juror’s behaviour was inappropriate. If it was, the appeal judge then 
considers whether the juror should be punished for his or her misconduct and whether a new 
trial should be ordered. The appeal judge may consider whether there was a miscarriage of 
justice.
205
 The general descriptions above of the judicial officer’s actions can vary depending 
on the country and the state where the trial occurred.  
 
In R v K,
206
 the court learned that jurors allegedly searched the internet during a trial. The 
Court’s Sheriff spoke to the jurors about their actions.
207
 The jurors then signed affidavits that 
described their misconduct.
208
 The affidavits were provided to the judicial officers and the 
parties.
209
 Prosecutors subsequently investigated the substance of the affidavits and reported 




Providing instructions to jurors is a low-interference solution: it does not interfere with 
jurors’ daily lives. If jurors follow the instructions, they can still use social media, but they 
cannot use them to discuss the trial. Jurors are not legally trained, so they may not know that 
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it is wrong to discuss a trial on social media unless a judge instructs them about it or they 
receive other training or see posters about it. Training jurors and using posters will be 
discussed later in this Chapter. Admittedly, the instructions do require jurors to alter their 
conduct slightly: while they could previously write about anything that they wanted to on 
social media (as long as they did not breach any laws, e.g., defamation), during trial and 
deliberation they cannot write about the trial. Nevertheless, this alteration to the jury’s lives is 
very slight, especially in comparison to other potential preventative solutions, such as 
sequestration.  
 
In a study by Judge Amy St Eve and Michael Zuckerman, jury instructions appeared to be a 
reason why jurors did not use social media inappropriately during trials.
211
 In their study, St 
Eve J of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and her law 
clerk, Zuckerman, provided surveys to approximately 140 jurors in both criminal and civil 
trials in the Northern District of Illinois after the jurors had completed their jury duty.
212
 In 
each case, the judge had instructed jurors against using social media inappropriately during 
the trial. In some of the lengthier trials, the judge instructed the jury on a daily basis to avoid 





Two of the questions in their survey were: ‘[w]ere you tempted to communicate about the 
case through any social networks, such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or 
Twitter? If so, what prevented you from doing so?’
214
 Only six of the 140 jurors who 
answered the surveys ‘reported any temptation to communicate about the case through social 
media’. None of the six jurors wrote that he or she actually followed through on his or her 
temptation. The same six jurors stated that the reason why they did not follow through with 
their temptation to discuss the case through social media was ‘the judge’s instructions or the 
obligations of a juror’.
215
 ‘Most’ of the 134 jurors who did not report a temptation to discuss 
the case on social media stated that they lacked the temptation due to the judge’s 
                                                             
211
 St Eve J and Zuckerman, above n 133. 
212
 Ibid 20.    
213
 Ibid 21.  
214
 Ibid 10.   





 Other jurors who did not report such a temptation stated that ‘fairness’ was 
the reason why they lacked the temptation.
217
 Some of the jurors who indicated that they did 
not feel tempted to use social media during the trial wrote that they simply did not use this 
technology.
218
 As a result of their survey, St Eve J and Zuckerman believe that a judge’s 
instructions to a jury can prevent jurors from using social media inappropriately.
219
 They also 
feel that it was important that the jurors recalled the judges’ instructions after the trial 
concluded.
220
 Judge St Eve and Zuckerman’s research is particularly interesting because it 
involves surveying jurors. In Australia, the law typically tries to keep jurors and their 
respective views a secret,
221




Judge St Eve and Zuckerman stated that they used a ‘model social media instruction during 
opening and closing instructions’
223
; but they did not state which model instructions they 
used. Judge St Eve and Zuckerman used a small sample size. The jurors may not have been 
as honest as they would normally be because a judge was one of the people responsible for 
the survey, as opposed to an academic being responsible. The jurors surveyed may have been 
ashamed to admit that they used social media inappropriately to a judge, even in anonymous 
surveys. It was useful for Judge St Eve and Zuckerman to specifically ask jurors what 
prevented them from using social media, so as to obtain information about which methods 
that attempt to prevent jurors from using social media are the most helpful. The study also 
shows that model instructions are useful and that model instructions should discuss fairness 
to the accused. 
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Judicial officers already instruct juries about many issues, such as identification evidence and 
bad character evidence, so they could also consider instructing jurors about using social 
media inappropriately. Australian judicial officers already have a presumption that ‘until the 
contrary is demonstrated, jurors understand and conform to the direction of the trial judge’.
224
 
Using instructions is not expensive, nor would it require any drastic changes to how trials are 
run.  
 
6.4.3.9 The Argument Against Providing Instructions to Jurors 
 
In contrast, some judges believe that they should not instruct jurors about social media use, 
preferring to use the general jury instructions that they already use. They believe that 
providing instructions about social media ‘is bound to be under-inclusive in light of rapid 
technological developments’.
225
 If judges do not instruct jurors not to use social media 
inappropriately, then it may not occur to jurors that there may be a problem with their social 
media use. It is also possible for judges to use other preventative methods to lessen the 




Some people believe that instructing jurors not to use social media could encourage them to 
use it.
227
 For example, in R v K,
228
 instructions were not given to the jury about searching the 
internet ‘because it was feared that any mention, of that kind, might only place the idea in the 
minds of an inquisitive juror’.
229
 While the instructions that the judicial officer considered 
using involved telling jurors not to search the internet, as opposed to not using social media 
inappropriately, searching the internet and using social media are similar in that they both 
involve using technology and communication. They are both part of many people’s daily 
lives. While instructing jurors not to use social media inappropriately may only encourage 
some jurors to do so, Judge St Eve and Zuckerman’s survey indicates that more jurors would 
probably abide by the instructions. 
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Caren Myers Morrison argues that instructions to jurors do not work. She suggests that jurors 
often misinterpret them.
230
 Jurors often believe instructions are limits to their decision 
making, so they dislike them.
231
 Even if jurors dislike instructions, instructions can be an 
effective tool for informing jurors about how they should behave during a trial. It is inevitable 
that there will be limits to jurors’ decision making during a trial. Marcy Zora states that 
having a judge providing jurors with instructions to avoid using social media is insufficient to 
prevent jurors from doing so.
232
 She further states that 
 
social media has become such an integrated part of many people’s lives that it is unlikely a 
simple jury instruction will be enough to prevent them from broadcasting their role as a juror on 




Zora does not appear to differentiate between a juror making general comments about a trial 
and a juror making specific comments about a trial. If a juror makes a general comment about 
a trial (e.g., he or she writes that he or she is serving as a juror), then this would arguably not 
be a major problem as opposed to a juror who states something specific about a trial or shows 
a bias of some kind (e.g., a juror who writes ‘I think the accused should be found guilty’).  
 
There can be some problems with giving standard instructions to a jury.
234
 The positive 
aspect of standard instructions is that a judicial officer does not need to spend time 
considering how to draft the instructions him or herself. The judicial officer can benefit from 
the careful thought that others have spent to draft the standard instructions.  
 
It may be objected that jurors may not understand the standard instructions.
235
 If instructions 
are carefully drafted in plain English, then this does not need to happen. Since jurors may 
have different levels of English comprehension, it is possible that jurors may not understand 
instructions no matter how well drafted the instructions are. It may be possible that standard 
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instructions can be drafted so that the majority of jurors understand. Courts can ask linguistic 
experts’ opinions about the instructions to ensure that this occurs. 
 
In 2008, research by staff of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission and the New 
South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research conducted with 1225 jurors showed 
that 95 per cent of jurors thought that they ‘understood all or most of the judge’s instructions 
on the law’ and 47 per cent of jurors thought that they ‘understood completely’.
236
 This 
reinforces the idea that jurors can understand a judicial officer’s instructions, though 
admittedly, it is possible that jurors believed that they understood the instructions, when they 
did not in reality. In the United Kingdom, case simulations with jurors took place to see the 
extent to which jurors understood the directions of a judge. Almost 70 per cent of jurors at 
two courts believed that they understood the directions of the judge, while approximately 50 





Instructions may be boring for jurors to listen to because they ‘do not tell a story and are 
intentionally devoid of climax, emphasis, and drama’.
238
 However, it is irrelevant whether 
instructions to the jury are boring: there are many parts of a trial that a layperson may 
consider boring, such as opening submissions. It is not the goal of a trial (in real life, as 
opposed to on television) to entertain. 
 
6.4.4 Providing a Message 
 
An additional preventative method is that, while allowing jurors to receive social media 
messages during a trial and deliberations, the court can provide jurors with a specific message 
that they can send to friends and family when they receive a social media message during a 
trial. This way jurors do not need to ignore the social media messages that they receive 
completely. One possible reply for jurors to send to messages that they receive is: 
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I am sending this note to you as instructed by Judge _______. I am now a sworn juror in a trial. 
I am sequestered. This means I am not allowed to read or comment upon anything having to do 
with the subject of the trial, the parties involved, the attorneys, or anything else related to my 
service as a juror. Please do not send me any materials; don’t email, text, or tweet me any 
questions or comments about this case or my service as a juror. Please do not text or email me 
during the course of this trial except in an emergency. I will send you a note when I am released 




The appeal of this solution is that jurors do not have to modify their everyday life as much as 
they would if social media use were completely banned. On the other hand, this thesis has 
stated that when jurors send the message from the judge, the message’s recipients may try to 
entice the juror to talk about the trial. The recipients of a message that uses legal language or 
that states that it was sent because of a judge’s instructions may become alarmed or 




Lorana Bartels and Jessica Lee state that ‘Krawitz’s concerns about the official nature of the 
message may also be unjustified — instead, a message conveyed with the imprimatur of the 
court may serve to highlight to jurors, their friends and family the importance of refraining 
from communication.’
241
 It is possible that Bartels and Lee are correct and recipients of the 
message may simply obey it without giving it another thought. It is possible that the juror’s 
family and friends may be more likely to obey the message because it uses legal language. 
This option makes it relatively easy for jurors to deal with a situation in which someone 
contacts them on social media to discuss the trial. The jurors do not need to think about what 
they can or cannot include in a response to friends or family.  
 
6.4.5 Written Warning or Written Oath 
 
Another possible method to prevent jurors from using social media inappropriately is to 
ensure that the warning given to jurors about inappropriate social media use is given in 
writing (in addition to being provided orally).
242
 The written warning should be specific.
243
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At the end of each day of trial in Maryland v Dixon
244
 the court gave each juror a letter. The 
first paragraph of the letter stated, ‘you should not discuss anything about this case with 
anyone else.’ The fourth paragraph stated ‘you should not make any posting on any internet 
site about this case or you being on this jury. This means no texting, instant messaging or 
leaving messages of any type on internet sites about this case or your involvement in this 
case.’
245
 Nevertheless, the jurors became friends with each other on Facebook about a week 
before they delivered their verdict. They also wrote about the case in posts online during their 
deliberations.
246
 This case demonstrates that providing jurors with a written warning may not 
be sufficient to prevent them from using social media inappropriately during a trial.  
 
Judicial officers can also request that jurors can take an oath or sign an affidavit to 
acknowledge the instructions that the court provided them.
247
 This could increase jurors’ 
knowledge about the instructions’ existence.
248
 It would probably increase how seriously the 
court perceives a juror’s actions if he or she subsequently uses social media inappropriately 
during the trial. Jurors could sign an oath or affidavit before the trial and another one at the 
end of the trial confirming that they did not use social media at any point during the trial.
249
 If 
jurors are required to sign an oath or affidavit, it gives them another opportunity to ask the 
court questions about their obligation not to use social media inappropriately during the 
trial.
250
 If the oath or affidavit is only about certain court instructions and not others, jurors 
could possibly believe that the instructions that were the basis of the affidavit or oath are 
more important than other instructions.
251
 Even so, jurors may be more likely not to use 
social media inappropriately if they must sign a written oath or affidavit. Research for this 
chapter could not find any cases to date in which jurors took an oath or signed an affidavit 
about social media use prior to a trial. Some people may argue that this could intimidate 
jurors. 
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If a juror has literacy challenges, and cannot understand the written oath or affidavit, the 
court staff member who manages juries can take the time to explain the written oath or 
affidavit to the juror. If the juror does not understand the court staff member’s explanation, 




Requiring Australian jurors to sign an oath or affirmation that states that they understand that 
they are forbidden from discussing the trial on social media is an easy, low-interference 
method to compel jurors to sincerely consider the judicial officer’s instructions. Jurors may 
take the instructions more seriously and they may be more likely to remember them if they 
see them in writing and promise to uphold them. A potential written oath for jurors to sign 
could be as follows: 
 
I sincerely declare that I will not mention this trial or anything related to the trial on any social 
media (including but not limited to Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Google+, Flickr 
and YouTube) during the trial or during or after jury deliberations. The reason for this 
requirement is that it is critical to give the accused a fair trial. It is also to prevent my decision 
about the accused’s guilt being affected by others who are not part of the jury. If I violate this 
oath then a judicial officer may find me in contempt of court. The punishment for contempt of 
court is imprisonment or a fine or both. If I accidentally violate my oath then I will inform a 




Bartels and Lee recommend that research be done with mock jurors signing the above oath to 
learn how successful it is.
254
 An advantage of using mock jurors is that it allows researchers 
to ‘isolate’ one or more variables.
255
 Also, it should be relatively easy to conduct research 
with mock jurors in Australia, as opposed to with real jurors.  
 
6.4.6 Training Judges 
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Another possible low-interference preventative solution is to train judges about the potential 
negative repercussions of jurors using social media inappropriately. This ‘would ensure that 
judges are aware of new potential threats to the administration of justice, while still 
respecting the discretion afforded to trial judges’.
256
 If judges are educated about jurors’ 
possible inappropriate social media use during a trial, then judges will be better able to 
anticipate when jurors might be likely to use social media inappropriately and better able to 




In Australia, staff of the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration and the National 
Judicial College of Australia hold seminars for judges about social media. For example, in 
August 2013, the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration held a seminar entitled 
‘Media/Social Media and its Influence on the Judiciary’.
258
 Australian judges could benefit 
from attending short courses on social media (if they have not done so already) to ensure that 
they understand how social media works and how a juror could use it to communicate 
inappropriately about a trial. Judges’ new knowledge about social media could be useful in 
other aspects of their jobs. For example, judges might use their new knowledge about social 
media to decide whether serving court documents by social media is acceptable in cases of 
substituted service if a party requests it in a civil matter. The training can also help judges if 
they face ethical situations involving their own social media use, such as those discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
 
6.4.7 Training Jurors 
 
Another possible preventative, low-interference solution is to train jurors before a trial not to 
use social media.
259
 Courts could develop an online course for jurors that takes an hour.
260
 
The course could explain the jurors’ job and their legal obligations. It could also state that 
jurors should not use media or social media during a trial and after the trial to discuss the 
trial. It could state the punishment that jurors receive if they use social media or media to 
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discuss a trial. There could also be a test at the end of the course for jurors to complete. The 




When jurors receive their summons to attend jury duty, they could receive a notice that they 
must complete their online jury training before they attend court for empanelling. The notice 
could state that if jurors do not have access to a computer, they can complete their training on 
a computer in a special room at court. The notice can also state that if jurors do not complete 
the online training before empanelling, then they must pay a fine. Providing computers at 
court and threatening jurors with a potential fine if they do not complete the online training 
could help to put sufficient pressure on the jurors to complete the online training. 
 
This solution may be expensive to create, but its possible benefits could be worth it. The 
online course could be useful to teach jurors about other ethical issues that they should be 
aware of, besides the requirement not to use social media inappropriately. Since the course 
would be online, it would be easy for jurors to take the course anywhere that they choose. 
Jurors who receive orientation programs are more satisfied with their experience on the 
jury.
262
 They are also more competent at decision making.
263
 Australian courts could use this 
measure to train jurors about a number of important issues. 
 
The Law Commission of the United Kingdom recommends that training in schools is given to 
every member of society about their duties as a juror. When they become jurors, then they 
will be more likely to abide by the training that they received.
264
 This is an excellent idea, but 
it may be expensive to provide training about jury duty to every person who attends school. It 
may also be difficult to organise.  
 
6.4.8 Posters and Other Visual Aids 
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It is possible that posters and other visual aids that state that jurors should not use social 
media inappropriately could be placed in the jurors’ deliberation rooms
265
 to serve as a useful 
reminder to the jurors. It may be of particular use to jurors who learn visually or who did not 
pay attention to a judge’s oral instructions. This would be a low-cost method of informing 
jurors not to use social media inappropriately. Bartels and Lee state that this suggestion is 




In Attorney General v Davey & Beard, there were six posters in the jury lounge and foyer that 
warned jurors that they could be imprisoned if they used social media.
267
 A juror still used 
Facebook to discuss the case.
268
 Even though the posters were not successful in convincing 
the juror not to use social media to discuss the trial, it is possible that the posters successfully 
deterred other jurors from doing so (though the judgment did not state whether this was the 
case). Using posters as a preventative solution is cheap and easy to implement and has the 
potential to be effective.  
 
6.4.9 Publicise Jurors Punished for Misconduct 
 
Another possible preventative solution is that when a judge sentences a juror for contempt of 
court as a result of using social media during a trial, courts can publicise the judge’s decision 
as much as possible.
269
 This could be a useful deterrent to other jurors who contemplate doing 
the same thing.
270
 There are two main reasons for this: if a juror is self-interested, he or she 
will want to avoid the punishment, and the possibility of punishment may bring home to a 
juror how important it is to follow the rule.
271
 One method of publicising a sentence is to 
mention the sentence on posters placed in the jury room, as previously mentioned. Courts 
could also draft a media release about this issue and circulate it to journalists in the hope that 
the journalists will write about it in newspapers and other media. 
 
The deterrent effect may be even greater in the rare situations where the juror who 
inappropriately used social media is a celebrity. Al Roker is an example. Roker worked as a 
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weatherman for the Today Show in the United States. In 2009, he was summonsed as a juror 
to the Manhattan Supreme Court.
272
 At court, a sign stated that taking photos was banned. 
Nevertheless, Roker took photos of jurors in the courthouse, but not in the courtroom, and 
tweeted them. Roker later informed the court of his tweets.
273
 The court subsequently 
dismissed Roker from jury duty, though he claimed that he was dismissed for reasons related 




David Bookstaver, the chief court spokesperson, said that Roker’s tweets were ‘ill-advised’, 
though not illegal.
275
 He added that ‘it is really nice that a guy who is really well known came 
down to do his jury service like everybody else.’
276
 Roker later tweeted that he ‘learned a 
lesson’
277
 and ‘going back into the courtroom, (with) iPhone buried deep in my bag’.
278
 
Roker said that while he did not think that the incident was ‘a big deal’, he did not intend to 
repeat his behaviour in the future.
279
 Roker was not yet part of a jury when he tweeted from 
the courthouse, nor did he tweet about a specific case.
280
 Bookstaver’s comments were too 
positive about Roker, given Roker’s inappropriate social media use. Bookstaver could have 
potentially undone any deterrent effect from publicising Roker’s inappropriate social media 
use. When politicians increase sentences for crimes generally, this often does not result in a 




6.4.10 Preventative Measures that Would not be Suitable in Australia 
 
Some American academics or researchers in the area of jurors using social media 
inappropriately suggest preventative measures that are novel and would be unlikely to be 
implemented in Australia. These measures are: virtual sequestration and a more active jury. 
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The author included these measures in this section for the sake of completeness. Additionally, 
American courts that read this thesis may decide to implement these preventative measures. 
 




 suggests ‘virtual sequestration’ as another method to prevent jurors from using 
social media inappropriately. This involves allowing jurors to return home in the evenings, 
but allowing courts to block their internet access or observe it. This is less costly than 
physical sequestration to the courts and is easier for jurors to deal with. Jurors may object to 
this intrusion into their privacy.
283
 Research for this thesis did not find any courts that have 
implemented ‘virtual sequestration’ to date. 
 
This preventative method is of high interference and it would violate jurors’ privacy 
significantly. It would probably cost courts considerable money because they would need to 
hire many information technology professionals to implement it. If courts were allowed 
access to jurors’ social media posts, they would gain access to jurors’ extremely sensitive and 
personal information. Jurors could easily avoid ‘virtual sequestration’ by starting new social 
media accounts that courts would not know about. ‘Virtual sequestration’ might also affect 
people who share the same computer as the juror (e.g., a family sharing a home computer). It 
would be unfair to the people who share a computer with the juror if the court blocks their 
internet access. Some technologically savvy jurors (or non-jurors who share their computers) 
may be able to avoid the ‘virtual sequestration’ regardless. This method would not be fair to 
the jurors who would access social media during a trial, but would not post anything 
inappropriate.  
 
6.4.10.2 A More Active Jury 
 
Another possible preventative, low-interference solution is to have ‘a more active jury’.
284
 
This means that jurors can take notes while in the courtroom, ask questions if they do not 
understand something, talk about a trial before they deliberate
285
 and ask witnesses 
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 Jurors can also use an online forum anonymously to write their ideas and 
thoughts about the trial. The reasoning behind this solution is that it might prevent jurors 
from wanting to discuss the trial on social media.
287
 Permitting jurors to talk about the trial 
with other jurors, who are effectively strangers, may not prevent jurors from still wanting to 
share their ideas about the trial with their family and friends on social media.
288
 
Unfortunately, if an anonymous online forum is established and people outside the jury can 
read the jurors’ online forum, then they may try to influence the jurors.
289
 An anonymous 
forum may not be sufficient for jurors, because it would not primarily be used to contact 




Modifications to juries to make them more active would be a radical change. The best 
solutions to this problem are likely ones that do not require radical changes. Radical changes 
would possibly take more time to be approved. The changes discussed above to jurors would 
provide jurors with powers similar to lawyers (e.g., the ability to ask witnesses questions). 
Jurors do not have legal training (aside from potentially taking a short course), so if they ask 
witnesses questions and complete other tasks in a more active jury, it could cause problems 
(e.g., wasting the court’s time).  
 
6.5 How to Assist Courts to Discover that Jurors Used Social Media Inappropriately 
 
If a juror uses social media inappropriately it is possible that the person with whom the juror 
communicated will inform the relevant judge’s associate, as occurred in Haruna v The 
Queen.
291
 It is also possible that the relevant juror will tell one of the lawyers involved in the 




People who are not directly involved in the trial or with one of the parties may inform a 
lawyer in the trial that a juror has used social media inappropriately. The son of the defence 
lawyer in the trial involving juror Hadley Jons found Jons’ Facebook post about the trial 
because he conducted online searches of the jurors in the case. He informed his parent about 
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what he found and the defence lawyer informed the court about Jons’ post.
293
 Some 
Australian jurors may currently use social media inappropriately without the courts’ 
knowledge. This section will discuss methods to increase the probability that Australian 
courts will discover when a juror has used social media inappropriately. 
 
6.5.1 Speak with Courts, Establish a Whistleblower Hotline, Email or Internet Page 
 
Courts could inform jurors that if they learn that another juror has used social media 
inappropriately, then they should inform the court staff member who looks after the jury. The 
juror could try to have a quiet word with the court staff member, who could then tell the 
presiding judicial officer as soon as possible. 
 
Additionally, courts could establish an anonymous hotline for jurors to call to report other 
jurors whom they know used social media inappropriately during a trial or during 
deliberations, similar to Crime Stoppers. Courts could investigate complaints to the hotline. 
Courts could assure the reporting jurors that their names would not be mentioned in court as 
having provided the information or disclosed it to the other jurors. Establishing the hotline 
could assist the court to learn when juror misconduct by using social media occurs. The 
anonymous aspect of the hotline could be of great comfort to jurors who want to inform the 
court that a juror has used social media inappropriately but are worried that other people may 
find out that they provided the information. Disadvantages might be that if jurors do not 
understand precisely when they should call the hotline, this could result in unnecessary calls 
to the hotline and unnecessary investigations. A hotline could also possibly make some jurors 
unnecessarily anxious about being reported, despite doing nothing wrong. Since a juror is at 
court during the day, the juror may not be able to call the hotline until after the trial. It is 
better if the juror informs the court about the other juror’s inappropriate social media use as 
soon as possible so that the presiding judicial officer can investigate. 
 
Another similar method courts could use to learn if jurors have used social media 
inappropriately is to create an email address specifically for jurors to email if they want to 
report other jurors who used social media inappropriately.
294
 The email address could be 
made easy for jurors to remember. Courts could promise jurors that any emails sent to this 
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email address would be confidential and courts will not disclose the person or email address. 
Receiving an email is not expensive or time consuming, although a court official would need 
to take time to monitor the emails that are received. Informing jurors about this email address 
could also help to prevent jurors from potentially using social media to discuss the trial in the 
first place. It could be problematic if the email arrives months or years after a trial. This is 




If courts decide to give jurors a written oath that states that they will not use social media, as 
previously discussed, they could include information about the aforementioned suggested 
email address at the same time. One of the benefits of jurors emailing the court about this 
issue is that jurors could easily and quickly send emails from their homes in the evening after 
court. However, a whistleblower hotline or email could cause jurors to be overly careful 




Courts could also create new pages on the court’s website that provide information to juries 
about what they should do in the event that they learn that a juror used social media 
inappropriately.
297
 If courts tell jurors orally about what they should do if they learn that 
jurors used social media inappropriately and jurors forget, it is possible that the jurors may 
visit the court’s website to seek information about what they should do. It would probably not 
cost the court much money to create the webpage. After courts put in the time to create the 
website, it should not take much time to maintain it.  
 
6.5.2 Review the Jurors’ Social Media Pages During the Trial 
 
Another possible method of discovering when jurors have used social media inappropriately 
is for a lawyer in the trial to review the publicly available elements of the social media pages 
of each juror without informing them during the trial.
298
 Some lawyers already review jurors’ 
social media pages; this has become increasingly common among American lawyers. Some 
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American judicial officers and staff of bar associations are in favour of this method.
299
 
However, reviewing some jurors’ social media pages may be challenging or even impossible 
if a juror has strict privacy settings.
300
 It may be hard to find a juror’s social media posts if he 




Lawyers may miss some or all of jurors’ inappropriate social media use during a trial, no 
matter how hard they try to find it. Jurors may be displeased with this intrusion into their 
privacy and it may cause some jurors to try to avoid jury duty. It is possible that some 
lawyers will not inform courts if they discover that a juror has used social media 
inappropriately if they think that a juror is prejudiced in their client’s favour. Most American 
courts do not require lawyers to provide them and opposing counsel with the information that 
they find while researching jurors’ social media pages. Some American judicial officers 
require prosecution lawyers to provide this information, but normally only after the defence 





This preventative solution would be impossible in Australia because it would probably breach 
the Solicitor’s Rule not to act in a manner that would lower the public’s confidence in the 
administration of justice.  
 
6.6 Consequences for the Juror or Jurors who Used Social Media Inappropriately 
 
When Australian judicial officers discover that a juror used social media inappropriately, they 
need to decide the consequences for the juror. There are a range of possible options that 
judicial officers may wish to implement. 
 
6.6.1 Dismiss the Juror 
 
Nicole D Galli, Christopher D Olszyk and Jeffrey G Willhelm suggest that courts dismiss a 
juror who has used social media inappropriately.
303
 This has occurred in at least five cases in 
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the relevant jurisdictions. For example, this occurred in Australia in Haruna v the Queen.
304
 
In that case, the jury foreperson communicated with a member of the State Director of Public 
Prosecutions by text and Facebook about the trial and was dismissed.
305
 The jury foreperson 
was a law student.
306
 One might expect that a law student would know better than to use 
social media inappropriately because the law student should understand the concept of 
providing a fair trial to an accused.  
 
In July 2011, Jonathan Hudson was a juror in a civil car crash trial in Texas. He sent the 
defendant a friend request on Facebook. The defendant reported Hudson’s request to the 
court. Consequently, the judicial officer dismissed Hudson from the jury.
307
 A similar 
decision would likely be made if this incident occurred in Australia. This is because the test 
applied to discharge a juror in Australia would probably be  
 
[w]hether the incident is such that, notwithstanding the proposed or actual warning of the trial 
judge, it gives rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair-minded and 





This case also illustrates that it is not necessary for a juror to make comments directly about a 
trial to be dismissed. Just before Hudson’s conduct, Texas regulators amended instructions to 





As stated previously, Al Roker was dismissed from jury duty
310
 for taking photos of jurors in 
the courthouse, but not in the courtroom, and tweeting them.
311
 A juror was also dismissed 
for inappropriately using social media in the United Kingdom. The juror had to decide on the 
guilt of the accused in a sexual assault and child abduction case. The juror added a poll to her 
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Facebook page which asked how she should vote.
312
 A judicial officer dismissed the juror 
and the trial continued with the remaining jurors.
313
 This case also demonstrates that jurors 
are not allowed to use social media applications to discuss a trial, in addition to simply 
commenting on social media.  
 
In the cases to date, judicial officers have dismissed jurors for using social media 
inappropriately, but on rare occasions have dismissed entire juries where one juror has used 
social media inappropriately and then discussed his or her social media use with the other 
jurors. Dismissing an entire jury would be a far greater interruption to the trial than if a 
judicial officer dismisses a single juror. It would also be a greater waste of resources.  
 
Another issue involving dismissing a juror who has used social media inappropriately is the 
relevance of the timing of the inappropriate social media use, for example, where it occurs 
not during the trial, but prior to the trial. As stated previously, Al Roker was dismissed from 
jury duty for his inappropriate social media use before he was actually assigned to a trial.
314
 
As soon as a juror is allocated to a trial, it is unacceptable for him or her to write anything 
specific about the trial. Prior to a juror being allocated to a trial in Australia, a juror likely 
knows nothing about the trial so he or she could probably not reveal anything confidential on 
social media. Nevertheless, he or she could potentially be influenced by a third party, if for 
example, he or she posted on Facebook ‘I’m going to court tomorrow to potentially become a 
juror in a trial, let’s see what happens,’ and a third party comments, ‘find them guilty 
whatever you do — they deserve it!’  
 
Dismissing a juror for using social media inappropriately can demonstrate the importance of 
alternate jurors. For example, in the Josh Carrier trial in the United States, Carrier faced 
charges involving sexually abusing a child. During the trial, one of the jurors sent a Facebook 
message to a friend of hers that stated that she had jury duty. Judge David Gilbert learned 
about the Facebook message from the defendant’s lawyer. His Honour dismissed the juror 
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from the case and replaced her with an alternate juror.
315
 This is as opposed to a juror who 
was dismissed for inappropriately using social media in the United Kingdom. As previously 
stated, a juror added a poll to her Facebook page that asked her friends how she should vote 
in the trial.
316
 A judicial officer dismissed the juror and the trial continued with the remaining 
jurors.
317
 If there are no alternate jurors, then a trial may need to proceed without a full 
complement of jurors. 
 
6.6.2 Compel the Juror to Write an Essay 
 
Punishing jurors who use social media inappropriately by compelling them to write an essay 
about a fair trial for the accused may make jurors more likely to understand why courts have 
punished them than other types of punishment (e.g., imprisonment). In 2010, 20-year-old 
Michigan juror Hadley Jons wrote on her Facebook wall, ‘gonna be fun to tell the defendant 
they’re GUILTY’.
318
 Jons wrote this post after the first day of a trial.
319
 The son of the 
defence lawyer in the trial found Jons’ post because he was conducting online searches of the 
jurors in the case.
320
 The defence lawyer informed the court about Jons’ post and the judge 
dismissed Jons from the jury before the second day of the trial commenced.
321
 The judge later 
charged Jons with contempt of court and required her to return to court.
322
 The judicial officer 
also sentenced Jons to pay a $250 fine and write a five-page essay about an accused’s ‘right 




Compelling a juror to write an essay may be highly useful in cases where the juror does not 
think that their use of social media was wrong. It may also be an effective deterrent to future 
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jurors. Australian States’ sentencing acts do not contain any provisions that appear to permit 
judges to sentence offenders to write an essay, nor do they appear to contain any provisions 
that are analogous to compelling an offender to write an essay.
324
 In restorative justice, 
offenders often must write a letter in which they apologise for their actions.
325
 This is 
somewhat similar to requiring an offender to write an essay. Both require the offender to 
think critically about their actions. 
 
6.6.3 Amend the Jury Act 
 
A simple solution for Australian courts could be for legislators from each State to amend 
their respective jury acts to state that if a juror comments on social media inappropriately 
about a trial prior to delivering the verdict then he or she is in contempt of court. To date, no 
Australian legislators have done so. The jury acts in some Australian States prohibit  
researching a case on the internet.
326
 Changing the jury acts to prohibit social media use and 
making it punishable as contempt of court is not a far stretch. Courts could then treat each 
juror who used social media as being in contempt, and punishing the juror could become a 
straightforward process.  
 
It is noted that contempt of court is also an offence pursuant to the common law.
327
 ‘The 
fundamental basis of any charge of contempt of court consists of the capacity of the 
impugned conduct to interfere with the due administration of justice.’
328
 The remedy for 
committing contempt of court at common law is a fine or imprisonment.
329
 It may be possible 
that a judicial officer could decide to punish a juror who used social media inappropriately 
for contempt of court at common law. 
 
6.6.4 Imprison the Juror 
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Research into jurors using social media inappropriately in the relevant jurisdictions found that 
three jurors have been imprisoned for inappropriately using social media. In 2010, Judge 
Nancy Donnellan of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida dismissed 29-year-old 
Jacob Jock from jury duty in a negligence case.
330
 Her Honour dismissed Jock because he had 




After Her Honour dismissed Jock from jury duty, Jock wrote on Facebook ‘score…I got 
dismissed!! Apparently they frown upon sending a friend request to the defendant…haha.’
332
 
Her Honour then summonsed Jock to return to court and found him guilty of contempt of 
court. She sentenced him to three days in gaol.
333
 Her Honour stated, ‘I cannot think of a 
more insidious threat to the erosion of democracy than citizens who do not care.’
334
 In this 
case, the Judge appeared to consider Jock’s rude behaviour when she sentenced him. Her 
Honour was correct to consider Jock’s offensive attitude to the court when she sentenced 
him. It is important for the public to respect the courts in order for the public to have 
confidence in them. It is interesting that Jock was not punished for originally attempting to 
contact the defendant, but instead was punished for his subsequent conduct. This subsequent 
conduct gave some colour to the original conduct to make it seem like it was deliberate. It 
shows that Jock had a lack of understanding of the need for jurors to behave properly. 
 
The second case in which a juror was imprisoned for using social media inappropriately was 
Attorney General v Fraill.
335
 This case involved contempt of court charges against Joanne 
Fraill, who had been previously a juror at the criminal case of Jamie Sewart and her co-
accused at the Crown Court in Manchester before Judge Peter Lakin in 2010.
336
 Jamie Sewart 
was tried with eight other accused. One of the nine co-accused, Philip Berry, was charged 
with conspiracy to commit misconduct in a public office. Berry pleaded guilty.
337
 The other 
eight co-accused were jointly charged with conspiracy to supply heroin and conspiracy to 
supply amphetamines. The co-accused were charged with additional offences that primarily 
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related to drugs and attempting to involve a police officer to further their drug offences.
338
 
The Judge specifically gave the jury a direction about internet use, but not social media use. 




After the jury had deliberated and provided some of its verdicts in early August 2010, Jamie 
Sewart was found not guilty on all of the charges against her. Some of her co-accused were 
convicted.
340
 After the majority of the verdicts were delivered, Lakin J learned that one of the 
jurors had contacted Sewart on Facebook. Judge Lakin asked each juror whether he or she 
had communicated with the accused through Facebook.
341
 Fraill then informed Lakin J that 
she contacted Sewart by Facebook.
342
 Judge Lakin learned that after the jury acquitted Sewart 
of all of the charges against her (but before the jury decided all of the verdicts for some of 
Sewart’s co-accused), Fraill had sent Sewart a message to her Facebook account that stated 
‘you should know me, I cried with you enough’. Sewart saw that this friend request, by a 
person named Jo Smilie, displayed a photograph of Fraill, whom she recognised as one of the 
jurors who acquitted her. Sewart then commenced a conversation with Fraill via the 




The day after Sewart and Fraill’s conversation on Facebook messenger, Sewart contacted her 
lawyer to inform her lawyer about the conversation. Sewart’s lawyer informed her counsel. 
Counsel arranged to provide the information about Sewart and Fraill’s conversation on 
Facebook instant messenger to Lakin J.
344
 Justice Ouseley held that both Fraill and Sewart 




The relevant law that Ouseley J applied was the Contempt of Court Act
346
 which states ‘it is a 
contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions 
expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their 
deliberations in any legal proceedings’. Justice Ouseley explained his decision to find Fraill 
guilty of contempt of court as follows:  
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Fraill is, as she has admitted, guilty of contempt of court because as a juror she communicated 
with Sewart via the internet and conducted an online discussion about the case with her when 
the jury deliberations had not been completed and verdicts had not been returned. During the 
course of the discussion she provided Sewart with information about the state of the jury’s 
deliberations. This conduct contravened the provisions of section 8 of the 1981 Act and 





Additionally, Ouseley J explained his decision that Sewart was guilty of contempt of court as 
follows:  
 
Sewart denied that she was in contempt. She was called to give evidence before us. In the 
course of her evidence she admitted that she knew perfectly well that during the 
communications between her and Fraill, that Fraill was a member of the jury which had 
acquitted her, and which was still considering the last remaining verdicts. The substance of the 
discussions have been set out in paragraphs 16 above. We shall not repeat them. It is clear, 
however, from the texts that she knew that what she was doing was wrong, and one of the 
earlier questions, ‘whats happenin with the other charge??’ asked by her is not open to any 
other interpretation than intentional solicitation of particulars of the jury deliberations. The 
remaining part simply underlined that the subject of the conversation was the deliberations of 
the jury. We had no hesitation in finding that Sewart’s conduct constituted clear contravention 




Justice Ouseley sentenced Fraill to immediate imprisonment for a term of eight months.
349
 
His reasoning for the immediate imprisonment consisted of hoping to ‘ensure the continuing 
integrity of trial by jury’.
350
 He added that  
 
her conduct in visiting the internet repeatedly was directly contrary to her oath as a juror and 
her contact with the acquitted defendant as well as her repeated searches on the internet 
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Justice Ouseley sentenced Sewart to two months imprisonment, suspended for two years.
352
 
A T H Smith and Kate O’Hanlon state that this case will ‘advance the state of the law by the 
crystallisation of underlying principles into a new rule. Jurors who flout a clear judicial 
instruction not to conduct their own research on the net are liable to sanctions that might 




Cheryl Thomas states that because of the online nature of the Facebook communication 
between Fraill and the co-accused, it could be used as evidence of the misconduct. In 
contrast, if they had had the same conversation in person, judicial officers may not have 




Fraill appears to have set a precedent in the United Kingdom that jurors who use social 
media inappropriately could face imprisonment, although the Fraill case was not mentioned 
in the third case in which a juror was imprisoned: Attorney General v Davey & Beard
355
 
(“Davey”). Both the Fraill and Davey cases were heard in the United Kingdom High Court of 
Justice. The Davey judgment was handed down two years after Fraill.  
 
Attorney General v Davey & Beard involved contempt of court charges against Davey and 
Beard. Davey was originally a juror in a paedophilia case.
356
 During the trial he posted the 
following message on Facebook: ‘Woooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury Deciding a 
paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to Fuck up a paedophile & now I’m within the law!’ 
Davey had 400 friends on Facebook and two of his friends posted smiley faces in response to 
the post.
357
 One of Davey’s Facebook friends informed the trial judge. The trial judge 
discharged Davey from the jury.
358
 The President of the Queen’s Bench division later decided 
that Davey ‘did an act calculated to interfere with the proper administration of justice and 
which he intended would interfere with the proper administration of justice’.
359
 This decision 
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was made because Davey knew that he had to be fair to the accused and that he should not 
talk about the trial with anyone other than the jurors. He also knew that he should not discuss 
the case on the Internet.
360




The punishments that the jurors who used social media inappropriately in Fraill
362
 and in 
Davey
363
 received are much more severe than the other punishments given in this area in the 
other jurisdictions. Researchers will likely be interested to follow judicial officers in the 
United Kingdom to see if they continue their strong stance against jurors using social media 
inappropriately or whether they will take a less strict approach in future cases. Fraill and 
Davey were sentenced in the British High Court; judgments in this Court can be overruled in 




Judge Dennis Sweeney, who presided over Dixon (a case in which jurors friended each other 
on Facebook and they also wrote about the case in posts online
365
), states that the majority of 
judges dislike punishing jurors, even when jurors commit misconduct.
366
 He believes that it 
may be acceptable to punish a juror ‘in particularly egregious cases where the directives to 
the juror were clear and there is no reasonable excuse for a violation.’ He adds that this is 
particularly the case where the juror’s misconduct resulted in a mistrial or an application for a 
new trial.
367
 It is submitted that the outcome of a juror’s misconduct (a mistrial or an 
application for a new trial) should not be relevant to whether a juror is punished. A mistrial or 
an application for a new trial may not occur for reasons that are not related to a juror’s 
misconduct, yet a juror may still have purposely violated a judicial officer’s instructions. 
Similarly, Hoffmeister argues that punishing jurors who use social media inappropriately 
should be avoided, if possible, because it could encourage potential jurors to avoid jury 
duty.
368
 Even if jurors are deterred from attending jury duty because a juror was punished, in 
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some cases it still may be important to punish jurors for their misconduct. Zora believes that 
punishing jurors who use social media inappropriately during a trial is critical to deter other 
jurors from possibly doing the same. She adds that punishment should only be given in cases 
where judges gave express instructions not to use social media and then a juror breached 
these instructions and the juror’s actions ‘brings the juror's impartiality into question’.
369
 
Zora’s suggestion about when judicial officers should punish jurors may be too narrow. 
Jurors may act inappropriately in ways that have nothing to do with breaching a judicial 
officer’s express instructions, yet the jurors should still be punished. For example, if a 
judicial officer instructs jurors not to use any outside sources to research a case and a juror 
uses social media to obtain information about the case. The judicial officer did not expressly 
tell the juror not to use social media, but a judicial officer might still punish the juror.  
 
6.7 The Consequences for a Trial After a Judicial Officer Discovers that a Juror Used 
Social Media Inappropriately 
 
There are a range of consequences that can follow when a judge discovers that a juror used 
social media inappropriately. Judges have decided upon different consequences for a trial 
after they discovered that a juror used social media inappropriately. In Haruna v the Queen
370
 
the trial judge dismissed the relevant juror and continued the trial. In Cecil, their Honours 




Judges appear to make decisions on this issue by examining the circumstances of each 
individual case.
372
 If a judge learns that a juror has used social media inappropriately and the 
trial has not yet concluded, he or she can declare a mistrial or continue the trial. If the trial 
has already concluded when a judge learns that a juror has used social media inappropriately, 
the prosecutor or the accused may apply for an appeal on the grounds of the juror’s 
misconduct. An appeal judge can change the original verdict or let the verdict stand.  
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6.7.1 Mistrial or Continue the Trial 
 
If a judge believes that a juror used social media inappropriately, he or she can decide that a 
mistrial occurred.
373
 A mistrial occurs when a judge stops a trial before it is finished and 
restarts the trial at a later time.
374
 In Moncton, Canada, Judge George Rideout of the Court of 
Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick declared a mistrial after he learned that a juror in Fred 
Prosser’s murder trial was a member of a Facebook group that was anti-Prosser. The juror 
also made comments in the group. Judge Rideout was concerned that the juror’s bias against 
Prosser might have influenced other jurors.
375
 Judge Rideout learned about the juror’s 
Facebook bias just before the prosecution was going to open its case.
376
 A mistrial should 
only be declared as a last resort due to the resources that are wasted. In this case, it was clear 
that the juror was biased against the accused. In fact, this case could be one of the clearest 
examples of an appearance of bias in a juror’s social media post. The juror’s comments on 
Facebook should not be interpreted to mean that the rest of the jury was biased against the 
accused or that the juror even spoke to her fellow jurors about her bias. 
 
6.7.2 Permit an Appeal or Let the Verdict Stand 
 
If a judge learns only after the trial has concluded that a juror has used social media 
inappropriately, it is possible that an appeal judge may grant an appeal
377
 or else let the 
verdict stand. In the cases where a judge decides to grant an appeal because a juror used 
social media inappropriately, the juror’s inappropriate social media use is usually not the sole 
cause of the decision to grant a new trial. For example, in Dimas-Martinez v Arkansas,
378
 
Associate Justice Donald Corbin granted the appellant a new trial because one juror slept 
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As previously stated, a new trial was also requested, but denied, in Maryland v Dixon. After 
the accused was convicted Dixon’s lawyers argued that there should be a new trial in the 
matter because (a) jurors used social media inappropriately, and (b) there were problems with 




6.7.3 The Trial Judge’s Decision on how to Deal with the Juror’s Inappropriate 
Behaviour Is the Reason for the Appeal 
 
A judicial officer’s decision in first instance about how to deal with a juror’s inappropriate 
behaviour on social media can be the sole reason that a judge grants an appeal. In Tennessee v 
Smith, the appellant had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.
381
 During 
the trial at first instance, a juror used Facebook to contact a witness who testified at the trial 
and posted that the witness ‘did a great job’ at court. The accused’s lawyer requested that he 
have permission to question the relevant juror, but the trial judge denied the request. The 
appellant’s lawyer also requested a new trial and alleged that the appellant did not receive a 
fair trial, but his request was denied.
382
 On appeal, their Honours decided that the trial judge 
had made a mistake because he did not order a hearing in open court with the relevant juror to 
learn more about the juror’s social media posts.
383
 As a result, on appeal the original 




6.7.4 An Accused May Need to Show More than Mere Social Media Use 
 
When a party seeks an appeal because a juror has used social media inappropriately, they 
may need to show that the juror was biased in addition to simply showing that the juror used 
social media inappropriately. In McGaha v Kentucky,
385
 the appellant appealed the conviction 
of murder against him. One of the grounds of appeal was that one of the jurors did not inform 
the court that she was a Facebook friend of the wife of the victim.
386
 Justice Daniel Venters 
delivered an opinion on behalf of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. He stated that when a 
juror is Facebook friends with someone involved in a trial, it cannot be automatically 
                                                             
380 Maryland v Dixon (Circuit Court, Baltimore City, Md, No 109210015, 21 December 2009) 16.  
381
 Tennessee v Smith (Tenn, No M2010-01384-SC-R11-CD, 10 September 2013) 5.  
382
 Ibid 4 - 5.  
383
 Ibid 10.   
384
 Ibid 13 - 14.  
385
 (Ky, No 2012-SC-000155-MR, 20 June 2013) 1.  
386 McGaha v Kentucky, (Ky, No 2012-SC-000155-MR, 20 June 2013) 1. 
228 
 
presumed that a juror is biased.
387
 The appellant was required to provide evidence to 
substantiate that the juror was biased.
388
 The appellant failed on this ground to convince the 




6.7.5 The Media Informs the Public of the Juror’s Inappropriate Use of Social Media 
 
It is possible that if a juror uses social media inappropriately, the media will inform the 
public. The judge will then have to consider how the relevant juror acted after the news of the 
inappropriate use of social media became public knowledge. In United States v Fumo, 
Pennsylvanian Senator Vincent J Fumo was convicted of 137 out of 139 charges of making 
misleading statements about job classification reports and contracts. A co-accused was also 
convicted.
390
 Fumo’s solicitors appealed against his convictions on various grounds. One of 
these grounds was that the trial judge had erred in failing to remove Eric Wuest from the 
jury.
391
 During jury deliberations, Wuest wrote about the trial on Facebook, Twitter, his 
website and his blogs.
392
 Wuest then watched a news report on television which stated that a 
juror in Fumo had posted material about the case online.
393
 Wuest then deleted his online 
posts.
394
 The accused requested that the judicial officer remove Wuest from the jury.
395
 The 
Court then questioned Wuest about his social media use during the trial,
396
 and the judicial 




The appeal judge believed that Wuest watching the single television report was an accident 
which lacked a ‘prejudicial effect on the trial,’ because it was about Wuest’s social media 
posts and not the particulars of the case itself.
398
 Wuest also said that he became very alarmed 
when he heard that the media knew about his posts.
399
 Consequently, he deleted his posts 
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 The Judge found that Wuest deleting his posts was ‘harmless’ behaviour.
401
 The 
appeal judge rejected the accused’s demand for a new trial,
402
 and stated that ‘Wuest was a 




The author is hesitant to agree with the trial judge that Wuest was ‘very conscientious of his 
duties’ given that he made general comments about the trial on social media. She is also 
hesitant to agree that Wuest deleting his posts right after he saw himself on the news was 
‘harmless’ behaviour. 
 
6.7.6 Evidence Against the Accused Is Very Strong 
 
It is possible that judges will consider the evidence against an accused to be so strong that a 
juror’s inappropriate use of social media in the trial is irrelevant. Commonwealth v Werner is 
a third case in which a new trial was requested, but was denied.
404
 In that case, a jury 
convicted the accused of 12 counts of larceny in excess of $250. At first instance, the trial 
judge instructed jurors not to chat about the case; however, she did not specifically instruct 
them not to use social media.
405
 After the accused’s conviction, her lawyers reviewed the 
Facebook posts of various jurors in the trial. The lawyers found that two jurors had posted 




As a result of the posts, the accused’s lawyers filed a motion requesting a new trial. They also 
attempted to subpoena the jurors’ Facebook posts and messages pertaining to their jury 
service. The trial judge denied the accused a new trial.
407
 On appeal, the appeal judges 
examined the evidence against the appellant. The evidence against the appellant was 
extremely strong, so even if an ‘extraneous influence’ had existed, the prosecution could still 
likely have proved that there had been no prejudice to the accused. The decision of the Judge 
at first instance was not overturned.
408
 If evidence against an accused is ‘extremely strong’, to 
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the extent that jurors’ actions are irrelevant, then one could argue that juries are irrelevant in 
the first place.  
 
6.7.7 Biased Comments on Social Media Use by Third Parties May not Be Sufficient for 
the Offender to Receive a New Trial 
 
Even if jurors write about a matter on social media and their friends write biased comments 
underneath, it is still possible that the accused will not receive a new trial. The lawyers for 
Michael Roseboro in Pennsylvania requested a new trial, but were denied.
409
 Roseboro’s trial 
was for the first degree murder of his wife. The Judge in the action instructed the jurors 





Two jurors in the case, Nick Keene and Michael Hecker, wrote various posts on Facebook 
while they served as jurors. Keene wrote ‘yea it blows three (expletive) weeks and when I'm 
done I have two weeks until school starts.’ Hecker wrote ‘hoping this will be the last week of 
court,’ on his Facebook page prior to the final week of the trial commencing. Three people 
commented on Hecker’s post. Their comments were: 
 
1. ‘ha’; 
2. ‘fry him’; and 
3. ‘why were you in court?’411 
 
Hecker responded on his Facebook page to the comments by writing ‘Im a juror on a 1
st
 
degree murder trial…have been for the last 3 weeks unfortunately. I cant wait till I can share 
my thoughts on it’. One of Hecker’s friends on Facebook later wrote ‘You'll have to stop in at 
CNH and share….’ After the prosecution concluded its case, Hecker posted on his Facebook 
wall ‘Your honor, the Commonwealth rests. THANK GOD’. 
 
                                                             
409
 Tom Murse, ‘Roseboro Juror’s Facebook Postings Pose Problems’, Intelligencer Journal Lancaster New Era 
(online), 4 August 2009 <http://articles.lancasteronline.com/local/4/240616#>.  
410
 Tom Murse, ‘Roseboro Juror’s Facebook Postings Pose Problems’, Intelligencer Journal Lancaster New Era 
(online), 4 August 2009 <http://articles.lancasteronline.com/local/4/240616#>.  The author notes that Murse 
did not state whether the Judge instructed the jurors against using social media inappropriately. 
411 Ibid.    
231 
 
Journalists who searched for the jurors’ contact information found the jurors’ Facebook posts. 
They provided copies of the posts to the relevant judges in the trial. The jurors then delivered 
a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.
412
 The Judge did not take any action when he 




The accused’s solicitors then requested a new trial as a result of the jurors’ Facebook posts; 
however, the Judge denied this request. One of the judges stated that the Facebook posts were 
‘regrettable and contrary to the Court’s instructions’ but ‘woefully insufficient to taint the 
unanimous verdict of the jury’. The accused’s solicitors appealed his conviction. They also 
appealed on a second ground of the amount of weight that the jury gave to the evidence that a 




The other remarks on Hecker’s Facebook page and the remark on Keene’s Facebook page 
appear fairly general and unrelated to the verdict in the case. The Roseboro case is another 
case which demonstrates that the unanimity of a jury verdict appears relevant to whether a 
judge will take action when a juror uses social media inappropriately during a trial.  
 
6.7.8 Juror Uses Social Media Inappropriately After the Verdict Is Delivered 
 
If jurors use social media inappropriately after a verdict is delivered, then it should not be a 
successful ground for appeal. In Wilgus v Sirius Inc,
 415
 a new trial was requested but was 
denied. In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendant for personal injury and wrongful death. 
The jury found for the defence. Four days after the jury delivered its verdict, one of the jurors 
emailed the plaintiff’s solicitors a message stating that they had seen photographs on the 
plaintiff’s social media pages a few days after the trial that ‘advocated the use of mushrooms 




The Judge agreed that the relevant juror did not see the plaintiff’s Facebook pages during the 
trial or the jury’s deliberations. The Judge decided that the juror did not commit juror 
                                                             
412
 Ibid.    
413
 Janet Kelly, ‘Roseboro Appeal Questions 2 “Errors”’, Intelligencer Journal Lancaster New Era (online), 6 
March 2011 <http://lancasteronline.com/article/local/249519_Roseboro-appeal-questions-2--errors-.html>.  
414
 Ibid.   
415
 Wilgus and Ors v F/V Sirius Inc., 665 F Supp 2d 23, 2 (Me D, 2009).  
416 Ibid.  
232 
 
misconduct and rejected the plaintiff’s application for a new trial.
417
 It makes sense that the 
Judge denied the plaintiff’s application for a new trial because the juror did not see any 
potentially prejudicial material before the jury delivered a verdict. 
 
6.7.9 A Juror’s Attempt to Use Social Media Inappropriately Is a Problem, even if a 
Juror Does Not Actually Do Anything Inappropriate 
 
Judicial officers may still be concerned if jurors attempt to use social media inappropriately 
during a trial, even if they do not actually make any inappropriate comments or see any 
inappropriate material. West Virginia v Cecil
418
 involved a juror who used social media 
inappropriately, which contributed to the Judge’s decision to hold a new trial. In this case, the 
appellant was tried and convicted of one count of sexual abuse in the first degree and two 
counts of sexual abuse by a custodian. The appellant appealed his convictions on various 





The appellant’s counsel submitted that the misconduct occurred when two of the jurors tried 
to view the MySpace account of one of the victims in the trial. The public’s ability to access 
the victim’s MySpace website was removed prior to the trial; consequently, the jurors were 
not able to view it. One of the jurors talked about the case with her daughter who attended 
school with one of the victims. One of the jurors also advised other jurors that the law 




The Judge stated that the jurors’ attempts to view the MySpace profile ‘constitutes 
misconduct extrinsic to the jury’s deliberative process’. However, the Judge stated that if this 
were the only misconduct that had occurred, it would not be sufficiently prejudicial to modify 
the verdict.
421
 The Judge later stated that even though the jurors did not actually see the 
victim’s MySpace website,  
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the mere fact that members of a jury in a serious felony case conducted any extrajudicial 
investigation on their own is gross juror misconduct which simply cannot be permitted. Without 





The Judge added that the greater concern was the juror who incorrectly advised other jurors 
about the legal standard to apply to the victim’s testimony.
423
 The Judge decided that the 
totality of the juror misconduct had resulted in a trial that was unfair to the accused. The 
accused’s convictions were vacated and a new trial was held.
424
 This case shows that concern 
about jurors using social media can arise because of a mere attempt to use social media, 
regardless of whether that attempt was successful. 
 
6.8 Key Recommendations of this Chapter 
 
The most important measures that the author recommends to prevent jurors from using social 
media inappropriately are: providing jury instructions, requiring jurors to sign written oaths, 
training jurors and displaying relevant posters and other visual materials in the jury room. All 
four of these preventative measures are practical and require few resources. They are all low-
interference solutions, so jurors may be less likely to resent them. Courts should consider 
implementing these preventative methods as soon as possible, rather than wait until jurors’ 
use of social media becomes a frequent problem. It is better for courts to use a combination of 
methods, as opposed to just one, because different preventative methods may be more 
effective for different jurors.  
 
In order to assist courts in discovering when jurors have used social media inappropriately, it 
is recommended that the courts (1) create new pages on their websites that provide 
information to jurors about what they should do in the event that they learn that a juror has 
used social media inappropriately, and (2) create an email address that jurors may use if they 
want to report other jurors who have used social media inappropriately. Neither of these 
measures should cost the courts considerable resources, and they may be of significant help 
to courts in revealing inappropriate social media use.  
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Sharon Nelson, John Simek and Jason Foltin state that ‘this is the world in which we live, and 
we take our jurors as we find them’.
425
 Should we have to? The introduction to this chapter 
discussed Fraill;
426
 should the judge in that case been required to take Fraill as she was 
found?  
 
This chapter has dealt with the studies and cases in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States to date on this issue. These studies and cases demonstrate that some 
jurors are using social media inappropriately and causing problems for courts in the 
jurisdictions examined; for example, courts may be required to expend resources 
investigating jurors’ actions.  
 
Throughout the history of the jury, there have been significant changes, and people have 
predicted before that these changes would end the use of juries. Those predictions were 
wrong. The jury system has changed and endured the relevant changes, so it appears probable 
that the jury system will also be able to survive and adapt to the existence of social media.
427
 
It is crucial that Australian courts actively address the issues mentioned in this chapter, 
because of the importance of what is at stake: an accused’s right to a fair trial.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Key Overall Recommendations 
 
In this thesis, the author has tried to avoid simply criticising procedures and court rules, 
instead attempting to inform readers about the actions that courts and legal regulators in four 
relevant jurisdictions have taken to adapt to social media. The relevant jurisdictions are: (1) 
Australia; (2) Canada; (3) the United Kingdom; and (4) the United States. The author has also 
made recommendations for Australian courts, journalists, lawyers and legal regulators to 
consider.  
 
This chapter will summarise the main points of each previous chapter, then go on to discuss 
general similarities among the issues affecting the stakeholders that this thesis has discussed. 
These stakeholders are the courts, lawyers, journalists and the public. It will then discuss the 
key findings and main recommendations of this thesis, concluding by making 
recommendations for future research in the area of social media and the courts, along with 
some final points.  
 
7.1 Summary of Each Chapter of this Thesis 
 
Chapter One of this thesis provided background information about social media and 
explained important terms: (1) confidence in the courts and the judiciary, (2) confidence in 
the legal profession, (3) providing a fair trial to an accused, and (4) open justice. 
 
Chapter Two examined the issue of judges using social media privately and its potential 
impact upon the public’s confidence in the courts and the judiciary. It considered three 
specific issues: (1) whether judges should be discouraged from using social media privately, 
(2) whether they should be prevented from being ‘friends’ on social media with lawyers who 
may appear before them, and (3) judges participating in ex parte communication about cases 
before them. 
 
Chapter Three discussed the benefits and challenges that lawyers who use social media can 
experience. If lawyers face ethical challenges when they use social media, it can lower the 
public’s confidence in the courts and the legal profession. This chapter discussed three ethical 
issues that lawyers can face if they use social media: (1) unintended or faulty retainers, (2) 
challenges involving their duty to the court, and (3) their duty of confidentiality. The author 
236 
 
drafted a set of proposed ethical guidelines for lawyers regarding their social media use. The 
proposed ethical guidelines are in Appendix A. 
 
In Chapter Four the author discussed the results of her survey on courts’ social media use. Of 
23 contacted, 15 courts completed the survey. When courts engage with the public by using 
social media, it can increase the public’s confidence in the courts. Chapter Four examined the 
benefits that courts can receive when they use social media. It also discussed: (1) the reasons 
why some courts do not use social media, (2) the information that courts can post on social 
media, (3) which types of social media courts should use, (4) which courts should be 
responsible for the courts’ social media accounts, and (5) how courts can start using social 
media. 
 
Chapter Five considered whether journalists should be able to use social media in the 
courtroom. The chapter discussed the relationship between courts and the media and how 
social media has changed the media industry. It also mentioned how judicial officers have 
dealt with the presence of video cameras in the courtroom. It examined which courts 
currently permit journalists to use social media in the courtroom and which do not. It 
discussed safeguards that judicial officers can employ if they permit journalists to use social 
media in the courtroom and alternatives to permitting journalists to use social media in the 
courtroom. It was argued that journalists should be able to use social media in the courtroom 
as an extension of the open justice principle. Appendix E of this thesis contains a policy on 
this issue for courts to consider using. 
 
Chapter Six examined cases where jurors use social media inappropriately and how this can 
result in an unfair trial for an accused. It considered the reasons why jurors who use social 
media inappropriately can be a problem, reasons why jurors use social media, and potential 
methods to prevent jurors from using social media inappropriately. It posed the question of 
how to assist courts to discover inappropriate social media use by jurors and also discussed 
the consequences for jurors who have behaved inappropriately.  
 
7.2 Issues Common to the Majority of Stakeholders 
 




There appears to be a lack of knowledge about how to use social media and about its 
accompanying dangers among many of the stakeholders discussed in this thesis. Additionally, 
courts and legal regulators across Australia do not use standardised guidelines or procedures 
to address the ethical implications of social media. Courts and legal regulators could benefit 
from standardisation (e.g., using the same ethical guidelines about social media use for all 
Australian lawyers). If standardisation occurs, the relevant stakeholders in this area (judicial 
officers, lawyers, journalists, courts and jurors) can benefit from other people’s knowledge. 
The relevant stakeholders nationwide will also have access to ethical guidelines that concern 
their social media use. It is admitted that it may be time consuming for legal regulators 
nationwide to agree on single sets of ethical guidelines. 
 
7.2.2 Regulators in the United States Are Taking the Lead 
 
Inappropriate use of social media by the relevant stakeholders (e.g., judges and lawyers) has 
occurred more frequently in the United States than in the other countries discussed in this 
thesis. It comes as no surprise, then, that legal regulators in the United States are taking a lead 
on creating ethical guidelines for social media use. For example, several ethical bodies in the 
United States have released ethical guidelines about the judiciary using social media, yet no 
ethical bodies in Australia have released guidelines about the judiciary using social media. 
Since American legal regulators have taken a lead on this issue, Australian legal regulators 
can consider the American ethical guidelines. They can also examine whether Americans 
have experienced problems following the guidelines.  
 
7.2.3 Few Incidents in Australia of Inappropriate Social Media Use by the Relevant 
Stakeholders Have Occurred 
 
To date, there have been few publicly reported incidents of inappropriate social media use by 
the Australian stakeholders discussed in this thesis. The recommendations made in this thesis 
can help to lessen the chances that such inappropriate social media use will occur in the 
future. It is submitted that it is better to implement preventative measures now than to wait 
for inappropriate uses of social media to occur. Increasing use of social media by Australians 
could increase the chances that the relevant Australian stakeholders will use social media 




7.2.4 The Instantaneous Nature of Social Media Can Cause Problems 
 
The ability to post information on social media instantly can have a negative impact on all 
stakeholders discussed. All of these stakeholders can benefit from taking a cautious approach 
to social media.  
 
7.2.5 Grounds for Appeal 
 
It is possible that inappropriate use of social media by the stakeholders mentioned could form 
the grounds for an appeal by a party. While this has only happened in Australia once to date,
1
 
it has happened in other jurisdictions several times and consumes a considerable amount of 
courts’ resources. It could also lower the public’s confidence in the courts. 
 
7.3 Key Findings 
 
7.3.1 There Is a Lack of Ethical Guidelines on Social Media for Australian Judges and 
Lawyers 
 
The Guide to Judicial Conduct is the primary document in Australia containing information 
about the community’s expectations of judges.
2
 It does not currently discuss social media. 
Judicial officers may face many different types of ethical challenges when they use social 
media, such as whether they should ‘friend’ lawyers who appear before them.  
 
In Australia, legal regulatory bodies in Victoria,
3





created guidelines for lawyers about social media use. The law societies of the other 
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Australian States and Territories have not released guidelines on this topic to date. As a 
result, some Australian lawyers may find it difficult to find answers to ethical challenges that 
they face involving social media.  
 
7.3.2 Few Australian Courts Use Social Media 
 
In Australia, staff of the Family Court, the Supreme Court, the County Court and 
Magistrates’ Court in Victoria, and the Supreme Court of New South Wales use social media 
to engage the public. Four Australian courts out of nine surveyed by the author use social 
media.
6
 The survey found that the main reasons why courts do not use social media are a lack 
of resources or a lack of conviction that they will experience benefits from doing so.  
 
7.3.3 There Are No Uniform Guidelines for Australian Journalists on Social Media Use 
in the Courtroom 
 
There is currently legislation in New South Wales
7
 and South Australia
8
 that permits 
journalists to use social media in the courtroom. The Supreme Court of Victoria
9
 also has a 
formal policy that permits journalists to use social media in the courtroom. The courts in the 
other states and territories do not have any such legislation or formal policy. The public in 
those States and Territories cannot receive the benefits that flow from journalists using social 
media in the courtroom. 
 
7.3.4 Inappropriate Social Media Use by Jurors Can Have Many Different 
Repercussions 
 
If jurors use social media inappropriately, it can affect the accused: the accused may not 
receive a fair trial because the juror was exposed to information about the trial to which the 
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rules of evidence were not applied.
10
 If jurors use social media inappropriately during a trial, 
a judicial officer may have to investigate the matter. He or she will have to decide how to 
deal with the relevant juror and whether to let the trial continue or declare a mistrial. If he or 
she declares a mistrial, this can affect many people involved in the trial, such as the victim, 
the other jurors and the lawyers. If the judicial officer learns about the juror’s inappropriate 
use of social media after a trial finishes, then an appeal judge may need to decide whether or 
not to grant an appeal. This can have an additional impact on the accused, the victim and the 
lawyers in the trial. The accused’s future may be uncertain and the accused may have to 
endure another trial. The victim may need to participate in this additional trial, which may be 
stressful to him or her, while the lawyers may need to spend time preparing for and appearing 
at another trial.  
 
7.4 Key Recommendations 
 
7.4.1 Modify the Guide to Address Social Media Use 
 
The Guide to Judicial Conduct should be modified to discuss social media use. This can help 
to maintain the public’s confidence in the judiciary; Judge Judith Gibson of the New South 
Wales District Court agrees with this view.
11
 The Australian judiciary may currently be 
uncertain about their ethical obligations when they use social media. If the Guide is modified 
to address questions relating to social media, it may be of particular assistance to judges 
working in isolated parts of Australia who may not be able to consult other judges. Some 
judges may not have the skills to know about the potential problems that they can create if 
they use social media. If the Guide is amended to discuss social media, it could increase the 
courts’ transparency and accountability; it may also increase the public’s confidence in the 
judiciary. 
 
7.4.2 Create Standardised National Guidelines on Lawyers’ Social Media Use 
 
This thesis has argued that standardised national guidelines on lawyers’ social media use are 
necessary to try to prevent lawyers from using social media inappropriately. Legal regulators 
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could benefit from using the draft guidelines found in Appendix A of this thesis or parts 
thereof. The staff of the bar associations who participated in the International Bar 
Association’s survey
12
 and Mark, Gordon and Shackel of the New South Wales Office of the 
Legal Commissioner
13
 support the view that ethical guidelines on social media use are 
necessary for lawyers. A standardised set of guidelines makes sense because of the 
profession’s current stance towards uniformity, and could signify to lawyers the importance 
of this issue. More lawyers nationally may read uniform national guidelines than if only a few 
states have their own set of guidelines. National guidelines on lawyers’ social media use 
could also increase the public’s confidence in the legal profession.  
 
7.4.3 More Australian Courts Should Use Twitter 
 
Australian courts that do not use social media should think about creating a Twitter account 
to increase public contact with and confidence in the judiciary and the courts.
14
 Some of the 
Australian courts that use social media have experienced benefits from doing so.
15
 A presence 
on Twitter would likely take the smallest amount of resources to maintain out of the many 
different kinds of social media. If Australian courts use Twitter, they can directly 
communicate with people who they may not have had opportunities to reach otherwise.
16
 
They can also provide information to the public immediately, or when they choose to.
17
 They 
may be able to assist self-represented litigants in new ways.
18
 
                                                             
12 International Bar Association, The Impact of Online Social Networking on the Legal Profession and Practice 
(February 2012) 30 
<http://www.ibanet.org/Committees/Divisions/Legal_Practice/Impact_of_OSN_on_LegalPractice/Impact_of_
OSN_Home.aspx>. 
13 Steve Mark, Tahlia Gordon and Rita Shackel, ‘Regulation of Legal Services in the E-World: A Need to Short 
Circuit Hot Spots in Ethics and Novel Practices?’ (Working Paper Part 1, Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner, October 2011) 
<http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/regulation_of_legal-services_ working _ 
paper_oct2011_part1.pdf>. 
14 Alysia Blackham and George Williams, ‘Australian Courts and Social Media’ (2013) 38(3) Alternative Law 
Journal 170, 171. 
15 For example, the Family Court of Australia, the Victoria Magistrates’ Court and the Victoria Supreme Court.  
16
 Laura Click, From Sketch Pads to Smart Phones: How Social Media Has Changed Coverage of the Judiciary 
(2011) National Center for State Courts, 48 
<http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctmedia/id/30>. 
17 Patricia Seguin, The Use of Social Media in Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County (2011) Superior 
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7.4.4 Australian Courts Should Consider Releasing a Policy that Permits Journalists to 
Use Social Media in the Majority of Courtrooms 
 
This thesis has recommended that Australian courts consider releasing a formal policy that 
permits journalists to use social media in the courtroom, or use part of the policy found in 
Appendix E of this thesis. A model policy can provide Australian courts with clarity on 
whether social media may be used in the courtroom and whether there are any limitations on 
use. Such a policy can also help courts to preserve the open justice principle, and allow 
journalists and the public to experience the many benefits of using social media discussed in 
this thesis. Some examples of these benefits are that it can make it easier for the public to 
scrutinise the courts and the judiciary,
19
 decreasing the likelihood that people in the 
courtroom will commit perjury.
20
 It can also provide information to members of the public 




7.4.5 Australian Courts Use Four Key Preventative Measures for Jurors’ Social Media 
Use 
 
This thesis has recommended that the four best preventative measures for courts to 
implement in order to decrease the chances that jurors will use social media are: (1) judges 
giving directions to jurors, (2) courts training jurors not to use social media, (3) jurors signing 
an oath not to use social media, and (4) courts displaying posters that tell jurors not to use 
social media. These recommendations are all practical, low-interference solutions that should 
not cost too much time or money.  
 
One of the most important preventative measures is that judicial officers give directions to all 
jurors, witnesses and parties in a trial not to use social media in the courtroom. The 
instructions should be drafted (1) using language that laypeople can understand, (2) to include 
examples of social media, and (3) to contain examples of inappropriate social media use. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
19
 David Banks, ‘Tweeting in Court: Why Reporters Must Be Given Guidelines’, The Guardian (online), 15 
December 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/dec/15/tweeting-court-reporters-julian-assange>. 
20
 Jacob E Dean, ‘To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Twitter, “Broadcasting,” and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
53’ (2010) 79(2) University of Cincinnati Law Review 769, 787. 
21




Providing instructions to jurors makes sense because judges have consistently used 
instructions to jurors as a method of preventing jurors from acting inappropriately in the 
past.
22
 This strategy also applies the presumption that jurors will follow judges’ 
instructions.
23
 Research has found that instructions are a major reason why jurors do not use 
social media inappropriately during trials.
24
 Training jurors about social media use is also 





Jurors should also sign an oath that states that they will not use social media inappropriately 
during a trial. Signing an oath could increase the jurors’ awareness of the requirement not to 
use social media during a trial.
26
 They may also take the instructions more seriously and be 
more likely to uphold them.  
 
Finally, posters and other visual materials should be placed in the jury room to advise jurors 
against using social media inappropriately during a trial. Bartels and Lee support this idea.
27
  
Posters may be a useful reminder to the jurors, and may be of particular use to jurors who 
learn visually or who did not pay attention to a judge’s oral instructions. This would be a low-
cost method of informing jurors not to use social media inappropriately. Since so many 
Australian trials involve juries
28
 and so much money is spent on juries in Australia,
29
 it is in 
courts’ interest to implement the preventative measures discussed. 
 




                                                             
22 Amy St Eve J and Michael Zuckerman, ‘Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media’ (2012) 11(1) 
Duke Law & Technology Review 1, 25.  
23 Ibid.  
24
 Ibid 21.  




 Thaddeus Hoffmeister, ‘Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age’ (2012) 83(2) 
University of Colorado Law Review 409, 457. 
27
 Lorana Bartels and Jessica Lee, ‘Jurors Using Social Media in our Courts: Challenges and Responses’ (2013) 
23(1) Journal of Judicial Administration 35, 49. 
28




There is room for future research in this area using surveys. For example, researchers could 
survey Australian judges and lawyers about their social media use, asking whether the 
Australian judges and lawyers have experienced challenging ethical issues in connection with 
their social media use. Researchers could also survey citizen journalists who write about the 
courts, asking them about their knowledge of suppression orders and general court etiquette. 
Researchers could also give surveys to staff of the law societies who have not yet released 
guidelines for lawyers’ social media use. Australian researchers could also undertake similar 
research in the United States, where courts are very knowledgeable about social media.  
 
Researchers could draft and post a survey on the Supreme Court of Victoria’s Twitter page, 
which has the most followers of all Australian courts’ Twitter pages at the time of writing this 
thesis. The survey could ask people whether they feel that they better understand the Court 
because they used the Court’s Twitter page. It could also ask whether people have more 
confidence in the Court or know more about the Court as a result of using the Court’s Twitter 
page. The survey could also ask whether the people surveyed use the Court’s Twitter page to 
keep informed of breaking news.  
 
7.5.2 General Research 
 
Useful research could be conducted to examine the actions that courts are taking to adapt to 
social media in common law jurisdictions other than the four considered in this thesis. It 
could also examine other social media (e.g. Flixster, Google+ and Foursquare) than the core 
social networks that this thesis has discussed.  
 
Research could also be helpful in areas including judges’ clerks and associates’ social media 
use,
30
 how social media affects law students
31
 and how social media can specifically affect 
lawyers who have different specialties.
32
 Research would be useful about what should occur 
                                                             
30 See, eg, Kate Crowley, ‘Why Can’t We Be Friends? A Judicial Clerk’s Guide to Social Networking’ [2010–2011] 
14 Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest 641.   
31
 See, eg, Tal Harari, ‘Facebook Frenzy Around the World: the Different Implications Facebook Has on Law 
Students, Lawyers and Judges’ (2012) 19(1) ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 1, 5. 
32
 For example, see a discussion about how social media impacts bankruptcy lawyers in Mark Duedall et al, 
‘The Ethics Panel: Ethics 2.0 - The Ethical Challenges and Pitfalls Web 2.0 Presents to Bankruptcy Attorneys’ 
(2010) 26(2) The Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 245. 
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if a lawyer who has posted information on social media on behalf of a firm leaves the firm: 




7.5.3 Specific Research 
 
There are several potential areas for specific future research on this issue; some examples are 
given below. One such area could be the use of social media by judges as an educational tool. 
Researchers might also look at issues pertaining to using social media as identification 
evidence in criminal trials.
34
 It could be investigated whether limitations ought to be placed 
on the judiciary having LinkedIn profiles or whether judges should be prevented from liking 
things such as movies or books on Facebook. 
 
Research into the effects of publicising that jurors are punished for using social media 
inappropriately could be helpful. Given that the Fraill case involved sentencing a juror to the 
harshest punishment to date for using social media inappropriately — eight months 
imprisonment
35
 — the research could potentially focus on the effect that publicising this case 
had on the British people. It may be that the deterrent effect is overstated. Research could be 
conducted on whether judge-only trials should be used in more cases to avoid the risk that 




Research could also be conducted into consequences if a client posts a link to their social 





Research could also examine whether it is possible to design a social media application to 
help courts to censor negative comments that the public make on social media. The 
                                                             
33 Michael H Rubin, ‘The Social Media Thicket for Mississippi Lawyers: Surviving and Thriving in an Ethical 
Tangled Web’ (2012) 31(2) Mississippi College Law Review 281, 296. 
34 See, eg, Strauss v Police [2013] SASC 3 (18 January 2013).  
35
 Attorney General v Fraill [2011] EWHC 1629 (Admin) (16 June 2011) [57] (Ouseley J).  
36
 Elizabeth Greene and Jodie O’Leary, ‘Ensuring a Fair Trial for an Accused in a Digital Era: Lessons for 
Australia’ in Patrick Keyzer, Jane Johnston and Mark Pearson (eds), The Courts and the Media (Halstead Press, 
2007) 101, 118.  
37
 See, eg, Thomas Spahn, ‘The Rise of Facebook Creates Ethics Issues for Lawyers and Judges’ (2011) 21(3) 
Experience 35, 35. 
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repercussions of the High Court posting audio and visual recordings of their court 






Another possibility for future work in this area is to hold a conference on the topic of social 
media and the courts. The conference could include members of the courts, lawyers and 
academics from Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.
39
 At the 
conference, attendees could discuss best practices in the area of social media and ethics for 
the relevant stakeholders.  
 
7.6 Final Words 
 
The Chief Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court, Tom Bathurst, states:  
 
One thing is for sure. We are only just beginning to come to terms with and identify the scope 
of social media’s potential influence, and whether it is capable of fundamentally altering the 




Social media can influence courts and legal regulators to alter court procedures and court 
rules, which are arguably important ‘basic structures of our society’.  
 
This thesis began with a comparison of Ned Kelly’s trial to Lloyd Rayney’s. The nature of 
trials and the ways in which people communicate about trials have changed dramatically in 
the period between the two, and trials and communication about them will continue to change 
in the future. It is to be hoped that courts, legal regulators and academics will work together 
as time passes to try to ensure that they embrace fundamental legal principles while this 
change occurs. 
                                                             
38 AAP, ‘High Court Footage to Go Online’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 13 September 2013  
<http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/high-court-footage-to-go-online-20130913-2tout.html>. 
39
 The Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration held a conference on 14–15 June 2013 that brought 
together Australian academics, public court information officers and some members of the judiciary about 
social media and the courts. The author presented parts of this thesis at the conference.  
40
 Chief Justice Tom Bathurst, ‘Social Media: the End of Civilization?’ (Speech delivered at the University of 









Model Ethical Guidelines for Australian Lawyers on Social Media Use 
 
Australian lawyers increasingly use social media
2
 for many different purposes. Some use it to 
advertise their business and to network;
3
 others use it to recruit new staff;
4
 others use it to 
educate the public and other lawyers.
5
 It is important that lawyers be aware of the ethical 
issues that they may face when they use social media. Several lawyers in the United States 
have faced ethical challenges as a result of using social media. For example, a prosecutor in 
Florida posted updates about an assault trial on Facebook, based on the Gilligan’s Island 




These ethical guidelines should be read together with legislation, court rules, the common 
law and professional conduct rules. The contents of these guidelines are not binding upon 
lawyers.
7
 It is important to note that if lawyers act unethically while using social media, this 
can decrease the public’s confidence in the legal profession and the courts. Lawyers may also 
breach professional conduct rules. These guidelines are not an exhaustive list of all of the 
ethical challenges that Australian lawyers may face when they use social media, and they 
should be updated regularly to ensure that they remain as relevant as possible.  
 
                                                             
1 The author notes that this appendix is almost identical to Chapter Three of this thesis. The author intends for 
Appendix A to be used by legal regulators and lawyers easily — they can simply read Appendix A as opposed to 
reading the entirety of Chapter Three of this thesis.  
2 Mark, Steve Mark, ‘New Technologies — Social Networking Sites’ (February 2011) Without Prejudice: The 
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner 
<http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/wp_issue53_feb11.pdf> 
3 The Law Society, ‘Social Media’ (Practice Note, The Law Society, 20 December 2011), [1.2] 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/social-media/>. 
4 Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (NSW), ‘A Guide on Practice Issues: Social Media’ (Practice 
Guidelines, May 2013) 
<http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/social_media_practice_guideline_may2013.
pdf>.  
5 Dustin B Benham, ‘Symposium, The Internet and the Law: The State Bar of Texas Provides New Guidelines to 
Attorneys Regarding the Proper Use of Social Media and Blogs for Advertising Purposes’ (2010) 52 Advocate 
13, 16. 
6
 Kathryn K Van Namen, ‘Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips — Prosecutors and Social Media: an Analysis of the 
Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in the Prosecution Function’ (2012) 81(3) Mississippi Law 
Journal 549, 568. 





The word ‘retainer’ describes a contract between a lawyer and a client for the lawyer to 
provide legal services. If a retainer exists, then the lawyer owes fiduciary duties to the client. 
This includes the duty of confidentiality. A lawyer’s professional indemnity insurance 
normally applies to work that is completed pursuant to a retainer.
8
 A lawyer cannot accept a 
retainer if it conflicts with his or her duties to other current or former clients or his or her own 
interests.
9
 If a lawyer acts in litigation without a proper retainer, then the lawyer may have to 




On social media, people may ask a lawyer legal questions. If the lawyer answers the 
questions, this can create an unintended retainer.
11
 Even if the lawyer answers someone’s 
legal question on social media in general terms, a client may still assume that a retainer was 
created by the lawyer’s mere answering of the question.  
 
If a lawyer provides general legal advice to a client on social media, it is important that in 
addition to answering the question, the lawyer clearly states that he or she does not intend to 
create a retainer.
12
 Even better, if the lawyer does not intend to create a retainer when a client 
requests legal advice on social media, the lawyer should not post any legal response. This is 
particularly important because the lawyer’s insurance may not cover the lawyer if the lawyer 
gives advice without a retainer in place.  
 
A potential client may also post a question on a lawyer’s social media page that the lawyer 
should not answer because he or she is not licensed to practise in the potential client’s 
jurisdiction.
13
 The lawyer may answer the question because he or she does not believe that a 
retainer was created or the lawyer may not have considered the repercussions of giving legal 
advice to a client in a jurisdiction where he or she is not licensed to practise. 
                                                             
8
 Gino Dal Pont, ‘Social Networking Sites Can Prove Ethically Dangerous’ (2011) 49(5) Law Society Journal 46, 
46. 
9 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (at June 2011) rr 10.1, 11.1.  
10 AW & LM Forrest Pty Ltd v Beamish (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Equity Division, Young 
J, 27 August 1998) 14.   
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 ISBA Legal Ethics Committee, ‘Need to Know: Legal Ethics Involved in Online Social Media and Networking: 




A retainer may exist on social media between a lawyer and a client, but the lawyer and client 
may have different ideas about the scope of the retainer because of the brevity of their social 
media exchanges.  
 
If a lawyer answers another person’s question on social media and the lawyer does not take 
full instructions, the lawyer may not have the knowledge to properly advise the client. As a 
consequence, the lawyer may unintentionally provide inaccurate legal advice. A lawyer who 




A lawyer may properly advise a client pursuant to a proper retainer on social media, but 
because the advice is given publicly, other people who are not the lawyer’s clients may read 
the advice and decide that it applies to them when it does not.
15
 These other people may then 
face a problem if they implement legal advice that does not apply to them. 
 
A lawyer may be in a position of conflict because he or she is unintentionally in a retainer 




A disclaimer may assist lawyers in the above situations involving unintended retainers. This 
may help lawyers to avoid being held accountable and prevent people from taking advice that 
was not meant for them. The disclaimer should clearly communicate to social media users 
that the lawyer does not intend to provide legal advice on social media.
17
 It should also state 
that the information posted should not be used as legal advice.
18
 Thus if a lawyer provides 
legal advice on social media, their disclaimer can state that the advice is not intended to be 
legal advice or that the advice is for a certain jurisdiction only.
19
 Such a disclaimer could also 
                                                             
14 David Day et al, ‘Your Presence in the E-World Guidelines for Ethical Marketing Practices Using New 
Information Technologies’ (Guidelines, Canadian Bar Association, August 2009) 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/ethicsguidelines-eng.pdf>. 
15 Law Institute of Victoria, ‘Guidelines on the Ethical Use of Social Media’ (29 November 2012) 
<http://www.liv.asn.au/PDF/For-Lawyers/Ethics/2012Guidelines-on-the-Ethical-Use-of-Social-Media.aspx>. 
16 Day et al, above n 14.  
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 Law Society of Upper Canada, ‘Professional Responsibilities When Using Technology’ (Practice Management  
Topics, 2013) [6] <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/ProfessionalResponsibilitiesWhenUsingTechnology/>; Office of the 




 Michael E Lackey Jr and Joseph P Minta, ‘Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweeting, 
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increase the chances that professional indemnity insurance would cover the lawyer in the 
event that the client sues the lawyer.  
 
Lawyers’ Duty to the Court 
 
A lawyer has a duty to the court that is ‘paramount’,
20
 even if a client gives contrary 
instructions.
21
 ‘The essence of these duties is the requirement for lawyers (within the context 
of the adversarial system) to act professionally, with scrupulous fairness and integrity and to 
aid the court in promoting the cause of justice’.
22
 Part of this duty is that lawyers must not 





It is possible for lawyers to breach their duty to the court while using social media 
inappropriately. Lawyers may write negative comments about judicial officers or other 
lawyers on social media.
24
 For example, a prosecutor in San Francisco blogged that opposing 
counsel was ‘chicken’ because she requested a continuance.
25
 The presiding judge called the 
prosecutor’s comments ‘juvenile, obnoxious and unprofessional.’
26
 They may also comment 
on the merits of their cases on social media. The likelihood of lawyers doing so is increased 




While in the past lawyers who commented about the merits of a case in public could reach 
many people, it is unlikely that they could have easily reached as many people as they now 
can using social media. 
 
Lawyers should not post anything on social media that they would not be comfortable saying 
in front of a judge, because it is possible that a lawyer’s post on social media could be 
                                                             
20 Giannerelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 556 (Mason CJ); Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ 
Conduct Rules (at June 2011) r 3.1.  
21 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227. 
22 D A Ipp, ‘Lawyers’ Duties to the Court’ (2012) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63, 65. 
23 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (at June 2011) r 28. 
24
 Law Institute of Victoria, above n 15, [1]. 
25
 Gina Slaughter and John G Browning, ‘Feature: The Attorney and Social Media Social Networking Dos and 
Don’ts for Lawyers and Judges’ (2010) 73(2) Texas Bar Journal 192, 193.   
26
 Margaret M DiBianca, ‘Ethical Risks Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to Use) Social Media’ (2011) 
12 Delaware Law Review 179, 197. 
27 Law Institute of Victoria, above n 15, [1]. 
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brought to a judge’s attention, whether a lawyer intends this or not (e.g., a lawyer writes 
something that opposing counsel emails to a judge’s associate). 
 
Lawyers should act courteously and with integrity when using social media.
28
 Lawyers 
should also be careful because their occupation may add authority to comments that they 




Lawyers should be careful about the photos that they post on social media or that others tag 
them in. Some photos or videos could bring the legal profession into disrepute. An example 
of this would be a photo of a lawyer standing in front of a dartboard with a judge’s photo on 
it on a lawyer’s Facebook page.  
 
The Duty of Confidentiality 
 
Lawyers have a duty to keep information that their clients tell them confidential.
30
 This is 




A lawyer may not provide anyone outside their firm with any confidential information 
obtained from a client unless the client gives permission or the lawyer is required to provide 
the information by law.
32
 Commentary of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules state that 




(a) information of a former client that is directly related to a matter for an existing client, for 
example information belonging to an insurer concerning a potential claim, in 
circumstances where the solicitor is asked to accept instructions to act for the claimant; 
(b) information of relevance to a competitor, such as product pricing or business models; and 
                                                             
28 Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (NSW), above n 4. 
29 Ethics and Professional Issues Committee, ‘Guidelines for Practising Ethically with New Information 
Technologies’ (Information to supplement the Professional Code of Conduct, Canadian Bar Association, 
September 2008) <www.cba.org/cba/activities/pdf/guidelines-eng.pdf>. 
30 Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Camp [2010] WASC 188 (28 July 2010) [33] (Heenan, Blaxell and 
Beech JJ). 
31
 Legal Services Commissioner v Tampoe [2009] LPT 14 (Atkinson J), quoted in Kenneth Martin J, ‘Between the 
Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Conflict Between Duty to the Client and Duty to the Court’ (Speech delivered at 
the Bar Association of Queensland Annual Conference, 4 March 2012) 21. 
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 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (at June 2011) r 9.  
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October 2012) r 9. 
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(c) in some circumstances, particularly intimate knowledge of a client, its business, 
personality and strategies, for example in [the] Yunghanns case.  
 
Lawyers should approach confidentiality on social media differently than they would other 
electronic communication because of how quickly and effortlessly confidential information 
can be sent to millions of people. 
 
Social media provides several new ways for lawyers to breach the duty of confidentiality, 
often accidentally.
34
 If a lawyer writes on social media that he or she just met with a client, 
but does not name the client, people who are aware of whom the lawyer met with can learn 
about the existence of the lawyer-client relationship between the two.
35
 Lawyers can make 
other remarks about a client that may not mention the client’s name, but could allow others to 
deduce who the client is. 
 
Lawyers can breach the duty of confidentiality on social media by writing something 
confidential on other lawyers’ social media pages. In particular, lawyers may not think of the 
ethical problems that can result when they write on the social media page of another lawyer at 
their firm. The other lawyer’s privacy settings may permit people from outside their firm to 
see their social media posts.  
 
A lawyer may ‘vent’ about his or her job, clients or judges he or she appears before on social 
media, which can breach their duty of confidentiality.
36
 For example, In the Matter of 
Margrett A. Skinner in the United States, one of Skinner’s clients wrote negative comments 
about Skinner’s conduct as a lawyer on a few websites.
37
 Skinner retaliated by writing 
confidential information about the client on blogs.
38
 Staff of the State Bar of Georgia 




                                                             
34 Steven C Bennett, ‘Ethics of Lawyer Social Networking’ (2009) 73(1) Albany Law Review 113, 118. 
35 D Bruce, ‘The Attorney and Social Media Ethically Navigating the Social Media Landscape’ (2010) 73 Texas 
Bar Journal 196, 200. 
36
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Create Need for Law Firm Policies’ (2011) 47 Arizona Attorney 32, 36. 
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39 Ibid 1.  
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While there have been lawyers who have vented inappropriately about their jobs and clients 
for as long as the profession has existed, the ability of social media to reach so many people 
risks making the situation arguably worse than in previous contexts. While lawyers’ duty of 
confidentiality is well known, lawyers may not think about this duty when using social 
media. 
 
Some social media sites allow the user to import information, such as contacts, from his or 
her existing email accounts. While doing so, a lawyer may accidentally make information 
public about his or her clients or witnesses. A lawyer who posts photographs on social media 
may thereby reveal confidential information from one of their matters.
40
 For example, in 
Florida, the family of an accused brought leopard-print underwear to court for the accused to 
wear.
41
 The accused’s lawyer photographed the underwear and posted the photograph on her 
Facebook page with a caption.
42
 Someone who saw the photograph on Facebook informed 
the judge, who declared a mistrial.
43





It is important that all lawyers have a strategy to ensure that information on their computers is 
secure. If a lawyer’s social media site is hacked, confidential information may be taken.  
 
Lawyers should think critically about the risks of a specific type of technology prior to 
sharing confidential information on it.
45
 A cookie cutter approach to client confidentiality on 
social media may not be appropriate because new types of technology emerge all the time. 
Existing social media also significantly change often.  
 
Lawyers who are debating whether or not to post material on social media because it may be 
confidential should think about whether it falls into the categories of confidential information 
listed above.  
 
                                                             
40 Lackey Jr and Minta, above n 19, 155.  
41 David Ovalle, ‘Lawyer’s Facebook Photo Causes Mistrial in Miami-Dade Murder Case’, The Miami Herald 
(online), 9 September 2012 
<http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/12/2999630/lawyers-facebook-photo-causes.html>. 
42
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43
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Social media has had a major impact on how lawyers work,
46
 and it is important that lawyers 
understand how to use it.
47
 Lawyers should not forget to apply common sense when they use 
social media.
48
 Lawyers should not use social media to contact another lawyer’s client. If 
another lawyer’s client tries to become a lawyer’s friend on social media, the lawyer should 
reject his or her request.
49
 Lawyers should ensure that any client communications that they 




Lawyers should ensure that staff in their offices, besides lawyers, also read through these 
ethical guidelines. Non-lawyer staff may breach these guidelines in the same way as a lawyer. 
If a lawyer is in doubt about an ethical issue involving social media, he or she should speak to 
another lawyer at his or her law firm or call his or her State’s legal regulatory body.  
  
                                                             
46 Steve Mark, Tahlia Gordon and Rita Shackel, ‘Regulation of Legal Services in the E-World: A Need to Short 
Circuit Hot Spots in Ethics and Novel Practices?’ (Working Paper Part 1, Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner, October 2011) 4 
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47 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, ‘Guideline on Ethics and the New Technology’ (Guidelines, Law 
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Family Court of Australia: 
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By submitting the questionnaire I agree to the following. I have read the information letter 
enclosed about the nature and scope of this questionnaire. Any questions I have about the 
research process have been answered to my satisfaction. I give my consent for the results to 
be used in the research. I am aware that this survey is anonymous and that no personal details 
are being collected or used, though the researcher will state the name of the relevant court 
and the position of the person who provided information to her in her thesis or other scholarly 
work. I know that I may change my mind, withdraw my consent, stop participating, and 
withdraw my data within two weeks of submitting the questionnaire. My responses are 
representative of the court wherein I am employed.  
 
I understand that the findings of this study may be published and that no information which 




 Does your court use social media webpages to inform the public about the court’s 
activities (i.e. Facebook, Twitter)? (yes/no) 
 If yes, please provide a link to all of the social media webpages. 
 If yes, please describe the activities of your court on social media webpages (i.e. has a 
Facebook page, has a Twitter account). 
 If yes, what is the title of the person responsible in your court for maintaining the 
social media webpages (i.e. a public information officer)? 
 Is yes, please describe approximately how often new information is added onto your 
court’s social media webpages. 
 If yes, why has your court decided to use social media? 
 If yes, has your court received any benefits from using social media? (yes/no) 
 If yes, what are the benefits that your court has received? 
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 If no, please provide a reason if you can. 
 If no, please state whether your court is considering implementing social media 











I invite you to participate in a research study looking at whether courts in Australia, Canada, 
the United Kingdom and the United States use social media to engage the public. Social 
media are online communities wherein people can communicate by providing text, photos 
and video. Social media makes information instantly available to a wide audience. Some 
courts use social media to encourage the public to become more interested in legal issues. 
 
This study is part of one chapter of my PhD Degree in law, supervised by Professor Neil 
McLeod in the School of Law at Murdoch University. 
 
Nature and Purpose of the Study 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether courts use social media and if not, whether 
they intend to in the future. The study will also produce recommendations regarding social 
media use by courts.  
 
If you consent to take part in this research study, it is important that you understand the 
purpose of the study and the task you will be asked to complete. Please make sure that you 
ask any questions you may have, and that all your questions have been answered to your 
satisfaction before you agree to participate.  
 
You should be aware that this survey is anonymous and no personal details are being 
collected or used, though I will state the name of the relevant court and the position of the 




What the Study Will Involve 
 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete the following task: 
 
 Complete one questionnaire that asks about your court’s social media use.  
 The questionnaire is attached to this email. 
 It is estimated that the questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Please note that a document describing your consent to this study is enclosed with this email. 
If you do not respond by informing me whether or not you will participate in the survey, I 
may telephone you to confirm that you received this email and the questionnaire. 
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal from the Study 
 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may withdraw within two weeks of 
submitting the questionnaire without discrimination or prejudice. 
 
If you withdraw within two weeks of submitting the questionnaire, all information you have 
provided will be destroyed.  
 
Benefits of the Study 
 
After I complete this section of my PhD, I will share with you the information that I learn 
about what the target countries are doing regarding this issue. This may help inform your 




There are no specific risks anticipated with participation in this study. 
 
If you have any questions about this project please feel free to contact either myself, Marilyn 
Krawitz, marilyn.krawitz@nd.edu.au (+61 0403864029), or my supervisor Professor 
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McLeod, N.McLeod@murdoch.edu.au on ph. +61 8 9360 2981. Professor McLeod and I are 
happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have about this study.  
 
Once I have analysed the information from this study I will email you a summary of my 
findings. You can expect to receive this feedback in three to six months.  
 
If you are willing to consent to participation in this study, please complete the attached 
questionnaire and return it via email.  
 









This study has been approved by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval 
2013/014).  If you have any reservation or complaint about the ethical conduct of this research, and wish 
to talk with an independent person, you may contact Murdoch University’s Research Ethics Office (Tel. 
+61 8 9360 6677) or e-mail ethics@murdoch.edu.au). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence 






All Responses to the Survey 
 




Q. Does your court use social media webpages to inform the public about the court’s 
activities (i.e. Facebook, Twitter)? 
(yes/no) 
Family Court: Yes, but only a Twitter account. 
Federal Court: The Federal Court does not use social media such as Twitter and Facebook 
at this stage. However, we do take an active interest in its development and are part of a 
working group in Victoria — consisting of other courts, tribunal and government agencies — 
looking at this issue. 
NSW Supreme Court: It does not currently engage in social media activities. 
NT Supreme Court: No. 
SA Courts: No.  
VIC Children’s Court: No.  
VIC Magistrates’ Court: Yes. 
VIC Supreme Court: Yes. 
WA Supreme Court: No. 
 
Q. If yes, please provide a link to all of the social media webpages. 
Family Court: The Twitter handle is: @FamilyCourtAU 
VIC Magistrates’ Court: https://twitter.com/magcourtvic 
VIC Supreme Court: https://twitter.com/SCVSupremeCourt  
http://www.youtube.com/user/SupremeCourtVictoria?feature=guide 
 
Q. If yes, please describe the activities of your court on social media webpages (i.e. has a 
Facebook page, has a Twitter account). 
Family Court: Only Twitter and there are no plans to become involved on Facebook. 
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VIC Magistrates’ Court: The Court has a Twitter account, which is used to connect with 
court users and the wider community. We regularly provide information about new 
magistrates, changes to legislation, changes to court process and new practice directions, as 
well as details of upcoming and past community engagement activities.  
At this stage, the only social media platform used by the Court is Twitter.  
VIC Supreme Court: Twitter is used predominantly as a signpost to take followers to 
judgments and sentences on the court’s website or Austlii. Twitter is also used regularly to 
publicise court decisions, announcements and events. Twitter is followed to monitor news 
reports and court reporting. 
The court has established a YouTube channel, currently containing two in-house videos of 
significant reform announcements.  
 
Q. If yes, what is the title of the person responsible in your court for maintaining the social 
media webpages (i.e., a public information officer)? 
Family Court: There are three staff members responsible for sending and authorising the 
tweets which is beneficial for a number of reasons: 1) to ensure that it is a ‘business-wide’ 
approach and doesn’t focus on one aspect of court business (e.g., it is not just for media 
interest): 2) to spread the responsibility and to encourage broader ownership of the account 
and 3) to maintain consistency in the number and frequency of tweets, should the staff 
members be on leave.  
The three staff members are from different areas of the court: Media Manager — tweets 
information on media reports or interviews, media releases, information from the Chief 
Justice and ceremonial sittings. 
Manager National Enquiry Centre — tweets practical information such as registry closures, 
updates on the Court’s portal and new judgments 
Communications Manager — tweets information that has been updated on the website such 
as new publications, practice directions, fee updates. 
VIC Magistrates’ Court: There are two staff members responsible for the Court’s Twitter 
account, the Manager, Magistrates’ Support Services and the Court Advice Officer 
(Operations) 




Q. If yes, please describe approximately how often new information is added onto your 
court’s social media webpages. 
Family Court: We are averaging 3–4 tweets per week. From commencement on 15 October 
2012 to 8 August 2013, the court had sent 139 tweets and it has 579 followers.  
VIC Magistrates’ Court: The Court aims to regularly post new information, with this 
occurring daily or weekly depending on the number of reportable items. 
VIC Supreme Court: Twitter is very much driven by court business and activity. Tweets are 
posted regularly, but not necessarily daily. Tweets are limited to factual information, without 
comment or personal views. 
 
Q. If yes, why has your court decided to use social media? 
Family Court: To provide information direct to our various audiences by pushing it through 
new channels to allow urgent information such as an outage at a registry to be immediately 
pushed out to followers who could then further expand the audience by re-tweeting. 
To have an avenue to release critical information or message directly to the public without 
having to rely on traditional forms of media which can at times, skew the message that the 
Court is attempting to convey. 
VIC Magistrates’ Court: With the support of the former Chief Magistrate, the Court 
decided to use social media as an additional way to inform court users and the community of 
the Court’s activities as well as keeping them up to date with legislative reforms and any 
changes to court processes and fees. It is a great tool for keeping in touch with our users, and 
they can contact us using this forum. 
VIC Supreme Court: A Twitter account was established initially to monitor court reporting, 
but also in recognition of the fast emerging trend of ‘instant’ media being used and adopted 
by community members who did not necessarily follow traditional media. During times of 
budget restraints, Twitter provides a free and easy-to-use social media platform. A YouTube 
channel was established as a platform to host our own video productions, as an educational 
tool on some aspects of Court business. 
 
Q. If yes, has your court received any benefits from using social media? (yes/no) 
Family Court: Yes. 
VIC Magistrates’ Court: Yes. 




Q. If yes, what are the benefits that your court has received? 
Family Court: Many benefits were achieved with the introduction of a Twitter account and 
the objectives for commencing the account as listed above, have been achieved. The Court 
initially commenced the account as a pilot to determine whether it was a viable and 
worthwhile form of communication, and without significant risk. Following the six-month 
pilot, the Court undertook a review and it was determined that there were many benefits and 
that the account should continue. The review included stakeholder feedback which was quite 
positive. There had been concerns, given the sensitive nature of the Court’s jurisdiction, that 
the account would be at risk of being used inappropriately by disgruntled members of the 
public. This has not been the case and as most of the followers are lawyers or related to the 
law, a professional tone has been set.  
The other benefit is that there is minimal/no cost associated apart from the time of personnel.  
VIC Magistrates’ Court: The Court has received great benefit from establishing the use of 
social media. It has given us the opportunity to effectively connect with members of the 
public, who we may not have previously engaged with, and the public are easily made aware 
of the Court’s community engagement activities and recruitment opportunities. The use of 
social media has also provided the Court with another way of collaborating with other 
Victorian Courts by participating in the Courts’ Social Media Group. 
VIC Supreme Court: Increased awareness, via Twitter. Disseminating a message in a timely 
fashion, having it retweeted to increased followers. Court tweets provide credibility, before or 
after media tweets on Court activity, being the authoritative primary source. Followers 
receive information that a sentence or judgment has been handed down in a more timely 
manner and can go to the full text sooner instead of relying upon traditional media to tell 
them about a case. 
Recognition among court peers as a progressive jurisdiction setting the benchmarks. The 
Supreme Court of Victoria was the first court in Australia to establish an active Twitter 
account two years ago. 
 
Q. If no, please provide a reason if you can. 
NSW Supreme Court: Until now, there has been no official consideration given to the need 
for the Court to use social media and no submissions made to the Court on the issue. 
However, there has been some informal discussion within the Court about social media 
engagement and contact made with other jurisdictions both here and overseas to ascertain 
what is done in other places. 
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SA Courts: There are insufficient resources to examine social media and potential benefits 
from adopting it. Nevertheless, there is a working party consisting of the Former Chief 
Justice, the Honourable John Doyle AC QC, and other judges to examine the in-court use of 
live text-based forms of communication.  
There is currently a Facebook page for the Hon John Doyle AC QC, which he did not set up 
himself.  
The Court does not have the resources to dedicate to a Facebook page. 
There may be some benefit for the Courts Education Manager to engage with school students 
for civics education and legal studies through Facebook. 
VIC Children’s Court: Court officials publish very few written decisions and are concerned 
that there would not be enough information to tweet about. They do not publish daily lists 
online due to the legislative restriction on publication of identifying details relating to people 
involved in cases before the court. Resources may also be an issue. 
WA Supreme Court: We are not using social media webpages. We did look at it carefully, 
but decided not to use it, mainly due to resourcing and the practical issues of constant 
maintenance of the sites. 
 
Q. If no, please state whether your court is considering implementing social media activities 
in the future. 
NSW Supreme Court: The Court is currently considering the use of social media, 
particularly Facebook and Twitter, to communicate directly with the community, beyond its 
static website. 
NT Supreme Court: The Judges of the Northern Territory of the Supreme Court are 
currently assessing the value of social media and if proceeded with will need to consider any 
pitfalls, develop supporting policies and any resourcing implications. 
VIC Children’s Court: Court officials are open to using social media — they just need to be 
convinced that there’s a good reason to start using social media. 
 
Canada, USA and UK Courts 
 
Q. Does your court use social media webpages to inform the public about the court’s 
activities (i.e. Facebook, Twitter)? (yes/no) 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench: No. 
British Colombia Court of Appeal: No. 
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Nova Scotia Courts: Yes.  
Saskatchewan Courts: Yes.  
Massachusetts Court System: The Massachusetts Court System does not currently use 
social media as a public communications tool, but a social media plan will be developed in 
the near future. 
United Kingdom
1
: No. The courts in the UK do not have the time or resources to 
communicate in such a fashion. 
 
Q. If yes, please provide a link to all of the social media webpages. 
Nova Scotia Courts: https://twitter.com/CourtsNS_News; 
https://twitter.com/CourtsNS_Notice; https://twitter.com/CourtsNS_NSCA;  
https://twitter.com/CourtsNS_NSSC; https://twitter.com/CourtsNS_NSPC; 
https://twitter.com/CourtsNS_NSSM. 
Saskatchewan Courts: Twitter: https://twitter.com/SKCourts; 
YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/channel/UC192QXfF7WP3ktJvIIB304g?feature=watch. 
 
Q. If yes, please describe the activities of your court on social media webpages (i.e., has a 
Facebook page, has a Twitter account). 
Nova Scotia Courts: The Courts of Nova Scotia use their Twitter accounts to Tweet news 
items about the Court, notices for the legal profession, and links to decisions of the Courts as 
they are released (daily). The Twitter accounts are set up as a one-way (outward) 
communications tool. The Courts do not get tweets in return. 
Saskatchewan Courts: The Courts have a Twitter page and a YouTube page. 
 
Q. If yes, what is the title of the person responsible in your court for maintaining the social 
media webpages (i.e. a public information officer)? 
Nova Scotia Courts: There are two; The Manager of Publications (Decisions); and The 
Director of Communications. 
Saskatchewan Courts: Courts Communication Officer. 
 
                                                             
1 A member of Her Majesty’s Tribunals Service Performance Analysis, Reporting Team completed the survey. 
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Q. If yes, please describe approximately how often new information is added onto your 
court’s social media webpages. 
Nova Scotia Courts: The Manager of Publications (Decisions) sends out tweets with links to 
released decisions every day. The Communications Director sends out tweets about News 
and Notices twice a month for each, on average. 
Saskatchewan Courts: Twitter: 3–4 times a week; YouTube: rarely. 
 
Q. If yes, why has your court decided to use social media? 
Nova Scotia Courts: We used to have an RSS Feed service on the Courts’ website. It did not 
get many subscribers. We have hundreds of subscribers for our Twitter accounts. 
Saskatchewan Courts: To make information more accessible to users by placing it where 
they can access it easily. 
 
Q. If yes, has your court received any benefits from using social media? (yes/no) 
Nova Scotia Courts: Yes. 
Saskatchewan Courts: Too soon to determine. The Twitter and YouTube accounts were 
launched in March 2013. 
 
Q. If yes, what are the benefits that your court received? 
Nova Scotia Courts: We have many more subscribers to the Twitter service than we had for 
the RSS service. The Twitter service also appears to be drawing more people to the website 
where, we assume, they discover the other content available to them on the website. 
 
Q. If no, please provide a reason if you can. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench: The reason we do not is because we do not have the staff 
needed to administer social media interaction. 
British Colombia Court of Appeal: The cost of providing a social media portal is beyond 
the Court’s budget. The Court, as an institution, ‘pushes’ information out into the public and 
does not engage in a dialogue. In fact, it often cannot engage in a dialogue about its decisions. 
 
Q. If no, please state whether your court is considering implementing social media activities 
in the future. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench: Although the above assessment effectively closes the 
door, if we did have the resources, we would need to engage in an analysis to assess the 
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benefits and risks of engaging the public in social media. Judicial expression is subject to 
many limitations based on principles such as impartiality, independence and fairness. These 
constraints may not conform to the nature and purpose of social media. 
British Colombia Court of Appeal: The Court will continue to look at the advantages and 
disadvantages of using social media in the future. 
United Kingdom: No. Lack of resources. In the current UK economic climate of austerity 













This policy sets out Australian accredited journalists’ permitted and prohibited uses of 
electronic devices in all Australian courtrooms,
1
 except Family Courts.
2
 It is based on the 
following principles: 
 




b. Open justice must be maintained;4 and 
c. Permitting accredited media to use electronic devices in the courtroom assists the 




Definitions for the Policy 
 




b. ‘Courtroom’ means a room in which a hearing occurs;7 
c. ‘Electronic device’ means ‘any device capable of transmitting and/or recording data 
or audio, including smartphones, cellular phones, computers, laptops, tablets, 
notebooks, personal digital assistants, or other similar devices’;
8
 and 
                                                             




 Mississippi Rules for Electronic and Photographic Coverage of Judicial Proceedings, Rule 3(c) (2003). 
3 Courts of Saskatchewan, Twitter and Other Text-Based Forms of Media Communication from Saskatchewan 
Courtrooms (2010) 1 <http://www.sasklawcourts.ca/docs/Twitter_Protocol_2012.pdf>. 
4 Ibid.  
5
 Judiciary of England and Wales, Practice Guidance: The Use of Live Text-Based Forms of Communication 
(including Twitter) from Court for the Purpose of Fair and Accurate Reporting (14 December 2011) 2 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/guidance/2011/courtreporting>. 
6
 Provincial Court of British Columbia, above n 1, 1.  
7
 Ibid.   
8 Ibid.  
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Use of Electronic Devices in the Courtroom 
 
1. Accredited journalists may use electronic devices in courtrooms to send and receive 
messages and use social media, without seeking permission,
10
 except as follows: 
a. where the accredited journalist causes any interference with court technology;11 









Judicial Officer’s Discretion 
 
2. Notwithstanding this policy, the presiding judicial officer(s) may use his/her/their 
discretion to decide whether accredited journalists may use electronic devices in 
his/her/their courtroom.
14
 If the presiding judicial officer(s) decide(s) to use 
his/her/their discretion not to permit social media in the courtroom, he/she/they must 
provide express reasons.  
 
3. It is possible to appeal a judicial officer’s decision. [Courts should explain how to 
appeal a judicial officer’s decision here.] 
 
                                                             
9
 Ibid.  
10 Ibid 2.  





 Canadian Centre for Court Technology, Guidelines Regarding the Use of Electronic Communication Devices in 
Court Proceedings (November 2012) 2  
<https://modern-courts.ca/documentation/Use%20of%20Electronic%20Communication%20Devices%20in 
%20Court%20Proceedings.pdf>. 












5. An accredited journalist who does not follow this policy may be subject to one or 
more of the following penalties:
16
 
a. He or she may be instructed to turn off his or her electronic device or provide it to 
court staff while he or she is in the courtroom;
17
 
b. He or she may be instructed to leave the courtroom;18 
c. He or she may forfeit his or her media accreditation;19 
d. He or she may be prosecuted for contempt of court;20 
e. He or she may be prosecuted for breaching a suppression order;21 or 
f. Any other order that the relevant judicial officer thinks fit.22 
 
  
                                                             
15 Canadian Centre for Court Technology, above n 13, 2.  
16
 Provincial Court of British Columbia, above n 1, 3.  
17 Court of Queens Bench of Alberta, above n 11, 2.  
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Provincial Court of British Columbia, above n 1, 3.  
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid.  
22
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